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ANSWER  
TO  
SIR HENRY CLINTON'S  
NARRATIVE  
OF THE  
CAMPAIGN IN 1781  
IN  
NORTH AMERICA.

BY  
EARL CORNWALLIS.



26652

PHILADELPHIA:  
JOHN CAMPBELL,  
MDCCCLXVI.

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A N  
A N S W E R  
TO THAT PART OF THE  
N A R R A T I V E  
O F  
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  
SIR HENRY CLINTON, K. B.  
Which relates to the Conduct of  
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  
EARL CORNWALLIS,  
DURING THE  
CAMPAIGN IN NORTH-AMERICA,  
IN THE YEAR 1781.  
BY EARL CORNWALLIS.

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Printed for J. DEBRET T, (Successor to Mr. ALMON,)  
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M.DCC.LXXXIII.





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# C O N T E N T S.

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Between General Sir HENRY CLINTON, K. B. Com-  
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C O R R E-

T H E

## INTRODUCTION.

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THE feelings, which dictate this publication, have originated from the contents of a Narrative, signed by Sir Henry Clinton, late Commander in Chief in America. In which Narrative, events are attributed to my conduct during the campaign of 1781, which, I trust, it will appear, were by no means the unavoidable consequences of any part of it.

The materials, hitherto produced, cannot be deemed complete, either in form or substance. There were many deficiencies in the papers laid before the House of Lords; in particular, four letters, dated July the 24th, August the 16th, 20th, and 22d, from me to Sir Henry Clinton, were wanting; one of which contained my reasons at large for undertaking the

A

march

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march into Virginia: This omission, as the Secretary of State informed the House, was owing to their not having been transmitted by the Commander in Chief. Four other letters (three of them dated the 2d, 27th, and 30th of August, and one the 14th, 15th, and 18th of October) from Sir Henry Clinton to me, were read to the Lords, according to the order of their dates; although they were only delivered to me, by the Secretary to the Commander in Chief, in the latter end of November, at New-York, above a month after my surrender; and consequently, their contents could not influence my conduct in any manner.

I own I am perfectly aware of the impropriety of publishing official letters for private reasons; but, since the measures with respect to America have now undergone a total change, I hope, I shall in some degree stand excused for producing the whole correspondence, in my possession, relative to the principal transactions of that campaign; as it is the most candid and complete mode, in my power, of submitting them to the public consideration.

The perusal of this Correspondence will, I think, render not only the military, but every other reader a competent judge of the propriety



## INTRODUCTION.      iii

priety of my conduct, either when I acted under positive orders, pressing contingencies, or discretionary powers.

It is foreign to the present purpose, and I shall therefore not endeavour to enumerate the many difficulties, which I had to struggle with, in my command of the Southern district, previous to the march into North Carolina, in the beginning of the year 1781. This measure was thought expedient not only by me, but by the Commander in Chief: I was principally induced to decide in favour of its expediency from a clear conviction, that the men and treasures of Britain would be lavished in vain upon the American war, without the most active exertions of the troops allotted for that service; and, that, while the enemy could draw their supplies from North Carolina and Virginia, the defence of the frontier of South Carolina, even against an inferior army, would be from its extent, the nature of the climate, and the disposition of the inhabitants, utterly impracticable. The many untoward circumstances, which occurred during the four months succeeding the complete victory of Camden, had entirely confirmed me in this opinion. Our hopes of success, in offensive operations, were

were not founded only upon the efforts of the corps under my immediate command, which did not much exceed three thousand men; but principally, upon the most positive assurances, given by apparently credible deputies and emissaries, that, upon the appearance of a British army in North Carolina, a great body of the inhabitants were ready to join and co-operate with it, in endeavouring to restore his Majesty's Government.

The disaster of the 17th of January cannot be imputed to any defect in my conduct, as the detachment was certainly superior to the force against which it was sent, and put under the command of an officer of experience and tried abilities. This misfortune, however, did not appear irretrievable; and to have abandoned, without absolute necessity, the plan of the campaign, would have been ruinous and disgraceful: ruinous, by engaging us in a defensive system, the impracticability of which I have already stated; and disgraceful, because the reasons for the undertaking still existed in their full strength, the public faith was pledged to our friends in North Carolina, and I believed my remaining force to be superior to that under the command of General Greene.

That

## INTRODUCTION. v

That this opinion was well founded, the precipitate retreat of that General from North Carolina, and our victory at Guildford, after his return with Virginia reinforcements, are sufficient proofs.

The unexpected failure of our friends rendered the victory of Guildford of little value. I know that it has been asserted or insinuated that they were not sufficiently tried upon this occasion: But can any dispassionate person believe, that I did not give every encouragement to people of all descriptions to join and assist us, when my own reputation, the safety of the army, and the interests of my country, were so deeply concerned in that junction and assistance? All inducements in my power were made use of without material effect; and every man in the army must have been convinced, that the accounts of our emissaries had greatly exaggerated the number of those who professed friendship for us, as they must have observed, that a very inconsiderable part of them could be prevailed upon to remain with us, or to exert themselves in any form whatever.

This disappointment, and the wants and distresses of the army, compelled me to move to Cross-creek; but meeting there with no material

terial part of the promised assistance and supplies, I was obliged to continue my march to Wilmington, where hospitals and stores were ready for us. Of this move I sent information by several expresses to Lord Rawdon, but unfortunately they all failed. My intention then was, as soon as I should have equipped my own corps, and received a part of the expected reinforcement from Ireland, to return to the upper country; in hopes of giving some protection to South Carolina, and of preserving the health of the troops, until new measures could be concerted with the Commander in Chief.

The march of General Greene into South Carolina, and Lord Rawdon's danger, made my situation very critical. Having heard of the arrival of a packet from Europe, without any certain accounts of the failing of the reinforcement, I thought it too hazardous to remain inactive; and, as it was impossible to receive in time any orders or opinions from Sir Henry Clinton to direct me, it became my duty to act from my own judgment and experience; I therefore upon mature deliberation, decided to march into Virginia, as the safest and most effectual means of employing the small corps, under my command, in contributing towards  
the

## INTRODUCTION. vii

the general success of the war. I came to this resolution principally for the following reasons,—I could not remain at Wilmington, lest General Greene should succeed against Lord Rawdon, and, by returning to North Carolina, have it in his power to cut off every means of saving my small corps, except that disgraceful one of an embarkation, with the loss of the cavalry, and every horse in the army: From the shortness of Lord Rawdon's stock of provisions, and the great distance from Wilmington to Camden, it appeared impossible, that any direct move of mine could afford him the least prospect of relief: in the attempt, in case of a misfortune to him, the safety of my own corps might have been endangered; or if he extricated himself, the force in South Carolina, when assembled, was, in my opinion, sufficient to secure what was valuable to us, and capable of defence in that province. I was likewise influenced by having just received an account from Charles-town of the arrival of a frigate with dispatches from the Commander in Chief, the substance of which, then transmitted to me, was, that General Phillips had been detached to the Chesapeake, and put under my orders; which induced me to hope, that  
solid



viii      I N T R O D U C T I O N .

solid operations might be adopted in that quarter: and I was most firmly persuaded, that, until Virginia was reduced, we could not hold the more southern provinces; and that, after its reduction, they would fall without much resistance, and be retained without much difficulty.

With these sentiments, I joined General Phillips's corps at Peterburgh on the 20th of May, a few days after his death; but from his papers, and dispatches from the Commander in Chief, directed to him, which I received at that place on the 24th of May, I found there were other projects in contemplation, which to me were entirely new. The Commander in Chief having desired General Phillips to give his opinion concerning the scheme of operations in the Upper Chesapeake, and the design upon Philadelphia, I thought it my duty, as I was then in his place to offer mine: which was, that I could not see sufficient grounds for approving of either of these schemes; nor indeed could I bring myself to think any other plan, but the attempt to reduce Virginia, at that time either expedient or important. But I informed Sir Henry Clinton that I should repair to Williamsburgh about the time when  
I should

## INTRODUCTION. ix

I should probably receive his answer, in order to be in readiness to execute his commands; and that I should employ the intermediate space in destroying such of the enemy's stores and magazines, as might be within my reach.

Whoever reads the Correspondence will see, that, since Sir Henry Clinton had declared positively in his first, and in several subsequent dispatches, against the plan of reducing Virginia, no explicit alternative was left to me, between complying with the requisition (contained in his letters of the 11th and 15th of June) of such troops as I could spare from a healthy defensive station, or engaging in operations in the Upper Chesapeake: The choice of an healthy situation was controlled by other material considerations; for, whilst he stated in such strong terms the imminent danger of New York, or the important effects, which he expected from the expedition against Philadelphia, I did not think myself authorized to detain any part of the troops he so earnestly required; merely upon my opinion of the difference of the quality of the air at Williamsburgh, York, or Portsmouth; from the latter of which only, as it was already fortified, I could afford an immediate detachment. And

B

with

with respect to the operations in the Upper Chesapeake, it will be remarked, that, although that plan had been for some time under the consideration of the Commander in Chief, he did not seem inclined to take more share in the responsibility than barely to recommend it: and many reasons, but particularly my recent failure in a similar attempt, deterred me from undertaking it, without an explicit instruction. Accordingly, that I might be enabled to comply with those orders of the 11th and 15th of June, I passed James-river, (my remaining force being insufficient to fortify and maintain a post on the Williamsburgh Neck) and embarked the troops required with all possible dispatch. And it will be seen by the Correspondence, that the Commander in Chief's opinion of the indispensable necessity of an harbour for line of battle ships only appears in his letter of the 11th of July, after he had been acquainted, that the troops, intended for the expedition against Philadelphia, would be soon ready to sail.

Hampton-road was recommended by that order; but, as it was, upon examination, found totally unfit for the purpose desired, every person can judge, whether the order did not then,  
in

## INTRODUCTION. xi

in its spirit, become positive to occupy York and Gloucester; the only harbour in the Chesapeake, that I knew of then, or indeed that I have heard of since, in which line of battle ships can be received, and protected against a superior naval force; and, as the harbour was the indispensable object, I thought it unnecessary to enter into a description of the disadvantage of the ground, against a land attack, since there remained no other choice.

When the arrival of the French fleet, and the approach of General Washington, were known to Sir Henry Clinton, it will appear by the Correspondence, that his promises of relief in person were uniform: without giving me the smallest particle of discretionary power, different from holding the posts that I occupied. Every reader will therefore be competent to judge, whether, under these circumstances, and as I could not but suppose that the Commander in Chief spoke from a perfect knowledge of his own resources, and of the force of the enemy, it would have been justifiable in me either to abandon, by the evacuation of York, a considerable quantity of artillery, the ships of war, transports, provisions, stores, and hospitals, or, by venturing an action, without the  
most

most manifest advantage, to run the risk of precipitating the loss of them.

Although the Marquis de la Fayette advanced his light troops early in September to Williamsburgh, he did not take post there with his army till reinforced with the French troops from the West Indies, under the command of Brigadier de St. Simon. I could, at that time, after leaving some slight guards in the works, have marched out a little more than four thousand men, partly composed of troops unaccustomed to action. The enemy were in a strong position, and considerably superior in number, but I should have attacked them without hesitation, if I had thought myself at liberty, after a victory, to escape into the Carolinas, with the troops that were able to march. No other object appeared sufficient to justify this measure; for our labour would have been materially interrupted by an action, and even a victory, unless it had extended to the annihilation of the Marquis de la Fayette's corps, without considerable loss on our side (two events not to be expected) would not have enabled us to make a successful defence against the army then approaching, under the command of General Washington: But a defeat  
would

INTRODUCTION. xiii

would probably have been followed with the immediate loss of our post, which, until the end of September, was a in most defenceless state : and as I could never have proved, that I should not have been relieved, I should have been exposed to public execration, as a man, who, having reason to expect the early arrival of the Commander in Chief to supersede him in his command, had, in hopes of personal reputation from a victory, sacrificed the essential interest of his country. Far less could I have ventured an action without the most evident advantage, after the junction of General Washington ; a decision, which nothing could have justified, but a certainty that I could not be relieved : in that case, I should have fought before I was hemmed in by the enemy's works, believing a victory, over great disparity of numbers in the open field, to be possible ; but a successful defence, without relief, in such a post, and against such an attack, to be impossible.

My resolution at last, of attempting to escape with part of the army, could only have been dictated by despair. The enemy's immense train of battering artillery had now nearly reduced our fresh earthen works to ruins : The attacks were conducted with so much caution, that



that we had no opportunity of making any material impression upon them: The batteries of the second parallel, which I knew in a few hours would compel us to surrender at discretion, were nearly completed; and I had then lost all hopes of relief. If the sudden gale of wind had not prevented our passage of the river, Brigadier de Choisy, who lay with a small corps a few miles from Gloucester, would have been attacked at day-break by the greatest part of our force; after which, being without baggage, I should have gained the upper country by rapid marches, mounting my infantry, by collecting horses on the way, and leaving my intended route doubtful, until I was opposite to the fords of the great rivers; I then intended to have turned off to the northward, expecting that the enemy would principally take their measures to prevent my escape to the southward. The success of this attempt would, no doubt, have been precarious; and I cannot say that it would have been practicable to have reached New York; but, in our desperate situation, I thought it well deserved a trial.

I shall make no other remark upon the enumeration that is made of the troops under my orders, than that a great part of them were dispersed

## INTRODUCTION. xv

dispersed in garrisons, totally out of my reach, and that some regiments had hardly any existence, but in name. I am not in possession of the general returns of the southern district for the year 1781, but those of the corps under my immediate command, at different periods, are annexed to the Correspondence.

During that campaign, I reckoned among the many other embarrassments which I had to encounter, that, on some important occasions, it was impossible to communicate with, or to receive instructions from the Commander in Chief, in time to enable me to act according to his wishes: But, I trust, it will appear from the Correspondence now laid before the public, —that our failure in North Carolina was not occasioned by our want of force to protect the rising of our friends, but by their timidity, and unwillingness to take an active and useful part, —that the move to Wilmington was rendered necessary from the distresses of the troops, and the sufferings of the numerous sick and wounded,—that the march into Virginia was undertaken for urgent reasons, which could not admit of my waiting for the approbation of the Commander in Chief,—that I did not establish the station in Virginia, but only re-  
inforce

xvi      I N T R O D U C T I O N.

inforce it,—that I occupied the posts of York and Gloucester by order, and was induced to remain in them by the prospect of relief, uniformly held out to me by the Commander in Chief,—and, that, during the considerable interval between my arrival at Petersburg, and that of the French fleet in the Chesapeake, my corps was completely at the disposal of Sir Henry Clinton, either to be withdrawn, or employed in the Upper Chesapeake, or sent back to the Carolinas,—and consequently, that my conduct and opinions were not the causes of the catastrophe, which terminated the unfortunate campaign of 1781.

CORNWALLIS.

MANSFIELD-STREET,  
Feb. 10, 1783.

C O R R E -

# C O R R E S P O N D E N C E

B E T W E E N

Gen. Sir HENRY CLINTON, K. B.

C O M M A N D E R I N C H I E F,

A N D

Lieut. Gen. Earl CORNWALLIS.

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## P A R T I.

R E L A T I V E T O T H E C A M P A I G N I N  
N O R T H C A R O L I N A.

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## N U M B E R I.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated Camp  
on Turkey-Creek, Broad River, Jan. 18, 1781.*

S I R,

I N my letter of the 6th of this month, I had the honour to inform your Excellency, that I was ready to begin my march for North Carolina, having been delayed some days by a diversion made by the enemy towards Ninety-six. General Morgan still remained on the Pacolet; his corps, by the best ac-

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counts

counts I could get, consisted of about five hundred men, continental and Virginia state troops, and one hundred cavalry under Colonel Washington, and six or seven hundred militia: but that body is so fluctuating, that it is impossible to ascertain its number, within some hundreds, for three days following.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tarleton, with the legion and corps annexed to it, consisting of about three hundred cavalry and as many infantry, and the first battalion of the seventy-first regiment, and one three-pounder, had already passed the Broad River for the relief of Ninety-six. I therefore directed Lieutenant-Colonel Tarleton to march on the West of Broad River, to endeavour to strike a blow at General Morgan, and at all events to oblige him to repass the Broad River; I likewise ordered that he should take with him the seventh regiment and one three-pounder, which were marching to reinforce the garrison of Ninety-six, as long as he should think their services could be useful to him. The remainder of the army marched between the Broad River and Catawba.

As General Greene had quitted Mecklenburgh-county, and crossed the Pedee, I made not the least doubt that General Morgan would retire on our advancing. The progress of the army was greatly impeded by heavy rains, which swelled the rivers and creeks; yet Lieutenant-Colonel Tarleton conducted his march so well, and got so near to General Morgan who was retreating before him, as to make it  
dangerous

dangerous for him to pass Broad River, and came up with him at eight o'clock of the morning of the 17th instant. Every thing now bore the most promising aspect: the enemy were drawn up in an open wood, and, having been lately joined by some militia, were more numerous; but the different quality of the corps under Lieutenant-Colonel Tarleton's command, and his great superiority in cavalry, left him no room to doubt of the most brilliant success. The attack was begun by the first line of infantry, consisting of the seventh regiment, the infantry of the legion and corps of light-infantry annexed to it; a troop of cavalry was placed on each flank; the first battalion of the seventy-first, and the remainder of the cavalry, formed the reserve. The enemy's line soon gave way, and their militia quitted the field; but our troops having been thrown into some disorder by the pursuit, General Morgan's corps faced about and gave them an hearty fire: this unexpected event occasioned the utmost confusion in the first line; the first battalion of the seventy-first and the cavalry were successively ordered up; but neither the exertions, intreaties, or example, of Lieutenant-Colonel Tarleton, could prevent the panic from becoming general. The two three-pounders were taken, and I fear the colours of the seventh regiment shared the same fate. In justice to the detachment of the royal artillery, I must here observe, that no terror could induce them to abandon their guns, and they were all either killed or wounded in the defence



fence of them. Lieutenant-Colonel Tarleton with difficulty assembled fifty of his cavalry, who having had time to recollect themselves, and being animated by the bravery of the officer who had so often led them to victory, charged and repulsed Colonel Washington's horse, retook the baggage of the corps, and cut to pieces the detachment of the enemy who had taken possession of it; and, after destroying what they could not conveniently bring off, retired with the remainder unmolested to Hamilton's ford, near the mouth of Bullock's creek. The loss of our cavalry is inconsiderable; but I fear about four hundred of the infantry are either killed, wounded, or taken; I will transmit the particular account of the loss as soon as it can be ascertained.

It is impossible to foresee all the consequences that this unexpected and extraordinary event may produce; but your Excellency may be assured, that nothing but the most absolute necessity shall induce me to give up the important object of the winter's campaign.

I shall direct Lieutenant-Colonel Balfour to transmit a copy of this letter, by the first opportunity, to the Secretary of State.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

NUMBER

N U M B E R II.

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated  
New York, March 5th, 1781.*

[Received JUNE, 1781.]

MY LORD,

I WAS honoured with your Lordship's dispatches dated the 18th of November, the 3d, 4th, 6th, 7th, 22d, and 29th of December; and 3d, 6th, and 18th of January, by the Halifax sloop of war, on the 16th ultimo. And, by the Mercury packet, which will sail in a day or two for Europe, I propose to transmit copies of such of them to the Minister as may be necessary for his Majesty's information.

What your Lordship observes, in your letter of the 4th December, I am very sensible of; and am fully persuaded that no representation I can make will have any effect upon men lost to every sense of humanity.

I am sorry to say, my Lord, that I have the same reason to lament the want of safe conveyances for my dispatches, which your Lordship regrets in your letter of the 6th January, having had several prepared for your Lordship ever since the beginning of that month. And I am even now obliged to trust them by the precarious conveyance of a merchant vessel, as I have in vain applied for a ship of war for these two months past for the purpose.

I request your Lordship's forgiveness for the omission

fion I was guilty of, in not answering the paragraph of your letter of the 30th June, relative to Lieutenant-governor Graham. As there are now no Refugees in Georgia, and of course no occasion for such an office as that to which he was appointed; and as he is now in full possession of his property, and does not seem to wish for a continuance of the employment, it is very proper that it should cease—and but reasonable that Mr. Graham should be reimbursed for the sums he has advanced, as well as paid his salary of twenty shillings per day for himself and clerk, from the 3d of March to the period he ceased to act.

It gives me very great pleasure to learn from your Lordship, that the army under your command is now perfectly healthy, and in good order.

I am sorry the oat-ships met with an accident off Charles-town bar. It is a risk, in my opinion, which every fleet runs that anchors there. Surely it would have been better for them to have stood off, and on;—but of those sea matters I am, of course, not a competent judge.

I am glad to find that your Lordship intends to send the victuallers, and all such transports, to England, as are unfit for service; their speedy return being most earnestly desired. I would wish to have all such invalids, whose times of service do not entitle them to Chelsea, and though unfit for service in the field, may be able to do duty in garrison, sent here from time to time, that they may be placed in the  
garrison

garrison battalion, which will finally insure to them his Majesty's royal bounty.

As I understand the Chatham has brought out fifty thousand pounds in specie to Charles-town, your Lordship's difficulties with regard to money will have been removed. But I cannot say so much for ours.

Lord George Germain having informed me, "As Major Ross was of opinion that many of the prisoners in our hands in Carolina might be induced to serve on board the King's ships, or in privateers, or enlist in the regiments serving in the West Indies, or go as volunteers upon expeditions in that quarter, he had recommended to your Lordship to get rid of all you could in those several ways, or in any other your Lordship should think fit to be adopted;" it is unnecessary for me to add any thing upon that subject, but to say, that I leave them entirely to your Lordship's disposal.

I wish it had been possible to have procured the horses for General Vaughan; as I fear the troops may suffer from the drudgeries they were intended to perform.

I know not at present how it is possible, my Lord, to avoid the expence of quartering the troops at Charles-town, consistent with the terms of the capitulation; but I will endeavour to find some means of doing it, if it be practicable.

I am most exceedingly concerned, my Lord, at the unfortunate affair of the 17th January. From the  
account

account your Lordship gives me of it, I fear Morgan has been in very great force, that our first line has been too impetuous, and that the reserve has sustained the other too nearly, and probably in too loose order; and that the enemy has moved against them in that critical situation. I confess I dread the consequences; but my hope is, as it ever will be, in your Lordship's abilities and exertions.

I shall always be happy in paying every attention to your recommendations in filling up the vacancies in the thirty-third regiment, as I shall be constantly guided by your Lordship's wishes with respect to the promotions of your own regiment. I have already had an opportunity of fulfilling my intentions respecting Colonel Webster; but this is too unsafe a conveyance to trust the commission by.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

N U M B E R

N U M B E R   I I I.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated Camp  
near Wilmington, April 10, 1781.*

S I R,

I AM juſt informed that I have a chance of ſending a few lines to New York by the Amphitrite, but as it depends upon my being expeditious, I cannot attempt to give your Excellency a particular account of the winter's campaign, or the battle of Guildford. I have however the ſatisfaction of informing you, that our military operations were uniformly ſucceſſful; and the victory of Guildford, although one of the bloodieſt of this war, was very complete. The enemy gave themſelves out for nine or ten, and undoubtedly had ſeven, thouſand men in the field, upwards of two thouſand of which were eighteen-months men, or Continentals.

Our force was one thouſand three hundred ſixty infantry, rank and file, and about two hundred cavalry. General Greene retreated the night of the action to the Iron-works on Troubleſome Creek, eighteen miles from Guildford, leaving us four fix-pounders, being all the cannon he had in the field. The fatigue of the troops, and the great number of wounded, put it out of my power to purſue beyond the Reedy Fork, in the afternoon of the action; and the want of provisions and all kinds of neceſſaries

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for



for the soldiers, made it equally impossible to follow the blow next day. I, therefore, issued the enclosed proclamation; and, having remained two days on the field of battle, marched to Bell's-Mill on Deep-river, near part of the country where the greatest number of our friends were supposed to reside. Many of the inhabitants rode into camp, shook me by the hand, said they were glad to see us, and to hear that we had beat Greene, and then rode home again; for I could not get one hundred men in all the regulator's country to stay with us, even as militia.

With a third of my army sick and wounded, which I was obliged to carry in waggons or on horseback, the remainder without shoes and worn down with fatigue, I thought it was time to look for some place of rest and refitment; I, therefore, by easy marches, taking care to pass through all the settlements that had been described to me as most friendly, proceeded to Cross-Creek. On my arrival there, I found, to my great mortification, and contrary to all former accounts, that it was impossible to procure any considerable quantity of provisions, and that there was not four days forage within twenty miles. The navigation of Cape Fear, with the hopes of which I had been flattered, was totally impracticable, the distance from Wilmington by water being one hundred and fifty miles, the breadth of the river seldom exceeding one hundred yards, the banks  
generally

generally high, and the inhabitants on each side almost universally hostile. Under these circumstances I determined to move immediately to Wilmington. By this measure the Highlanders have not had so much time as the people of the upper country, to prove the sincerity of their former professions of friendship. But, though appearances are rather more favourable among them, I confess they are not equal to my expectations.

General Greene marched down as low as the mouth of Deep-River, where he remained four days ago; he never came within our reach after the action, nor has a shot been since fired, except at Ramsey's-Mill on Deep-River, where Colonel Malmedy, with about twenty of a gang of plunderers that are attached to him, galloped in among the centries and carried off three iagers.

I cannot sufficiently commend the behaviour of both officers and men under my command. They not only shewed the most persevering intrepidity in action, but underwent with cheerfulness such fatigues and hardships as have seldom been experienced by a British army, and justly merit every mark of favour and reward. The great assistance which I received from Generals Leslie and O'Hara, and Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, deserves my warmest acknowledgments and highest commendations.

I am now employed in disposing of the sick and wounded, and in procuring supplies of all kinds, to  
put

put the troops into a proper state to take the field. I am, likewise, impatiently looking out for the expected reinforcement from Europe, part of which will be indispensably necessary to enable me either to act offensively, or even to maintain myself in the upper parts of the country, where alone I can hope to preserve the troops from the fatal sickness which so nearly ruined the army last autumn.

I am very anxious to receive your Excellency's commands, being as yet totally in the dark as to the intended operations of the summer. I cannot help expressing my wishes that the Chesapeake may become the seat of war, even (if necessary) at the expence of abandoning New-York. Until Virginia is in a manner subdued, our hold of the Carolinas must be difficult, if not precarious. The rivers of Virginia are advantageous to an invading army, but North-Carolina is, of all the provinces in America, the most difficult to attack, (unless material assistance could be got from the inhabitants, the contrary of which I have sufficiently experienced) on account of its great extent, of the numberless rivers and creeks, and the total want of interior navigation.

In compliance with your Excellency's general directions, I shall dispatch my Aid-de-camp, Captain Brodrick, to England, with the particular accounts of the battle of Guildford, of the winter's campaign, and the present state of the province, copies of which

I shall

I shall have the honour of transmitting to your Excellency with my next dispatch.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

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N U M B E R   I V .

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated  
New-York, April 30, 1781.*

*[Received June, 1781.]*

MY LORD,

CAPTAIN Biggs, of his Majesty's ship Amphitrite, who arrived here the 22d, has delivered to me your Lordship's two letters from Wilmington, of the 10th instant, informing me of your having obtained a compleat victory over the rebel General Greene, near Guildford, on the 15th ult. on which occasion I beg leave, my Lord, to offer your Lordship my most hearty congratulations, and to request you will present my thanks to Major-General Leslie, Brigadier-general O'Hara, and Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, for the great assistance you received from them, and to the officers and men under your command, for their great exertions on the march through Carolina, and their persevering intrepidity in action.

The

The disparity of numbers between your Lordship's force and that of the enemy opposed to you, appears to be very great: and, I confess, I am at some loss to guess how your Lordship came to be reduced before the action to one thousand three hundred and sixty infantry, as, by the distribution sent to me in your letter of the 6th of January, I am to suppose it was your intention to take with you the regiments mentioned in the margin,† which (notwithstanding the loss of the seventy-first and legion, in the unfortunate affair of Cowpens) I should imagine must have amounted to considerably above three thousand, exclusive of cavalry and militia.

Before I was favoured with your Lordship's letter, the rebel account of the battle of Guildford had led me, indeed, to hope, that its consequences would have been more decisive, and that Greene would have re-passed the Roanoke, and left your Lordship at liberty to pursue the objects of your move into

North

† Brigade of Guards,  
Twenty-third,  
Thirty-third,  
Seventy-first, two Battalions,  
Iagers,  
Regiment of Bose,  
Light Infantry, Seventy-first,  
and  
Legion,  
North-Carolina Regiment.

North Carolina. Under the persuasion, therefore, that you would soon be able to finish your arrangements for the security of the Carolinas, I submitted to you in my letter of the 13th instant, (a duplicate of which I have the honour to enclose) the propriety in that case of your going in a frigate to Chesapeake, and directing such corps to follow you thither as you judged could be best spared. But, as it is now probable that your Lordship's presence in Carolina cannot be so soon dispensed with, I make no doubt that you will think it right to communicate to Major-general Phillips, without delay, the plan of your future operations in that quarter, together with your opinion how the Chesapeake army can best direct their's to assist them. That General-officer has already under his orders three thousand five hundred men, and I shall send him one thousand seven hundred more, which are now embarked, and will sail whenever the Admiral is ready.

With these, my Lord, which are rank and file fit for duty, and great part of them taken from the elite of my army, General Phillips is directed by his instructions to act in favour of your Lordship, to the best of his own judgment, until he receives your orders, and afterwards in such manner as you may please to command him, &c. But I shall be sorry to find your Lordship continue in the opinion that our hold of the Carolinas must be difficult, if not precarious, until Virginia is in a manner subdued, as  
that



that is an event which, I fear, would require a considerable space of time to accomplish, and, as far as I can judge, it might be not quite so expedient at this advanced season of the year to enter into a long operation in that climate. — This, however, will greatly depend upon circumstances, of which your Lordship and General Phillips may probably be better judges hereafter.

With regard to the operations of the summer, which your Lordship is anxious to receive my directions about, you cannot but be sensible that they must in great measure depend on your Lordship's successes in Carolina, the certainty and numbers of the expected reinforcement from Europe, and, likewise, on your Lordship's sending back to me the corps I had spared to you, under Major-general Leslie, which Colonel Rawdon, in his letter of the 31st of October, told me you could return in the spring. For until I am informed of the particulars of your Lordship's march through North Carolina, the effective strength of your moving army, your plan of operations for carrying those objects you had or may have in view, into execution, as well by the corps acting under your own immediate orders, as those acting in co-operation under Major-general Phillips, it must be obviously impossible for me to determine finally upon a plan of operations for the campaign.

I was

I was indeed in great hopes that your successes in North Carolina would have been such as to have put it in my power to avail myself of a large portion of your Lordship's army, the whole Chesapeake corps, and the entire reinforcement from Europe, for this campaign's operations to the northward of Carolina: but I observe with concern, from your Lordship's letter, that so far from being in a condition to spare me any part of your present force, you are of opinion that part of the European reinforcement will be indispensibly necessary to enable you to act offensively, or even to maintain yourself in the upper parts of the country.

Had I known what your Lordship's further offensive measures were intended to be for the remaining part of the season, I might now have given an opinion upon them, as well as upon the probable co-operation of the corps in the Chesapeake, without having which it will be scarce possible for me to form any; for as I said before, I fear no solid operation can be carried on to the northward of Chesapeake before those to the southward of it are totally at an end, either from success, or the season; and my letter to your Lordship of the 6th of November will have informed you what were my ideas of the operations proper to be pursued in Chesapeake, and my expectations from them, had circumstances admitted of my pursuing the plan to its full extent. But I must now defer fixing ultimately on a plan for the

E campaign

campaign, until I am made acquainted with the final success of your Lordship's operations, your prospects and sentiments, and I can judge what force I can collect for such measures as I can then determine upon.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. C L I N T O N.

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D U P L I C A T E. Inclosed in Number IV.

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, April 13, 1781.*

MY LORD,

AS it appears, even from the Rebel account of the action, that your Lordship has gained a victory over Greene; and it is probable he may in consequence have repassed the Roanoke, I beg leave to submit to your Lordship, the propriety of your coming to Chesapeake Bay in a frigate as soon as you have finished your arrangements for the security of the Carolinas, and you judge that affairs there are in such a train as no longer to require your presence; directing at the same time such troops to follow you thither, as your Lordship is of opinion can be best spared.

By

By Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce's arrival I am made acquainted that six British regiments are intended as an immediate reinforcement to the army under my command; should therefore any of these corps stop at Carolina your Lordship may probably direct them either to replace such troops as follow you, or to proceed immediately to the Chesapeake.

Agreeable to what I have already said to your Lordship in my letters of the 1st of June and 6th of November, it is my wish that you should continue to conduct operations as they advance northerly: for, except as a visitor, I shall not probably move to Chesapeake, unless Washington goes thither in great force. The success which has hitherto attended your Lordship excites the fullest assurance of its continuance; and as it is my inclination to assist your operations to the utmost extent of my power, I am convinced, from your disinterestedness, that you will not ask from me a larger proportion of troops than I can possibly spare.

As this goes by an unarmed vessel to Chesapeake, Major General Phillips will add what he thinks necessary to it, and forward it to Cape Fear.

The Admiral has at last consented that the *Medea* shall sail for Cape Fear, as soon as she is ready. Perhaps your Lordship may take that opportunity of returning in her; and, if we can prevail upon the Admiral, or Commanding Naval officer here, to spare Captain Duncan to conduct the naval part of  
our

our business in the Chesapeake, I think we shall have gained a great point.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

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N U M B E R V.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Wilmington,  
April 23, 1781.*

S I R,

I H A V E the honour to inclose to you a duplicate of my letter of the 10th, sent by the Amphitrite, and copies of all my letters to the Secretary of State; as they contain the most exact account of every transaction of the campaign, of the present state of things in this district, of my great apprehensions from the movement of General Greene towards Camden, and my resolutions in consequence of it, I have nothing to add to it for your Excellency's satisfaction. Neither my cavalry or infantry are in readiness to move; the former are in want of every thing, the latter of every necessary but shoes, of which we have received an ample supply; I must however begin my march tomorrow. It is very disagreeable to me to decide upon measures so very important, and of such consequence to the general conduct of the war, without an opportunity

opportunity of procuring your Excellency's directions or approbation; but the delay and difficulty of conveying letters, and the impossibility of waiting for answers, render it indispensibly necessary. My present undertaking fits heavy on my mind; I have experienced the distresses and dangers of marching some hundreds of miles, in a country chiefly hostile, without one active or useful friend; without intelligence, and without communication with any part of the country. The situation in which I leave South Carolina adds much to my anxiety; yet I am under the necessity of adopting this hazardous enterprise hastily, and with the appearance of precipitation, as I find there is no prospect of speedy reinforcement from Europe, and that the return of General Greene to North Carolina, either with or without success, would put a junction with General Phillips out of my power.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

*Copy*



Inclosed in Number V.

*Copy of Earl Cornwallis's dispatch, No. 6, to Lord George Germain, dated Guildford, March 17, 1781.*

MY LORD,

YOUR Lordship's dispatch No. 1, dated the 9th of November ult. was delivered to me by my Aid-de-Camp, Major Rofs. The officers and soldiers who fought so gallantly on the 16th of August received with the warmest sense of gratitude the royal approbation of their behaviour; and it is particularly pleasing to me, that my conduct has given satisfaction to his Majesty and to his Ministers.

By the long interruption of our communication with South Carolina I have not been informed whether Lieutenant-Governor Bull, and the other civil officers, have arrived in that province.

I shall pay proper attention to your Lordship's directions upon that subject, as well as relating to the prisoners of war confined at Charles-town. There are at present some hopes that a negotiation now on foot, between me and General Greene, will terminate in a cartel for their exchange: if it fails, I shall endeavour to dispose of them in the manner recommended by your Lordship, the expence and inconvenience of keeping them being intolerable.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

Inclosed

Inclofed in Number V.

*Copy of Earl Cornwallis's difpatch, No. 7, to Lord George Germain, dated Guildford, March 17, 1781.*

MY LORD,

HAVING occafion to difpatch my Aid-de-Camp, Captain Brodrick, with the particulars of the action of the 15th, in compliance with general directions from Sir Henry Clinton, I fhall embrace the opportunity to give your Lordfhip an account of the operations of the troops under my command previous to that event, and of thofe fubfequent, until the departure of Captain Brodrick.

My plan for the winter's campaign was to penetrate into North Carolina, leaving South Carolina in fecurity againft any probable attack in my abfence. Lord Rawdon with a confiderable body of troops had charge of the defensive, and I proceeded about the middle of January upon the offensive operations. I decided to march by the upper in preference to the lower roads leading into North Carolina, becaufe fords being frequent above the forks of the rivers, my paffage there could not eafily be obftructed, and General Greene having taken poft on the Pedee, and there being few fords in any of the great Rivers of this country below their forks, efpecially in winter, I apprehended being much delayed, if not entirely prevented from penetrating by the latter route.

I was

I was the more induced to prefer this route, as I hoped in my way to be able to destroy or drive out of South Carolina the corps of the enemy commanded by General Morgan, which threatened our valuable district of Ninety-six: and I likewise hoped, by rapid marches, to get between General Greene and Virginia, and by that means force him to fight without receiving any reinforcement from that province; or failing of that, to oblige him to quit North Carolina with precipitation; and thereby encourage our friends to make good their promises of a general rising to assist me in re-establishing his Majesty's government.

The unfortunate affair of the 17th of January was a very unexpected and severe blow; for, besides reputation, our loss did not fall short of six hundred men. However, being thoroughly sensible that defensive measures would be certain ruin to the affairs of Britain in the Southern Colonies, this event did not deter me from prosecuting the original plan. That General Greene might be uncertain of my intended route as long as possible, I had left General Leslie at Camden, until I was ready to move from Wynneshorough, and he was now within a day's march of me; I employed the 18th in forming a junction with him, and in collecting the remains of Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton's corps; after which, great exertions were made by part of the army, without baggage, to retake our prisoners, and to intercept General Morgan's corps on its retreat to the Catawba; but the celerity  
of

of their movements, and the swelling of numberless creeks in our way, rendered all our efforts fruitless.

I therefore assembled the army on the 25th at Ramsoure's Mill, on the South Fork of the Catawba, and as the loss of my light troops could only be remedied by the activity of the whole corps, I employed a halt of two days in collecting some flour, and in destroying superfluous baggage and all my waggons except those loaded with hospital stores, salt, and ammunition, and four reserved empty in readiness for sick or wounded. In this measure, though at the expence of a great deal of officers baggage, and of all prospect in future of rum, and even a regular supply of provisions to the soldiers, I must, in justice to this army, say that there was the most general and cheerful acquiescence.

In the meantime the rains had rendered the North Catawba impassable; and General Morgan's corps, the militia of the rebellious counties of Rowan and Mecklenburg under General Davidson, or the gang of plunderers usually under the command of General Sumpter, not then recovered from his wounds, had occupied all the fords in a space of more than forty miles upwards from the fork. During its height, I approached the river by short marches, so as to give the enemy equal apprehensions for several fords; and after having procured the best information in my power, I resolved to attempt the passage at a private ford (then slightly guarded) near M'Cowan's ford, on the morning of the 1st of February.

Lieutenant-colonel Webster was detached with part of the army and all the baggage to Beattie's Ford, six miles above M'Cowan's, where General Davidson was supposed to be posted with five hundred militia; and was directed to make every possible demonstration, by cannonading and otherwise, of an intention to force a passage there; and I marched at one in the morning with the brigade of guards, regiment of Boscawen, twenty-third, two hundred cavalry, and two three-pounders, to the ford fixed upon for the real attempt.

The morning being very dark and rainy, and part of our way through a wood where there was no road, one of the three-pounders in front of the twenty-third regiment, and the cavalry, overfet in a swamp, and occasioned those corps to lose the line of march, and some of the artillery-men belonging to the other gun, (one of whom had the match,) having stopped to assist, were likewise left behind. The head of the column in the mean while arrived at the bank of the river, and the day began to break. I could make no use of the gun that was up, and it was evident, from the number of fires on the other side, that the opposition would be greater than I had expected. However, as I knew that the rain then falling would soon render the river again impassable, and I had received information the evening before that General Greene had arrived in General Morgan's camp, and that his army was marching after him with the  
greatest

greatest expedition, I determined not to desist from the attempt; and therefore, full of confidence in the zeal and gallantry of Brigadier-general O'Hara and of the brigade of guards under his command, I ordered them to march on, but, to prevent confusion, not to fire until they gained the opposite bank. Their behaviour justified my high opinion of them; for a constant fire from the enemy, in a ford upwards of five hundred yards wide, in many places up to their middle, with a rocky bottom and strong current, made no impression on their cool and determined valour, nor checked their passage. The light infantry, landing first, immediately formed, and in a few minutes killed or dispersed every thing that appeared before them, the rest of the troops forming and advancing in succession. We now learned that we had been opposed by about three hundred militia, that had taken post there only the evening before, under the command of General Davidson. Their general and two or three other officers were among the killed; the number of wounded was uncertain, and a few were taken prisoners. On our side, Lieutenant-colonel Hall and three men were killed, and thirty-six men wounded, all of the light infantry and grenadiers of the guards. By this time the rear of the column had joined, and the whole having passed with the greatest dispatch, I detached Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, with the cavalry and twenty-third regiment, to pursue the routed militia. A few were soon  
killed



killed or taken; and Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton having learned that three or four hundred of the neighbouring militia were to assemble that day at Tarrants's house, about ten miles from the ford, leaving his infantry, he went on with the cavalry, and, finding the militia as expected, he with excellent conduct and great spirit attacked them instantly, and totally routed them with little loss on his side, and on their's between forty and fifty killed, wounded, or prisoners. This stroke, with our passage of the ford, so effectually dispirited the militia, that we met with no further opposition on our march to the Yadkin, though one of the most rebellious tracts in America.

During this time the rebels having quitted Beattie's Ford, Lieutenant-colonel Webster was passing his detachment and the baggage of the army; this had become tedious and difficult by the continuance of the rain and the swelling of the river; but all joined us soon after dark about six miles from Beattie's ford. The other fords were likewise abandoned by the enemy: the greatest part of the militia dispersed, and General Morgan with his corps marched all that afternoon and the following night towards Salisbury. We pursued next morning in hopes to intercept him between the rivers; and, after struggling with many difficulties, arising from swelled creeks and bad roads, the guards came up with his rear, in the evening of the third, routed it, and took a few waggons at the  
Trading



Trading Ford of the Yadkin.—He had passed the body of his infantry in flats, and his cavalry and waggons by the ford, during that day and the preceding night; but at the time of our arrival the boats were secured on the other side, and the ford had become impassable. The river continuing to rise, and the weather appearing unsettled, I determined to march to the upper fords, after procuring a small supply of provisions at Salisbury. This, and the height of the creeks in our way, detained me two days; and in that time Morgan having quitted the banks of the river, I had information from our friends, who crossed in canoes, that General Greene's army was marching with the utmost dispatch to form a junction with him at Guildford. Not having had time to collect the North-Carolina militia, and having received no reinforcement from Virginia, I concluded that he would do every thing in his power to avoid an action on the South side of the Dan; and, it being my interest to force him to fight, I made great expedition, and got between him and the upper fords; and, being assured that the lower fords are seldom practicable in winter, and that he could not collect many flats at any of the ferries, I was in great hopes that he would not escape me without receiving a blow. Nothing could exceed the patience and alacrity of the officers and soldiers under every species of hardship and fatigue in endeavouring to overtake him. But our intelligence upon this occasion was  
exceedingly

exceedingly defective; which, with heavy rains, bad roads, and the passage of many deep creeks, and bridges destroyed by the enemy's light troops, rendered all our exertions vain; for, upon our arrival at Boyd's ferry on the 15th, we learned that his rear-guard had got over the night before, his baggage and main body having passed the preceding day at that and a neighbouring ferry, where more flats had been collected than had been represented to me as possible.

My force being ill suited to enter by that quarter so powerful a province as Virginia, and North Carolina being in the utmost confusion, after giving the troops a halt of one day, I proceeded by easy marches to Hillsborough, where I erected the king's standard, and invited by proclamation all loyal subjects to repair to it, and to stand forth and take an active part in assisting me to restore order and constitutional government. As a considerable body of friends were said to reside between the Haw and Deep rivers, I detached Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton on the 23d, with the cavalry and a small body of infantry, to prevent their being interrupted in assembling. Unluckily, a detachment of the rebel light troops had crossed the same day, and by accident fell in with about two hundred of our friends, under Colonel Pyle, on their way to Hillsborough; who, mistaking the rebels for Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton's corps, allowed themselves to be surrounded, and a number of them were most inhumanly butchered when begging

ging for quarter, without making the least resistance. The same day I had certain intelligence that General Greene, having been reinforced, had re-crossed the Dan, which rendered it imprudent to separate my corps, occasioned the recall of Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton's detachment; and forage and provisions being scarce in the neighbourhood of Hillsborough, as well as the position too distant (upon the approach of the rebel army) for the protection of the body of our friends; I judged it expedient to cross the Haw, and encamped near Allemance Creek, detaching Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton with the cavalry, light company of the Guards, and one hundred and fifty men of Lieutenant-colonel Webster's brigade, a few miles from me on the road to Deep River, more effectually to cover the country.

General Greene's light troops soon made their appearance; and on the 2d, a patrol having reported that they had seen both cavalry and infantry near his post, I directed Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton to move forward with proper precautions, and endeavour to discover the designs of the enemy. He had not advanced far, when he fell in with a considerable corps, which he immediately attacked and routed; but being ignorant of their force, and whether they were supported, with great prudence desisted from pursuit. He soon learned from prisoners, that those he had beat were Lee's legion, three or four hundred back mountain men, under Colonel Preston, with a number  
of

of militia; and that General Greene with a part of his army was not far distant. Our situation for the former few days had been amongst timid friends, and adjoining to inveterate rebels; between them I had been totally destitute of information, which lost me a very favourable opportunity of attacking the rebel army. General Greene fell back to Thompson's House, near Boyd's Ford, on the Reedy Fork; but his light troops and militia still remained near us, and as I was informed that they were posted carelessly at separate plantations for the convenience of subsisting, I marched on the 6th to drive them in, and to attack General Greene if an opportunity offered. I succeeded completely in the first; and at Weitzell's Mill, on the Reedy Fork, where they made a stand, the back-mountain men and some militia suffered considerably, with little loss on our side; but a timely and precipitate retreat over the Haw prevented the latter. I knew that the Virginia reinforcement were upon their march; and it was apparent that the enemy would, if possible, avoid risking an action before their arrival.

The neighbourhood of the Fords of the Dan in their rear, and the extreme difficulty of subsisting my troops in that exhausted country putting it out of my power to force them, my resolution was to give our friends time to join us, by covering their country as effectually as possible, consistent with the subsistence of the troops, still approaching the communication

tion with our shipping in Cape Fear River, which I saw it would soon become indispensibly necessary to open, on account of the sufferings of the army from the want of supplies of every kind; at the same time I was determined to fight the rebel army, if it approached me, being convinced that it would be impossible to succeed in that great object of our arduous campaign, the calling forth the numerous Loyalists of North Carolina, whilst a doubt remained on their minds of the superiority of our arms. With these views, I had moved to the Quaker Meeting, in the Forks of Deep River, on the 13th; and on the 14th I received the information which occasioned the movement that brought on the action at Guildford, of which I shall give your Lordship an account in a separate letter.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

Inclosed in No. V.

*By the Right Honourable Charles Earl Cornwallis,  
Lieutenant-general of his Majesty's Forces,  
Ec. Ec. Ec.*

A P R O C L A M A T I O N.

WHEREAS it has pleased the Divine Providence to prosper the operations of his Majesty's arms in driving the rebel army out of this province; and whereas it is his Majesty's most gracious wish to rescue his faithful and loyal subjects from the cruel tyranny under which they have groaned for several years, I have thought proper to issue this Proclamation, to invite all such faithful and loyal subjects to repair, without loss of time, with their arms and ten days provisions, to the Royal Standard now erected at Hillsborough, where they will meet with the most friendly reception: and I do hereby assure them that I am ready to concur with them in effectual measures for suppressing the remains of rebellion in this province, and for the re-establishment of good order and constitutional government.

Given under my hand at head quarters at Hillsborough this 20th day of February, in the year of our Lord 1781, and in the twenty-first year of his Majesty's reign.

CORNWALLIS.

By his Lordship's command,  
H. BRODRICK,  
Aid de Camp.

God save the King.

Inclosed

Inclosed in Number V.

*Copy of Earl Cornwallis's Dispatch, No. 8, to Lord  
George Germain, dated Guildford, 17th March,  
1781.*

MY LORD,

I HAVE the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that his Majesty's troops under my command obtained a signal victory, on the 15th instant, over the rebel army commanded by General Greene.

In pursuance of my intended plan, communicated to your Lordship in my dispatch, No. 7, I had encamped on the 13th instant at the Quaker Meeting between the forks of Deep River. On the 14th I received information, that General Butler, with a body of North-Carolina militia and the expected reinforcements from Virginia, said to consist of a Virginia state-regiment, a corps of Virginia eighteen-months men, three thousand Virginia militia and recruits for the Maryland line, had joined General Greene; and that the whole army, which was reported to amount to nine or ten thousand men, was marching to attack the British troops. During the afternoon intelligence was brought, which was confirmed in the night, that he had advanced that day to Guildford, about twelve miles from our camp.

Being



Being now persuaded that he had resolved to hazard an engagement, after detaching Lieutenant-colonel Hamilton with our waggons and baggage escorted by his own regiment, a detachment of one hundred infantry and twenty cavalry, towards Bells Mill on Deep River, I marched with the rest of the corps, at day-break on the morning of the 15th, to meet the enemy or to attack them in their encampment. About four miles from Guildford, our advanced guard, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, fell in with a corps of the enemy, consisting of Lee's legion, some back-mountain men and Virginia militia, which he attacked with his usual good conduct and spirit, and defeated; and, continuing our march, we found the rebel army posted on rising grounds about a mile and a half from the court-house. The prisoners taken by Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton having been several days with the advanced corps, could give me no account of the enemy's order or position, and the country people were extremely inaccurate in their description of the ground. Immediately between the head of the column and the enemy's line, was a considerable plantation, one large field of which was on our left of the road, and two others, with a wood of about two hundred yards broad between them, on our right of it; beyond these fields the wood continued for several miles to our right. The wood beyond the plantation in our front, in the skirt of which the enemy's first line was formed, was about a  
mile

mile in depth, the road then leading into an extensive space of cleared ground about Guildford courthouse. The woods on our right and left were reported to be impracticable for cannon; but, as that on our right appeared the most open, I resolved to attack the left wing of the enemy; and, whilst my disposition was making for that purpose, I ordered Lieutenant Macleod to bring forward the guns and cannonade their center. The attack was directed to be made in the following order:

On the right the regiment of Bose and the seventy-first regiment, led by Major-general Leslie, and supported by the first battalion of guards; on the left, the twenty-third and thirty-third regiments, led by Lieut. Col. Webster, and supported by the grenadiers and second battalion of guards commanded by Brigadier-general O'Hara; the yagers and light-infantry of the guards remained in the wood on the left of the guns, and the cavalry in the road, ready to act as circumstances might require. Our preparations being made, the action began at about half an hour past one in the afternoon; Major-general Leslie, after being obliged by the great extent of the enemy's line, to bring up the first battalion of guards to the right of the regiment of Bose, soon defeated every thing before him; Lieutenant-colonel Webster, having joined the left of Major-general Leslie's division, was no less successful in his front, when, on finding that the left of the thirty-third was exposed to a heavy  
fire

fire from the right wing of the enemy, he changed his front to the left, and, being supported by the yagers and light-infantry of the guards, attacked and routed it. The grenadiers and second battalion of guards moving forward to occupy the ground left vacant by the movement of Lieutenant-colonel Webster.

All the infantry being now in the line, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton had directions to keep his cavalry compact, and not to charge without positive orders, except to protect any of the corps from the most evident danger of being defeated. The excessive thickness of the woods rendered our bayonets of little use, and enabled the broken enemy to make frequent stands, with an irregular fire, which occasioned some loss, and to several of the corps great delay, particularly on our right, where the first battalion of the guards and regiment of Bose were warmly engaged in front, flank, and rear, with some of the enemy that had been routed on the first attack, and with part of the extremity of their left wing, which by the closeness of the woods had been passed unbroken. The seventy-first regiment and grenadiers, and second battalion of guards, not knowing what was passing on their right, and hearing the fire advance on their left, continued to move forward, the artillery keeping pace with them on the road, followed by the cavalry. The second battalion of guards first gained the clear ground near Guildford court-house, and found a corps of continental infantry much superior in number formed  
in

in the open field on the left of the road. Glowing with impatience to signalize themselves, they instantly attacked and defeated them, taking two six-pounders; but, pursuing into the wood with too much ardour, were thrown into confusion by a heavy fire, and immediately charged and driven back into the field by Colonel Washington's dragoons, with the loss of the six-pounders they had taken. The enemy's cavalry was soon repulsed by a well-directed fire from two three-pounders just brought up by Lieut. Macleod, and by the appearance of the grenadiers of the guards, and of the seventy-first regiment, which, having been impeded by some deep rains, were now coming out of the wood on the right of the guards, opposite to the Court-house. By the spirited exertions of Brigadier-general O'Hara, though wounded, the second battalion of guards was soon rallied, and, supported by the grenadiers, returned to the charge with the greatest alacrity. The twenty-third regiment arriving at that instant from our left, and Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton having advanced with part of the cavalry, the enemy were soon put to flight, and the two six-pounders once more fell into our hands; two ammunition-waggons and two other six-pounders, being all the artillery they had in the field, were likewise taken. About this time the 33d regiment and light-infantry of the guards, after overcoming many difficulties, completely routed the corps which was opposed to them, and put an end to the action in this quarter.

quarter. The twenty-third and seventy-first regiments, with part of the cavalry, were ordered to pursue; the remainder of the cavalry was detached with Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton to our right, where a heavy fire still continued, and where his appearance and spirited attack contributed much to a speedy termination of the action. The militia with which our right wing had been engaged, dispersed in the woods; the continentals went off by the Reedy-fork, beyond which it was not in my power to follow them, as their cavalry had suffered but little; our troops were excessively fatigued by an action which lasted an hour and a half, and our wounded dispersed over an extensive space of country, required immediate attention; the care of our wounded, and the total want of provisions in an exhausted country, made it equally impossible for me to follow the blow the next day. The enemy did not stop until they got to the Iron-works on Troublesome-Creek, eighteen miles from the field of battle.

From our observation, and the best accounts we could procure, we did not doubt but the strength of the enemy exceeded seven thousand men; their militia composed their line, with parties advanced to the rails of the fields in their front; the continentals were posted obliquely in the rear of their right wing. Their cannon fixed on us whilst we were forming, from the center of the line of militia, but  
were

were withdrawn to the Continentals before the attack.

I have the honour to enclose to your Lordship the list of our killed and wounded; Captain Schutz's wound is supposed to be mortal, but the surgeons assure me that none of the other officers are in danger, and that a great number of the men will soon recover. I cannot ascertain the loss of the enemy, but it must have been considerable, between two and three hundred dead were left upon the field; many of their wounded that were able to move, whilst we were employed in the care of our own, escaped and followed the routed enemy; and our cattle-drivers and forage-parties have reported to me, that the houses in a circle of six or eight miles round us are full of others: those that remained we have taken the best care of in our power. We took few prisoners, owing to the excessive thickness of the wood facilitating their escape, and every man of our army being repeatedly wanted for action.

The conduct and actions of the officers and soldiers that compose this little army will do more justice to their merit than I can by words. Their persevering intrepidity in action, their invincible patience in the hardships and fatigues of a march of above six hundred miles, in which they have forded several large rivers and numberless creeks, many of which would be reckoned large rivers in any other country in the world, without tents or covering against the climate,

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and



and often without provisions, will sufficiently manifest their ardent zeal for the honour and interests of their Sovereign and their country.

I have been particularly indebted to Major-general Leslie for his gallantry and exertion in the action, as well as his assistance in every other part of the service. The zeal and spirit of Brigadier-general O'Hara merit my highest commendations; for, after receiving two dangerous wounds, he continued in the field whilst the action lasted; by his earnest attention on all other occasions, seconded by the officers and soldiers of the brigade: his Majesty's guards are no less distinguished by their order and discipline than by their spirit and valour: the Hessian regiment of Bose deserves my warmest praises for its discipline, alacrity, and courage, and does honour to Major Du Buy, who commands it, and who is an officer of superior merit: I am much obliged to Brigadier-general Howard, who served as volunteer, for his spirited example on all occasions: Lieutenant-colonel Webster conducted his brigade like an officer of experience and gallantry. Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton's good conduct and spirit in the management of his cavalry, was conspicuous during the whole action; and Lieutenant Macleod, who commanded the artillery, proved himself upon this, as well as all former occasions, a most capable and deserving officer. The attention and exertions of my Aid-de-camps, and of all the  
other



other public officers of the army, contributed very much to the success of the day.

I have constantly received the most zealous assistance from Governor Martin, during my command in the southern district: hoping that his presence would tend to incite the loyal subjects of this province to take an active part with us, he has cheerfully submitted to the fatigues and dangers of our campaign: but his delicate constitution has suffered by his public spirit, for, by the advice of the physicians, he is now obliged to return to England for the recovery of his health.

This part of the country is so totally destitute of subsistence, that forage is not nearer than nine miles, and the soldiers have been two days without bread; I shall, therefore, leave about seventy of the worst of the wounded cases at the New-garden Quaker-meeting-house, with proper assistance, and move the remainder with the army to-morrow morning to Bell's-mill. I hope our friends will heartily take an active part with us, to which I shall continue to encourage them; still approaching our shipping by easy marches, that we may procure the necessary supplies for further operations, and lodge our sick and wounded where proper attention can be paid to them.

This dispatch will be delivered to your Lordship by my Aid-de-camp, Captain Brodrick, who is a  
very

very promising officer, and whom I beg leave to recommend to your Lordship's countenance and favour.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

Inclosed in No. V.

*Copy of Earl Cornwallis's Dispatch, No. 9, to Lord George Germain, dated Wilmington, April 18, 1781.*

M Y L O R D,

I MARCHED from Guildford on the morning of the 18th of March, and next day arrived at Bell's-mill, where I gave the troops two days rest, and procured a small supply of provisions. From thence I proceeded slowly towards Cross-creek, attending to the convenience of subsistence, and the movement of our wounded. On my way I issued the enclosed proclamation, and took every other means in my power to reconcile enemies, and to encourage our friends to join us.

From all my information I intended to have halted at Cross-Creek, as a proper place to refresh and refit the troops; and I was much disappointed,  
on

on my arrival there, to find it totally impossible: provisions were scarce, not four days forage within twenty miles, and to us the navigation of the Cape Fear river to Wilmington impracticable; for the distance by water is upwards of a hundred miles, the breadth seldom above one hundred yards, the banks high, and the inhabitants on each side generally hostile. — Under these circumstances, I was obliged to continue my march to this place, in the neighbourhood of which I arrived on the 7th instant.

I have been busy, since my arrival, in disposing of our sick and wounded, and in procuring the necessary supplies to put the troops in a proper state to take the field. I am in daily expectation of seeing the reinforcement from Europe, and of receiving the Commander-in-chief's directions for the further operations of the campaign.

Captain Schutz died a few days after the action, as we expected; but I am sorry to inform your Lordship, that, notwithstanding the flattering appearances and the assurances of the surgeons, Colonel Webster, (whose loss is severely felt by me and the whole army) Captain Maynard of the guards, and Captain Wilmoufky and Ensign de Trott of the Regiment of Bose are since dead: the rest of the officers are recovering fast, and many of the wounded soldiers have already joined their regiments.

Major

Major Craig, who took possession of this place in the latter end of January, has conducted himself with great zeal and capacity, having with a very small force not only secured the post from all insults, but made himself respectable in this part of the country, by several successful excursions.

I shall not trouble your Lordship on the subject of South-Carolina, having directed Lord Rawdon, who commands on the frontiers, and Lieutenant-colonel Balfour, commandant of Charles-town, to take every opportunity of communicating to your Lordship, as well as to the Commander-in-chief, the state of affairs in that province. As they are both officers of capacity and great merit, I trust that their conduct will have given satisfaction.

I have the honour to be, &c.

C O R N W A L L I S.

Inclosed

Inclosed in Number V.

N O R T H C A R O L I N A.

*By Charles Earl Cornwallis, Lieutenant-General of his  
Majesty's Forces, &c. &c. &c.*

A P R O C L A M A T I O N.

WHEREAS by the blessing of Almighty God, his Majesty's arms have been crowned with signal success, by the compleat victory obtained over the Rebel forces on the 15th instant, I have thought proper to issue this proclamation to call upon all loyal subjects to stand forth, and take an active part in restoring good order and government. And whereas it has been represented to me that many persons in this province who have taken a share in this unnatural rebellion, but having experienced the oppression and injustice of the Rebel government, and having seen the errors into which they have been deluded by falsehoods and misrepresentations, are sincerely desirous of returning to their duty and allegiance, I do hereby notify and promise to all such persons (murderers excepted) that if they will surrender themselves with their arms and ammunition, at head quarters, or to the officer commanding in the district contiguous to their respective places

places of residence, on or before the 20th day of April next, they shall be permitted to return to their homes, upon giving a military parole, and shall be protected in their persons and properties from all sort of violence from the British troops, and will be restored as soon as possible to all the privileges of legal and constitutional government.

Given under my hand at head quarters, this 18th day of March, A. D. 1781, and in the twenty-first year of his Majesty's reign.

C O R N W A L L I S.

Inclosed in No. V.

*Copy of Earl Cornwallis's dispatch, No. 10, to Lord George Germain, dated Wilmington, April 18th, 1781.*

M Y L O R D,

AS Governor Martin returns to England by this opportunity, I shall beg leave to refer your Lordship to him for many particulars relating to this province; but I think it incumbent on me to be explicit to your Lordship, as his Majesty's Minister, on one or two capital points.

The principal reasons for undertaking the winter's campaign were, the difficulty of a defensive war in South Carolina, and the hopes that our friends in  
North

North Carolina, who were said to be very numerous, would make good their promises of assembling and taking an active part with us, in endeavouring to re-establish his Majesty's government. Our experience has shewn that their numbers are not so great as had been represented, and that their friendship was only passive; for we have received little assistance from them since our arrival in the province, and although I gave the strongest and most public assurances, that after refitting and depositing our sick and wounded, I should return to the upper country, not above two hundred have been prevailed upon to follow us, either as provincials or militia.

This being the case, the immense extent of this country, cut with numberless rivers and creeks, and the total want of internal navigation, which renders it impossible for our army to remain long in the heart of the country, will make it very difficult to reduce this province to obedience by a direct attack upon it.

If therefore it should appear to be the interest of Great Britain to maintain what she already possesses, and to push the war in the Southern Provinces, I take the liberty of giving it as my opinion, that a serious attempt upon Virginia would be the most solid Plan, because successful operations might not only be attended with important consequences there, but would tend to the security of South Carolina, and ultimately to the submission of North Carolina.



The great reinforcements sent by Virginia to General Greene, whilst General Arnold was in the Chefapeak, are convincing proofs that small expeditions do not frighten that powerful province.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

Inclosed in No. V.

*Copy of Earl Cornwallis's dispatch, No. 11, to Lord George Germain, dated Wilmington, April 23d, 1781.*

MY LORD,

I YESTERDAY received an express by a small vessel from Charles-town, informing me that a frigate was there, but not then able to get over the bar, with dispatches from Sir Henry Clinton, notifying to me that Major-General Philips had been detached into the Chefapeak with a considerable force, with instructions to co-operate with this army, and to put himself under my orders. This express likewise brought me the disagreeable accounts, that the upper posts of South Carolina were in the most imminent danger, from an alarming spirit of revolt, among many of the people, and by a movement of General Greene's army. Although the expresses that

I sent

I sent from Cross Creek to inform Lord Rawdon of the necessity I was under of coming to this place, and to warn him of the possibility of such an attempt of the enemy, had all miscarried, yet his Lordship was lucky enough to be apprized of General Greene's approach at least six days before he possibly could reach Camden, and I am therefore still induced to hope from my opinion of his Lordship's abilities, and the precautions taken by him and Lieutenant-colonel Balfour, that we shall not be so unfortunate as to lose any considerable corps.

The distance from hence to Camden, the want of forage and subsistence on the greatest part of the road, and the difficulty in passing the Pedee when opposed by an enemy, render it utterly impossible for me to give immediate assistance, and I apprehend a possibility of the utmost hazard to this little corps, without the chance of a benefit in the attempt; for if we are so unlucky as to suffer a severe blow in South Carolina, the spirit of revolt in that province would become very general, and the numerous rebels in this province be encouraged to be more than ever active and violent. This might enable General Greene to hem me in among the great rivers, and by cutting off our subsistence, render our arms useless: and to remain here for transports to carry us off, would be a work of time, would lose our cavalry, and be otherways as ruinous and disgraceful to Britain, as most events could be. I have therefore under so  
many

many embarrassing circumstances, (but looking upon Charles-town as safe from any immediate attack from the Rebels,) resolved to take advantage of General Greene's having left the back part of Virginia open, and march immediately into that province to attempt a junction with General Phillips.

I have more readily decided upon this measure, because if General Greene fails in the object of his march, his retreat will relieve South Carolina; and my force being very insufficient for offensive operations in this province, may be employed usefully in Virginia in conjunction with the corps under the command of General Phillips.

I have the honour to be, &c.

C O R N W A L L I S.

C O R R E S-

# N U M B E R VI.

State of the TROOPS that marched with the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis.

D A T E S.	R A N K A N D F I L E P R E S E N T, A N D F I T F O R D U T Y.												
	Britifh.								German.			Provincials.	
	Brigade of Guards.	7th Regiment.	16th Regiment, 3 Companies.	23d Regiment.	33d Regiment.	71ft Regiment, 1ft Battalion.	71ft Regiment, 2d Battalion.	71ft Regiment, Light Company.	Regiment of Bole.	Vagers.	British Legion, &c. &c.	North Carolina Volunteers.	T O T A L.
Jan. 15, 1781.	690	167	41	286	328	249	237	69	347	103	451	256	3224
Feb. 1, 1781.	690	—	—	279	334	—	234	—	345	97	174	287	2440
Mar. 1, 1781.	605	—	—	258	322	—	212	—	313	97	174	232	2213
Apr. 1, 1781.	411	—	—	182	229	—	161	—	245	97	174	224	1723



# C O R R E S P O N D E N C E

B E T W E E N

Gen. Sir HENRY CLINTON, K. B.

C O M M A N D E R I N C H I E F,

A N D

Lieut. Gen. Earl C O R N W A L L I S.

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## P A R T II.

RELATIVE TO EARL CORNWALLIS'S MARCH  
INTO VIRGINIA.

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## N U M B E R I.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated  
Wilmington, April 24, 1781.*

S I R,

I HAVE reflected very feriouſly on the ſubject of my attempt to march into Virginia, and have in conſequence written a letter to Major-general Phillips, of which I have the honour to enſloſe a copy to your Excellency. I have, likewise, directed Lieutenant-colonel Balfour to ſend tranſports and provisions

provisions to this port, in case I should find the junction with Major-general Phillips inexpedient or impracticable, and that I should have the mortification of seeing that there is no other method of conveying his Majesty's troops to South-Carolina, without exposing them to the most evident danger of being lost.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

(Inclosed in Number I.)

*Copy of Earl Cornwallis's Letter to Major-general Phillips, dated Wilmington, April 24, 1781.*

DEAR PHILLIPS,

MY situation here is very distressing: Greene took the advantage of my being obliged to come to this place, and has marched to South-Carolina. My expresses to Lord Rawdon, on my leaving Cross-Creek, warning him of the possibility of such a movement, have all failed; mountaineers and militia have poured into the back part of that province, and I much fear that Lord Rawdon's posts will be so distant from each other, and his troops so scattered, as to put him into the greatest danger of being beat  
in



in detail, and that the worst of consequences may happen to most of the troops out of Charles-town. By a direct move towards Camden, I cannot get time enough to relieve Lord Rawdon; and, should he have fallen, my army would be exposed to the utmost danger, from the great rivers I should have to pass, the exhausted state of the country, the numerous militia, the almost universal spirit of revolt which prevails in South Carolina, and the strength of Greene's army, whose continentals alone are at least as numerous as I am; and I could be of no use on my arrival at Charles-town, there being nothing to apprehend at present for that post, I shall, therefore, immediately march up the country by Duplin Courthouse, pointing towards Hillsborough, in hopes to withdraw Greene; if that should not succeed, I should be much tempted to try to form a junction with you. The attempt is exceedingly hazardous, and many unforeseen difficulties may render it totally impracticable, so that you must not take any steps that may expose your army to the danger of being ruined: I shall march to the lowest ford of the Roanoke, which, I am informed, is about twenty miles above Taylor's-ferry. Send every possible intelligence to me by the cypher I enclose, and make every movement in your power to facilitate our meeting, (which must be somewhere near Petersburg) with safety to your own army: I mention the lowest ford, because in a hostile country ferries cannot be depended

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pended upon; but if I should decide on the measure of endeavouring to come to you, I shall try to surprize the boats at some of the ferries, from Halifax upwards.

I am, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

## N U M B E R II.

*Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New York,  
March 2d, 1781.*

*Received by Earl Cornwallis in Virginia.*

MY LORD,

YOUR Lordship may probably hear that the army and navy in Chesapeake are blocked up by a superior French naval force to that under Captain Symonds. The first account I had of it was from General Arnold, dated the 14th February; and I sent it immediately to the Admiral at Gardiner's Bay. —A day or two afterwards I had it confirmed that they were part of the fleet from Rhode Island; which I have heard since sailed from thence on the 9th ultimo. Notwithstanding which, I greatly fear he has not sent a naval force to relieve them. Washington has detached some New-England troops under La Fayette and Howe, that way. If so much time is given, I cannot answer for consequences. Portf-  
mouth

mouth is safe, at this season, against any attack from the Suffolk side, but not so from a landing in any of the bays to the eastward of Elizabeth River.—I have much to lament that the Admiral did not think it adviseable to send there at first, as Brigadier-general Arnold's projected move in favour of your Lordship's operations, will have been stopt: and if the Admiral delays it too long, I shall dread still more fatal consequences. I have troops already embarked in a great proportion to that of the enemy; but to send them under two frigates only before the Chesapeake is our own, is to sacrifice the troops and their convoy.

I enclose to your Lordship all the news I have been able to collect. Ethan Allen has, I think, quitted Congress, and put them at defiance. Your Lordship will see his plan by the News-paper of the 28th February, said to be genuine. Discontents run high in Connecticut. In short, my Lord, there seems little wanting to give a mortal stab to rebellion but a proper reinforcement, and a permanent superiority at sea, for the next campaign; without which, any enterprize depending on water movements must certainly run great risk.—Should the troops already embarked for Chesapeake proceed; and, when there, be able to undertake any operation in addition to what Brigadier-general Arnold proposes, I am confident it will be done. Major-general Phillips will command this expedition.

Till

Till Colonel Bruce arrives I am uncertain what reinforcements are intended for this army. The Minister has, however, assured me, that every possible exertion will be made.

I shall tremble for our post at Portsmouth, should the enemy's reinforcements arrive in that neighbourhood before the force, which I *now* flatter myself the Admiral will order a sufficient convoy for, arrives.

*March* 8th. I have received a letter from General Arnold, dated the 25th ultimo, wherein he tells me, that the French left him on the 19th. And in another letter of the 27th, he says, he has not the least doubt of defending his post against the force of the country and two thousand French troops until a reinforcement can arrive from New York: and that he proposed to send five hundred men under Colonel Dundas up James River, to make a diversion in favour of your Lordship.

The Admiral informs me of the return of the French ships to Rhode-Island, and of their having taken the *Romulus*, and carried her into that place. But as the Admiral, in his letter of the 2d instant, seems to think that the whole, or at least a great part, of the French fleet sailed for Chesapeake on the 27th, and that he was at that time ready to sail; I flatter myself he is either gone there, or has sent a sufficient force to clear the Chesapeake.

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The troops under General Phillips have been embarked some time, and are now at the Hook waiting for the Admiral, or a message from him: General Phillips commands; and I am sure you know his inclinations are to co-operate with your Lordship; and you will be pleased to take him under your orders, until your Lordship hears further from me.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

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N U M B E R III.

*Copy of Sir Henry Clinton's Instructions to Major-general Phillips, dated Head Quarters, New York, March 10th, 1781.*

*Received by Earl Cornwallis in Virginia.*

S I R,

YOU will be pleased to proceed with the troops embarked under your command to Chesapeake Bay, and there form a junction as soon as possible with Brigadier-general Arnold, whom, and the corps with him, you will take under your orders.

Should any unforeseen accident prevent your forming an immediate junction with Brigadier-general Arnold, you will, however, exert every endeavour to communicate with him. And as the principal object of your expedition is the security of him, the  
troops

troops at present under his orders, and the posts he occupies on Elizabeth River, near the mouth of James River in Virginia, you will, of course, use every means to attain this very material purpose.—The properest methods to be pursued on this occasion cannot be exactly pointed out to you, but must be left to your discretion.

When you shall have formed your junction with Brigadier-general Arnold, if you find that General acting under the orders of Earl Cornwallis, you will, of course, endeavour to fulfil those orders.—If this should not be the case; after receiving every information respecting his probable situation, you will make such movements with the corps then under your orders as can be made consistent with the security of the post on Elizabeth River, or you shall think will most effectually assist his Lordships operations, by destroying or taking any magazines the enemy may have on James River, or at Petersburg, on the Appamatox. After which, if it should be thought necessary, you will establish a post or posts, at such stations on James River, as shall appear best calculated to open the way for, and secure the safety, as far as possible, of a rapid movement of troops to give jealousy for Upper James River, and to interrupt the course of supplies to the Carolinas.

The object of co-operation with Lord Cornwallis being fulfilled, you are at liberty to carry on such desultory expeditions for the purpose of destroying  
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the enemy's public stores and magazines in any part of the Chesapeake, as you shall judge proper.

If the Admiral, disapproving of Portsmouth, and requiring a fortified station for large ships in the Chesapeake, should propose York Town or Old Point Comfort, if possession of either can be acquired and maintained without great risk or loss, you are at liberty to take possession thereof: but if the objections are such as you shall think forcible, you must, after stating those objections, decline it, till solid operations take place in the Chesapeake.

As to whatever relates to the people of the country, their being received and armed, or being more for the King's service that they should remain quietly at their houses, or respecting the oaths that should be offered to them, or for your general conduct in matters of this kind, I refer you to my Instructions to Major-general Leslie, and Brigadier-general Arnold, copies of which will be given to you.

And concerning your return to this place, you will receive either my orders or Lord Cornwallis's, as circumstances may make necessary.

'Tis presumed his Lordship will be able to spare troops to station at Portsmouth, &c. but should that not be the case, you are at liberty to leave either the regiment of Prince Hereditaire or the seventy-sixth, or both, for that purpose, under any officer, being a general officer, Lord Cornwallis may choose to appoint; but if it should be an officer of your own appointing,



appointing, with the rank of Lieutenant-colonel; I think Lieutenant-colonel Dundas, as being acquainted with the spot, should remain.

It is probable, whenever the objects of this expedition are fulfilled, and that you have strengthened the present works, and added such others as you shall think necessary, that you may return to this place.— In which case, you must bring with you Brigadier-general Arnold, the Light Infantry, Colonel Robinson's corps, or the seventy-sixth, and, if it should be possible, the Queen's Rangers.

The moment you have communicated with Lord Cornwallis, and heard from his Lordship, you are to consider yourself as under his Lordship's orders, until he, or you shall hear further from me.

Most heartily wishing you success,

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

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#### N U M B E R IV.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated  
Peterburgh, in Virginia, 20th May, 1781.*

S I R,

YOU will easily conceive how sensible an affliction it was to me on entering this province, to receive  
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an account of the death of my friend General Phillips; whose loss I cannot sufficiently lament, from personal or public considerations.

The corps which I brought from North Carolina arrived here this morning. The information conveyed by your Excellency to General Arnold relative to the probable movements of the French armament, restrains me at present from any material offensive operations; but as soon as I can hear any satisfactory accounts of the two fleets, I will endeavour to make the best use in my power of the troops under my command. General Arnold being of opinion, that Portsmouth, with its present garrison, is secure against a coup de main, I would wish to avoid making a precipitate movement towards that place, without absolute necessity, because it would lessen our reputation in this province; but I have sent to assure the commanding officer, that I will do every thing I can to relieve him in case the French should attack the post. La Fayette is at Wiltown, on the other side of James River, not far from Richmond: I have not heard that Wayne has yet joined him.

It is with infinite satisfaction that I enclose to your Excellency copies of two letters from Lord Rawdon, which have relieved me from the most cruel anxieties. His Lordship's great abilities, courage, and firmness of mind cannot be sufficiently admired and applauded. There is now great reason to hope that we shall meet with no serious misfortune in that province; if how-

ever General Greene should persevere in carrying on offensive operations against it, we must, I think, abandon Camden, and probably Ninety-six, and limit our defence to the Congaree and the Santee: this will be only giving up two bad posts, which it is difficult to supply with provisions, and quitting a part of the country, which for some months past we have not really possessed.

I have taken every means to inform Major Craig of my having passed the Roanoke; on which event, it was previously concerted between us that he should fall down to Bald Head, and from thence proceed to Charles-town, as soon as transports arrive to carry him.

The Legion being in the utmost distress for want of arms, cloathing, boots, and indeed appointments of all kinds, I must beg that your Excellency will be pleased to direct the Inspector General to forward a supply of every article with the greatest dispatch.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

NUMBER

N U M B E R V.

*Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York,  
May 29th, 1781.*

[Received July 12, 1781, from Lieut. Col. Macpherson.]

M Y L O R D,

I had the honour of writing to your Lordship by Lord Chewton, who failed from hence in the Richmond the 4th instant, to join you at Wilmington; but your Lordship's departure from thence will have prevented his meeting you there, and I hope he has since then joined you in the Chesapeake.

When I first heard of your Lordship's retreat from Cross Creek to Wilmington, I confess that I was in hopes you had reason to consider Greene so totally *bors de combat* as to be perfectly at ease for Lord Rawdon's safety. And after your arrival at Wilmington I flattered myself that, if any change of circumstances should make it necessary, you could always have been able to march to the Wolkamaw, where I imagined vessels might have passed you over to George-town. I cannot therefore conceal from your Lordship the apprehensions I felt on reading your letter to me of the 24th ult. wherein you inform me of the critical situation which you supposed the Carolinas to be in, and that you should  
probably

probably attempt to effect a junction with Major-general Phillips.

Lord Rawdon's officer-like and spirited exertions, in taking advantage of Greene's having detached from his army, have indeed eased me of my apprehensions for the present. But in the disordered state of Carolina and Georgia, as represented to me by Lieutenant-colonel Balfour, I shall dread what may be the consequence of your Lordship's move, unless a reinforcement arrives very soon in South Carolina, and such instructions are sent to the officer commanding there, as may induce him to exert himself in restoring tranquillity in that province at least. These I make no doubt your Lordship has already sent to Lord Rawdon, and that every necessary measure for this purpose will be taken by his Lordship in consequence of them, should he remain in the command. But as there are many officers in the regiments coming out who are older than Lord Rawdon, I have to lament the probability of his being superseded in it, as I can scarce flatter myself that any of them will be possessed of the knowledge requisite for conducting operations in Carolina without having ever served in that country, or be so competent to the command there as officers of more local experience. I therefore beg leave to submit to your Lordship the propriety of sending either Major-general Leslie or Brigadier-general O'Hara to Charles-town, to take the command of the troops in that district; which in the present

present critical situation of affairs in the Southern Colonies, will certainly require an officer of experience, and a perfect knowledge of the country. Had it been possible for your Lordship in your letter to me of the 10th ult. to have intimated the probability of your intention to form a junction with General Phillips, I should certainly have endeavoured to have stopped you, as I did then, as well as now, consider such a move as likely to be dangerous to our interests in the Southern Colonies. And this, my Lord, was not my only fear; for I will be free to own, that I was apprehensive for the corps under your Lordships immediate orders, as well as for that under Lord Rawdon: and I should not have thought even the one under Major-general Phillips in safety at Petersburg, at least for so long a time, had I not fortunately on hearing of your being at Wilmington sent another detachment from this army to reinforce him.

I am persuaded your Lordship will have the goodness to excuse my saying thus much; but what is done, cannot now be altered: and as your Lordship has thought proper to make this decision, I shall most gladly avail myself of your very able assistance in carrying on such operations as you shall judge best in Virginia, until we are compelled, as I fear we must be, by the climate, to bring them more northward. Your Lordship will have been informed of my ideas respecting operations to the northward of the Carolinas, by my instructions to the different General officers

officers detached to the Chesapeake; and the substance of some conversations with General Phillips on that subject, which I committed to writing and sent to him with my last dispatch, with directions to communicate it to your Lordship. By these your Lordship will observe that my first object has ever been a co-operation with your measures; but your Lordship's situation at different periods, made it necessary for me occasionally to vary my instructions to those General officers according to circumstances. They were originally directed to assist your Lordship's operations in securing South and recovering North Carolina; their attention was afterwards pointed to the saving South Carolina; and now your Lordship may possibly think it necessary to employ your force in recovering both or either of those provinces, by either a direct or indirect operation. With respect to the first, your Lordship must be the sole judge; with respect to the last, you have my opinions, which may however probably give way to yours, should they differ from them, as they will have the advantage of being formed on the spot, and upon circumstances, which at this distance I cannot of course judge of: I shall therefore leave them totally to your Lordship to decide upon, until you either hear from me or we meet.

I should be happy to be able to ascertain the time when our reinforcements may arrive; but as I have received no letters from the minister of a later date than



than the 7th of February, I am at a loss to guess how soon we may expect them. As I had judged the force I sent to the Chesapeak fully sufficient for all operations there, even though we should extend them to the Experiment (mentioned in the conversations referred to) at the Western Head of Chesapeak about Baltimore, &c. and your Lordship will perceive that it was Generals Phillips and Arnold's opinion, they were sufficient for even that on the Eastern; (which however might certainly require a much greater force,) it is possible that the additional corps your Lordship has brought with you, may enable you to return something to me for this post: but I beg your Lordship will by no means consider this as a call; for I would rather content myself with ever so bare a defensive, until there was an appearance of serious operations against me, than cramp yours in the least. But (as I said in a former letter) I trust to your Lordship's disinterestedness, that you will not require from me more troops than are absolutely wanted; and that you will recollect a circumstance, which I am ever aware of in carrying on operations in the Chesapeak, which is, that they can be no longer secure than whilst we are superior at sea. That we shall remain so, I most sincerely hope; nor have I any reason to suspect we shall not: but at all events, I may at least expect timely information will be sent me of the contrary being likely to happen. In which case I hope your Lordship may be able to  
place

place your army in a secure situation during such temporary inconvenience; for should it become permanent I need not say what our prospects in this country are likely to be. The Admiral being now off the Hook, gives me an opportunity of communicating with him by letter; and I have in the most pressing terms requested his attention to the Chesapeake, having repeatedly told him, that should the enemy possess it even for forty-eight hours your Lordship's operations there may be exposed to most imminent danger. General Robertson has also endeavoured to impress him with the same ideas; but until I have an answer in writing I cannot be sure that he will, as I do, consider the Chesapeake as the first object. For he at present seems rather inclined to lead his fleet to open the Port of Rhode-Island, and to cruise to the northward of Nantucket, for a fleet which he has heard is coming from Europe with a small reinforcement to the French armament, and which I am of opinion is bound to Rhode-Island. I have, however, taken every occasion to represent to him the necessity of hearty co-operation and communication; if they fail, I am determined it shall not be on my side.

The requisitions your Lordship has made in your letter to me of the 20th instant, for horse accoutrements, &c. shall be supplied to the utmost extent of our abilities; and the inclosed extracts of letters from Lieutenant-colonel Innes to his deputy at Charles-Town,

Town, &c. will explain to your Lordship why they are not more ample.

June 1<sup>st</sup>. I have this moment received the Admiral's answer to my letter; and I am to suppose from it that he will do every thing in his power to guard the Chesapeake. The copy is inclosed for your Lordship's information. I heartily wish he may continue in this disposition; the necessity of which I shall not fail to urge by every opportunity he may give me of communicating with him.

As I shall frequently send one of my advice boats to your Lordship with any information which may deserve your attention, I hope to hear often from you by the same conveyance. Lord Chewton has a cypher, which was given him for that purpose: but should he not have joined you, we may make use of Colonel Dundas's until he does.

I shall spare your Lordship and myself the pain of saying much to you on the loss of our valuable friend; I feel it too sensibly for expression.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. C L I N T O N.

## N U M B E R VI.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated  
Portsmouth, Virginia, July 24, 1781.*

S I R,

I FIND by your Excellency's letter of the 29th of May, delivered to me by Lieutenant-colonel M'Pherson on the 12th of this month, that neither my march from Cross Creek to Wilmington, or from thence to Petersburg, meets with your Approbation. The move from Cross Creek to Wilmington was absolutely necessary, such was the situation and distress of the troops; and so great were the sufferings of the sick and wounded, that I had no option left. I tried many methods of informing Lord Rawdon of it; they all failed. I had left such a force in South Carolina, that, if Lord Rawdon could have had timely notice of the probability of General Greene's moving towards that province, and could have called in Lieutenant colonel Watson, General Greene would not have ventured to have placed himself before Camden.

On the 22d of April I received a dispatch from Lieutenant-colonel Balfour, inclosing a letter from Lord Rawdon of the 13th, apprizing him of General Greene's approach, and saying that he could not hope to get Lieutenant-colonel Watson to him in time;  
and

and that he had then at least fifteen days provision. The fate of the garrison of Camden must have been decided before I could have hoped to have reached the Pedee or Waggamaw. I had then no certainty of being able to get vessels in time to assist in passing the latter. From Wilmington to the Waggamaw is a perfect desert; and indeed in all that low country it is impossible to subsist in the summer, for want of water to turn the mills.

Had a misfortune happened to Lord Rawdon's corps, I knew that the whole country East of Santee and Pedee would be in arms against us. I therefore did not think that I could, with thirteen hundred infantry and two hundred cavalry, undertake such a march, and the passage of two such rivers as the Pedee and Santee, without exposing the corps under my command to the utmost hazard of disgrace and ruin. If, on the contrary, Lord Rawdon should have effected his retreat from Camden, and have assembled his whole force West of Santee, I was convinced that General Greene could do no effectual mischief but over-running the back country, which I should arrive too late to prevent, and which different corps of the rebels have constantly done ever since the first battle of Camden, exclusive only of the ground on which our forts were constructed. I should therefore have carried back my army to South Carolina, giving every advantage to General Greene's movement, in order to commence a defensive war on the frontiers of  
that

that province, which I have long since declared, both to yourself and to the minister, to be in my opinion impracticable, against the rebellious inhabitants supported by a continental army. In the measure which I pursued, I neither risked my own corps or Major-general Phillips's, being determined to return to Wilmington from Halifax, unless I heard from that officer that I could join him with safety; the great quantity of provisions, which I was credibly informed I should find at Halifax, would easily enable me to return. Major-general Phillips could be in no danger, as I had written expressly to him to take no measures in consequence of my letter that could expose his corps to hazard; and indeed I cannot help observing, that in this instance your Excellency seems to think the force of Virginia more formidable than you have done on some other occasions. With the warmest zeal for the service of my king and country, I am conscious that my judgement is liable to error. Perhaps, in the difficult situation I was in at Wilmington, the measure which I adopted was not the best; but I have at least the satisfaction to find, by the intercepted letters of the 14th of May, from General Greene to Baron Steuben, that it was not agreeable to his wishes that I came into Virginia.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

C O R R E S-

# N U M B E R VII.

State of the TROOPS that marched with the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis.

RANK AND FILE PRESENT, AND FIT FOR DUTY.									
DATE.	B R I T I S H.					G E R- M A N.	P R O V I N C I A L S.		TOTAL.
	Brigade of Guards.	Twenty-third Regiment.	Thirty-third Regiment.	Seventy-fifth Regiment, Two Battalions.	Eighty-second Regiment, Light Company.		Regiment of Bofe.	British Legion.	
May 1, 1781.	387	194	209	175	36	228	173	33	1435





C O R R E S P O N D E N C E

B E T W E E N

Gen. Sir HENRY CLINTON, K. B.

C O M M A N D E R I N C H I E F,

A N D

Lieut. Gen. Earl C O R N W A L L I S.

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P A R T III.

R E L A T I V E T O T H E O P E R A T I O N S  
I N V I R G I N I A.

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N U M B E R I.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated Byrd's  
Plantation, James River, May 26, 1781.*

S I R,

I HAVE consented to the request of Brigadier-general Arnold to go to New York; he conceives that your Excellency wishes him to attend you there, and his present indisposition renders him unequal to the fatigue of service. He will represent the horrid enormities which are committed by our privateers in  
Chefapeak-

Chesapeak-bay; and I must join my earnest wish, that some remedy may be applied to an evil which is so very prejudicial to his Majesty's service.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

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N U M B E R    I I.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated  
Byrd's Plantation, North of James River, 26th of  
May, 1781.*

S I R,

T H E reinforcement is safely arrived in James River, and I opened all your dispatches to poor Phillips, marked *On his Majesty's service*.

I hope that your Excellency has received my letters from Wilmington, and one of the 20th from Petersburg; as the latter went by an uncertain conveyance, I send a duplicate of it.

The arrival of the reinforcement has made me easy about Portsmouth for the present. I have sent General Leslie thither with the seventeenth regiment and the two battalions of Anspach, keeping the forty-third regiment with the army. I shall now proceed to dislodge La Fayette from Richmond, and with my light troops to destroy any magazines or stores in the neighbourhood which may have been collected  
either

either for his use or for General Greene's army. From thence I purpose to move to the Neck at Williamsburgh, which is represented as healthy, and where some subsistence may be procured; and keep myself unengaged from operations which might interfere with your plan for the campaign, until I have the satisfaction of hearing from you. I hope I shall then have an opportunity to receive better information than has hitherto been in my power to procure, relative to a proper harbour and place of arms. At present I am inclined to think well of York. The objections to Portsmouth are, that it cannot be made strong without an army to defend it, that it is remarkably unhealthy, and can give no protection to a ship of the line. Wayne has not yet joined La Fayette; nor can I positively learn where he is, nor what is his force. Greene's cavalry are said to be coming this way; but I have no certain accounts of it.

Your Excellency desires General Phillips and Arnold to give you their opinion relative to Mr. *Alexander's* proposal. As General Arnold goes to New York by the first safe conveyance, you will have an opportunity of hearing his sentiments in person.

Experience has made me less sanguine, and more arrangements seem to me necessary for so important an expedition than appear to occur to General Arnold.

Mr. *Alexander's* conversations bear too strong a resemblance to those of the emissaries from North

Carolina to give me much confidence; and, from the experience I have had, and the dangers I have undergone, one maxim appears to me to be absolutely necessary for the safe and honourable conduct of this war, which is, that we should have as few posts as possible, and that wherever the King's troops are, they should be in respectable force. By the vigorous exertions of the present governors of America, large bodies of men are soon collected; and I have too often observed, that when a storm threatens our friends disappear.

In regard to taking possession of Philadelphia by an incursion, (even if practicable,) without an intention of keeping or burning it, (neither of which appear to be advisable,) I should apprehend it would do more harm than good to the cause of Britain.

I shall take the liberty of repeating, that, if offensive war is intended, Virginia appears to me to be the only province in which it can be carried on, and in which there is a stake. But to reduce the province, and keep possession of the country, a considerable army would be necessary; for, with a small force, the business would probably terminate unfavourably, though the beginning might be successful. In case it is thought expedient, and a proper army for the attempt can be formed, I hope your Excellency will do me the justice to believe, that I neither wish nor expect to have the command of it, leaving you at New York on the defensive. Such sentiments are so far

far from my heart, that I can with great truth assure you, that few things could give me greater pleasure than being relieved by your presence from a situation of so much anxiety and responsibility.

By my letter of the 20th, your Excellency will observe, that, instead of thinking it possible to do any thing in North Carolina, I am of opinion that it is doubtful whether we can keep the posts in the back part of South Carolina; and I believe I have stated, in former letters, the infinite difficulty of protecting a frontier of three hundred miles against a persevering enemy, in a country where we have no water communication, and where few of the inhabitants are active or useful friends.

In enumerating the corps employed in the Southern District, your Excellency will recollect that they are all very weak, and that some of the British as well as Provincial regiments retain nothing but the name.

Our weakness at Guildford was not owing to any detachment, unless that with the baggage; but to our losses by action, sickness, &c. during the winter's campaign.

I saw with concern that you thought Lieutenant-colonel Balfour had acted injudiciously in sending home some transports. That business has, I apprehend, been misrepresented by persons interested in retaining rotten vessels in the service of Government. The circumstances I do not now perfectly recollect, but I believe you will find that the ships sent home were

were either victuallers, which the Treasury desired in the strongest manner, or transports which were so exceedingly bad that they could never have gone out with safety, after a stay of three months in Charlestown harbour. Whatever was done in it was with my approbation at the time, appearing evidently for the good of the service: I, therefore, think it my duty to exculpate Lieutenant-colonel Balfour, whom I have found, on all occasions, a most zealous, intelligent, and deserving officer.

Colonel Robinson's corps is so weak, and deserts so fast, that at the recommendation of General Arnold, I have consented that it shall return in the transports to New-York.

I have the honour to be, &c.

C O R N W A L L I S.

N U M B E R



N U M B E R III.

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Major-general Phillips, dated  
March 14, 1781, half past Two.*

[Received at Petersburg by Earl Cornwallis, May 20.]

DEAR PHILLIPS,

BY the enclosed from the Admiral you will see that the want of intelligence has again lost us a fair opportunity of giving "*a mortal blow*." I hope, however, he will still overtake them before they reach Chesapeak; they failed in a snow storm on Wednesday, and I fear he was not out of Gardiner's Bay till Saturday. He was, however, left pursuing on the 11th, with all his coppers and a fair wind. I think, if he does not overtake them at sea, they will not risk an action in Lynhaven-bay, and will therefore proceed with their *whole* fleet to York, as I told the Admiral they would, and there, perhaps, lay; and I had almost said *fascinate* the Admiral till another fleet arrives; if from Europe, it ought not to come without a hint from thence; from the West Indies it will not probably come unaccompanied by our friend Sir George. 'Tis possible it only means to see the transports off the Chesapeak, and then proceed to the *West-Indies* with the fleet of men of war; 'tis possible, also, that the whole is gone to the West-Indies, for  
it

it is a bold move to evacuate Rhode-island, and proceed to the Chesapeake so encumbered, liable to be followed by an unencumbered superior copper fleet. God send our old Admiral success! I depend on early information from you, and shall prepare for every possible event.—Recollect that we have not a single transport till you send some. With every wish for your health and success,

Believe me, &c.

H. CLINTON.

The schooner shall attend you, though we can ill spare her. As often as possible communicate by these vessels; they make their passage better than the frigates.

P. S. I have received your letters.

In addition to what I have written above, pray observe me well in what I am saying.

I think, if the French are gone to Chesapeake, they will shelter themselves in York-River.—The Admiral will immediately hold his usual language—that he waits for the army. That from South-Carolina cannot come, as Colonel Balfour has very injudiciously sent home the transports.—I cannot move a man till you send back transports; but, if he proposes any thing to you, he must first declare in writing positively what he thinks his fleet will do, or at least attempt

attempt, before you can decide; and then, after consulting your officers, let me know your opinion what can be done, and what land force it will require to do it. If all agree that they will be unattackable in that station, it must be blocked, and then we must do our best to assist Lord Cornwallis's operations, or carry on desultory operations in the Chesapeake till some other plan can be settled; but all must be settled in formal council.

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## N U M B E R IV.

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Major-general Phillips, dated New-York, March 24, 1781.*

[Received by Earl Cornwallis at Petersburg, May 20.]

DEAR SIR,

I BELIEVE that Lord Cornwallis has finished his campaign, and, if report says true, very handsomely, by taking all Greene's cannon, and recovering the greatest part of his own men who had been made prisoners by Mr. Greene.—If that should be the case, and Lord Cornwallis does not want any co-operation to assist him, and you see no prospect of striking an important stroke elsewhere, I shall probably request you and General Arnold to return to me, with such troops as I have already named in my instructions.

instructions. But all this will depend on the information I shall receive from you, and your opinion respecting the post at Portsmouth, and such others as you propose to establish on James river, with their importance considered, either as assisting Lord Cornwallis's operations, or connected with those of the navy.

When you return, you will be pleased to bring with you a small proportion of howitzes, mortars, cohorns, &c. so placed in the vessel in which they are embarked, as to be ready to land directly, as it is very likely we may proceed upon some operation immediately on your arrival.

I believe Fayette is intrenched at Annapolis, and that his corps does not now exceed nine hundred men, though he started with thirteen hundred. You may possibly attempt him in earnest:—he will, at all events, serve as a mask to your return to us.

You will probably hear from Lord Cornwallis before you determine on any attempt at a distance from him.—I wish much to know what troops he thinks he can spare from the troops under his Lordship's immediate orders; for, till I do, 'tis impossible to fix any plan.—Three complete regiments will, I hope, arrive at Charles-town in the course of a few days, if Captain Elphinston should think it too early in the season to come directly here; and three more are hourly expected from the West-Indies, both which divisions will, of course, join me.

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The French certainly expect an early reinforcement; if it comes from Europe, we must, I think, hear from thence long before it arrives: if from the Havannah, copper-bottomed sloops or frigates, which the Admiral will doubtless have on the look out, will announce their arrival, and give you time to determine what, in that case, will be best to be done.—And here I take the liberty of hinting to you, that (from the appearance on the map) when you have once obtained a naval force in Curratuck and Albemarle Sounds, by holding the bridges of Pequimans and Pasquotank rivers, you secure a short passage across the Albermarle-sound, and communication with Lord Cornwallis; or, by destroying the bridges on those rivers, you prevent the enemy's approach by the bridge at North West landing.

Upon those hints I request your opinion, in cypher, as soon as possible.—In the mean time I shall prepare for what may probably be your determination, after talking with Brigadier-general Arnold.

I beg you will be so good to forward the enclosed to Lieutenant-colonel Moncrief by the first opportunity to Charles-town, and that you will bring Mr. Fyers, of the corps of engineers, with you, when you return to this place.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. C L I N T O N.

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P. S.

P. S. Pray fend Brigadier-general Arnold here by the first good opportunity, if you should not have particular occasion for his services.

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N U M B E R V.

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Major-general Phillips, dated New-York, April 11, 1781.*

[Received by Earl Cornwallis, at Petersburg, May 24.]

Your letter of the 3d instant, by Captain Chads, which I am this day favoured with, makes me apprehensive lest you may have misconceived my intentions with regard to the order in which I wished that the different objects recommended to you in my instructions should be attended to; and that your having in consequence proposed to commence with strengthening the works at Portsmouth, may occasion some delay of the operations desired to favour those of Lord Cornwallis, whose situation after the action of the 15th ult. might not only derive the greatest advantage from, but indeed might possibly be so critical as even to require a timely exertion of the troops under your command.

You will, therefore, have the goodness to forgive me, if I request you to recollect, that at the time those instructions were drawn up, General Arnold was partly invested by a considerable body of militia,  
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and threatened with an attack from the French armament from Rhode-island, and Fayette's corps then on their march to Virginia, which naturally pointed out the *security of him, the troops under his orders, and the posts on Elizabeth-river, as the principal object of your expedition*; which words were certainly intended to mean no more than relieving them from their supposed danger, by either forming a junction with General Arnold, or taking such measures against the enemies opposed to him as might most effectually enable you to throw into his lines an immediate supply of provisions and men; for how could I imagine that the post at Portsmouth, which General Arnold had but just informed me, in his letter of the 27th of February, he could defend against the force of the country, and two thousand French troops, until a reinforcement arrived from hence, would require additional works for its security, after you had joined him with so considerable a reinforcement, or was acting against the rebel stations in its neighbourhood? And I could not but suppose that you yourself comprehended what I intended to be the first object of my instructions, when you tell me in your letter, by Serjeant Coulter, that the proposed consultation would go, "*in the first instance to the security of this post, and in the next to the fulfilling the first object of your Excellency's instructions.*" Which, (excuse me for repeating it) has been invariably in all my instructions to the General-officers sent to the Cheapeake,



peak, *operation in favour of Lord Cornwallis*. But, if you will have the goodness to read those I gave you once more, I am sure you will perceive that what I have said about *strengthening the present works on Elizabeth-river, and adding such others as you shall think necessary*, is placed subsequent in order to most of the other objects recommended to you, and they were of course designed to have been taken into consideration after those had been accomplished, and you were upon the point of returning to me with part of your present force.

I am always happy to receive your opinions respecting the different operations of the war in this country, particularly those immediately connected with your own station. I, therefore, of course, shall pay every attention to what you say about the post at Portsmouth, and feel myself greatly obliged to you for the trouble you have taken to investigate its good and bad properties. My ideas of a post on Elizabeth-river have continued uniformly the same since I first took a view of it, having always considered it merely as a station to protect the King's ships, which might occasionally sail from thence to cruise in the waters of the Chesapeake, and command its entrance. I, therefore, only wished to have there such a number of troops as might be sufficient for its defence, and which, being occasionally reinforced, as circumstances should require and our abilities admit, might act offensively in distressing and embarrassing the measures

measures of the enemy in its neighbourhood.—For, God forbid I should think of burying the elite of my army in Nansemond and Princess Anne! these ideas I communicated to the General officers I sent on that service; and they each adopted such as appeared to them best calculated to answer the intended purpose. My own opinion indeed was that we should possess a close work at *Mill Point*, (which Fyers fortified by my order in 1776, as he will remember,) another at Norfolk, and a third somewhere on the *opposite side* of the river: but as I had been there only for a very short time, I could not of course but be influenced by the representations of the General officers and Engineers on the spot, who had more time, and better opportunity to examine all the different positions on that river. General Leslie therefore having informed me that he had, with the unanimous suffrage of the sea and land officers on the expedition, made choice of Portsmouth, (which probably he did with a view of putting our friends of Princess Anne, &c. under cover and protection, but, by your account, a small house, I fear, will be sufficient for them all,) and his Engineer, Captain Sutherland, having in consequence begun a work there, which he was of opinion could in a few days be in a state to be perfectly secure with a small garrison; I was induced to recommend to General Arnold the occupying the same ground: and though I must do the justice to that General officer to acknowledge that he gave me,  
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in his letter of the 23d of January, a very different representation of the post at Portsmouth, from the one given me by Major-general Leslie; circumstances became so critical at the time I received it, in consequence of the French preparations at Rhode-Island, and the numerous militia who were collecting in Virginia and North Carolina, that I thought it an improper time to change the station, because good or bad, such as it was, it must for the present be defended. I accordingly thought it right to defer, to some more proper occasion, the writing to General Arnold on the subject; and I was afterwards happy to find by his letter to me of the 27th of February, that his works there were in such forwardness; and that he was even preparing to send up James River, an expedition of five hundred men. All these circumstances considered, I was led to suppose that the post at Portsmouth, was now rendered an eligible one by the manner in which it was fortified. However, as I intimated before, it is by no means a position of my choice, and if you and General Arnold have such good reasons to condemn it, it may be right to return to our original object, *a station to protect the King's ships, which is capable of being maintained by a garrison of about five or six hundred men*; and if Mill-Point will answer these purposes without Norfolk, and the corresponding station on the opposite side of the river, I can have no objection;  
but

but leave it to you to act as you judge best for the King's service.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

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N U M B E R VI.

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Major-General Phillips,  
dated New-York, April 26th, 1781.*

[Received by Earl Cornwallis, at Petersburg, May 24.]

D E A R S I R,

YOUR letters of the 15th, 16th, 18th, and 19th instant, were delivered to me on the 22d by Captain Biggs of his Majesty's ship *Amphitrite*. And I should have now entered largely into, and given a detail answer (agreeable to your desire) to the several subjects thereof, if I had not from the purport of Lord Cornwallis's letter of the 10th, and yours of the 19th, judged it to be unnecessary at present to give either you or myself that trouble.

What you say in your letter of the 15th instant, respecting the post at Portsmouth, and the choice of another somewhere else on Elizabeth River, you will find fully answered in mine to you of the 11th which accompanies this: for (though written above a fortnight since) I had no safe opportunity before the present of sending it to you.

Lord

Lord Cornwallis's arrival at Wilmington has considerably changed the complexion of our affairs to the southward, and all operations to the northward must probably give place to those in favour of his Lordship, which at present appear to require our more immediate attention. I know nothing of his Lordship's situation but what I have learnt from his letter to me of the 10th, which you have read; and as I have the strongest reason to believe that he had above three thousand men (exclusive of cavalry and militia) when he entered North Carolina, I am totally at a loss to conjecture how his numbers came to be reduced before the day of action to one thousand three hundred and sixty infantry, except by supposing (as you have done) that he had previously weakened his army by detachments. Of this however, I shall probably be informed when I receive the copy of his Lordship's letter to the Minister; and I shall most likely be at the same time informed what prospects he may still have of arming the numerous friends we were taught to expect his finding in the districts he has visited in his march to, and retreat from, Guildford; without whose assistance we shall, I fear, hold those provinces by a very precarious tenure.

I had great hopes before I received Lord Cornwallis's letter, that his Lordship would have been in a condition to have spared a considerable part of his army from Carolina for the operations in Chesapeake, but

but you will observe from it that, instead of sending any part of his present force thither, he proposes to detain a part of the reinforcement coming from Europe for his more southern operations, even though they should be defensive. I shall therefore take the opinions of the General officers near me upon the present state of our affairs, and I propose afterwards to send you such a further detachment from this army as we may judge can be done with tolerable security to this post, at least while we remain superior at sea.

With so large a force as you will then have, I flatter myself that you will be able to make the most effectual exertions either directly or indirectly in Lord Cornwallis's favour, as far as your efforts on the shores of the Chesapeake can co-operate with what he may be doing in Carolina. What these, however, may be, you, as being upon the spot, must certainly be the best judge, until you either hear further from or see his Lordship.

In yours and Brigadier General Arnold's joint letter, you mention that from one thousand six hundred to two thousand more men, would enable you to take a post in force at Petersburg; from whence you might break up Mr. Greene's communications with Virginia, and in co-operation with Lord Cornwallis, probably disperse the Rebel army. And that you could moreover, with this increased strength, attempt Fayette's corps, Baltimore, and



Annapolis, with great probability of success, and finally attempt Philadelphia, and take post in the lower counties of Delaware, for which you apprehend your force would then be sufficient.

The security of the two Carolinas is certainly an object of the greatest importance, and should at all events be first attended to. Success also against any considerable corps of the enemy, which may be collected any where within reach, and the taking or destroying their public stores, magazines, &c. are undoubtedly very important advantages. But there is in my humble opinion still another operation, which if successful would be most solidly decisive in its consequences, and is therefore well worth our consideration. It is the trying the same experiment (which has hitherto unfortunately not succeeded to the southward) in other districts, which have been represented as most friendly to the King's interests. Virginia has been in general looked upon as universally hostile; Maryland has not been as yet tried, but is supposed to be not quite so much so: but the inhabitants of Pennsylvania on both sides of the Susquehannah, York, Lancaster, Chester, and the Peninsula between Chesapeake and Delaware, are represented to me to be friendly. There or thereabouts, I think this experiment should now be tried, but it cannot be done fairly until we have a force sufficient not only to go there, but to retain a respectable hold of the country afterwards, should it  
be



be judged necessary. I wish that our numbers were competent to the occupying two corresponding stations at Baltimore and Elk river. Agreeable to what I mentioned to you in the conversations we have had together on this subject, to which that you may be able on occasion to refer, I have committed the substance of them to writing, and send them to you inclosed. This I should have done sooner, had I had a safe opportunity before. I have now the greater reason to be convinced that the opinions I then gave you were right, from a conversation I have since had with a very intelligent friend of ours from the country, known to Colonel Simcoe, who goes to you by this opportunity, and will be able to give you the fullest information thereon.

April 30th. I expected that the Medea would have been sent to Lord Cornwallis, and that Captain Duncan would have been appointed by the Admiral to conduct the naval operations in the Chesapeake, for which he is particularly qualified from his knowledge of those waters, and his having had the management of that business in Lord Howe's command. But the Admiral has just wrote to me that he cannot possibly at present spare Captain Duncan, and that he has appointed Captain Hudson of the Richmond to carry my dispatches to Chesapeake and Cape Fear, and afterwards attend this service. My dispatches will therefore go in her under the charge of Lord Chewton, and as we both know Captain Hudson's  
great

great zeal to co-operate with the troops on all occasions, I hope every thing will go on under his direction perfectly to your satisfaction.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

Inclosed in No. VI.

*Substance of several Conversations had with Major-general Phillips, on the Subject of Operations in the Chesapeake, before his Embarkation on his Expedition thither.*

[Received by Earl Cornwallis at Peterfburg, May 24.]

UNTIL I know Lord Cornwallis's success to the southward, and what force can be spared from the southern district for further operations, and until the reinforcements expected to this army arrive; such troops as are in the Chesapeake may be employed, first in assisting his Lordship's operations, and then in either establishing a permanent post near the entrance of that bay (if the naval commander does not approve of the one in Elizabeth River,) where large ships as well as small may lie in security during any temporary superiority of the enemy's fleet; or if such a post cannot be found, in employing what remains of the season in carrying on desultory expeditions against such towns, stations, magazines, &c. as the enemy may have there;—to convince those people more by what we can do, than what we really do,  
that

that they are in our power; and finally, in pursuing the same plan (supporting friends,) in a more northerly and healthy climate.

With regard to a station for the protection of the King's ships, I know of no place so proper as York Town, if it could be taken possession of, fortified, and garrisoned with one thousand men;—as by having one thousand more at a post somewhere in Elizabeth River, York and James Rivers would be ours, and our cruisers might command the waters of the Chesapeak. Troops might likewise be spared from these posts to carry on expeditions during the summer months, when probably nothing can be risked in that climate but water movements. But if the Heights of York and those on Gloucester side cannot be so well and so soon fortified as to render that post hors d'inult, before the enemy can move a force, &c. against it, it may not be adviseable to attempt it: in that case, something may possibly be done at Old Point Comfort to cover large ships lying in Hampton Road, (which is reckoned a good one, and not so liable to injury from gales at N. E. as that of York, particularly in winter.) If neither can be secured, we must content ourselves with keeping the Chesapeak, with frigates and other armed vessels, which will always find security, against a superior naval force, in Elizabeth River. As our operations in proper season may re-commence in the Upper James, perhaps a station might be found at  
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the entrance of the narrows of that river that may be of use in future day, and held with a small force. James-town seems a proper spot for such a station; as does the place where the narrows and windings begin.

At a proper time of the year operations must still go northward—either by a direct movement—stationing your supplies in the navigable rivers which lie favourable for it—in which you are, however, exposed to a temporary naval superiority of the enemy—or by proceeding up the Chesapeake, if a force equal to the attempt can be collected; (for when it can, I should propose to take a station, threatening all the provinces bordering on Chesapeake with a desultory war;) prevent those provinces from being succoured;—by menacing communications; and availing ourselves of a supposed numerous band of friends, who otherwise may be forced to arm against us. Had we a force sufficient for two movements, that would be best;—four thousand men to proceed in transports up to Baltimore, taking a station within a certain distance of the Susquehannah, and having vessels always ready for a rapid move with part, or even the whole, to a corresponding station in the Eastern Neck; while a corps of ten thousand men, or more, (according to the force that can be brought against you,) occupies the Eastern Neck, and can, in its turn, succour the western corps. Whether the eastern corps acts alone, or in co-operation, it must  
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be in very great force for reasons obvious. I do not know enough of this Neck to say what force, or whether any, can be placed in security. The most advanced station would certainly be the best, particularly at first, to enable our friends, who, we are told, are at Lancaster, Little York-town, and Chester, to join us.—Iron Hill may perhaps be it; and as marshy creeks run up from Delaware and Chesapeake, the heads of which are not far asunder, many good posts may be found for corps of different strength;—for while we command those bays, there can be no danger of operation against our flanks and rear; and if the enemy should be superior in one, he cannot be so in both:—we should therefore have always a communication open. This corps should be very strong indeed,—or there should be one acting in favour of it in Jersey. The preference must be given to that plan, against which Washington can bring the least force. He undoubtedly can bring a greater force into Jersey than any where, as the New-England troops may be prevailed on to go there,—and they cannot so easily be drawn into the Eastern Neck, or even over the Delaware. Besides, if Washington moves into Jersey, his meal and flour have both but a short portage; but once deprived of the eastern counties, his cattle in that case coming chiefly from New England, will increase his difficulty of subsistence; for as we may, under those circumstances, attempt to occupy King's Ferry, he will  
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be reduced to the Detour. I therefore should prefer a single corps in the Eastern Neck, sufficient, however, for the purpose. As the French have added considerably to Washington's force, I do not think an army less than Sir William Howe had could be sufficient—fifteen thousand men. But where are they to be found? My whole force, rank and file, fit for duty, is nearly twenty-four thousand. It is presumed Lord Cornwallis will be content with six thousand for the southward; two thousand we suppose in the Chesapeake—twelve thousand are required for New York;—there remains only four thousand for that operation. I did expect ten thousand men as an augmentation to my present army.—Had they come, this project might have taken place; but I am now told, I am to expect only four thousand—which will not be sufficient.—However, once convinced that the French will not send reinforcement, and that we shall be permanently superior at sea, and have an active co-operating naval commander,—I should be tempted to try:—but until all this combines, I dare not:—and if it is delayed too long, our friends in Pennsylvania may be forced from us, or cajoled.

If we could hold the Chesapeake by the posts on Elizabeth and York rivers, Oxford, and Port Penn, and the two Eastern on the sea-coasts, and threaten our enemies of Virginia and Maryland, and protect our friends of all these countries, I think we should  
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in that case leave the French little to induce them to support the war.

26th April. These however I give you merely as my opinions at the time we talked this on subject;—and they will influence you, of course, no further, than as they correspond with your own now.

With respect to the number and disposition of friends in Pennsylvania, I am telling you more what I wish than what I expect to find; for we have been too often deceived by representations of sanguine friends.

H. CLINTON.

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N U M B E R VII.

(Secret, and most private.)

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Major-general Phillips,  
dated New York, 30th April, 1781.*

[Received by Earl Cornwallis at Petersburg.]

*Dear Phillips,*

I CANNOT judge from Lord Cornwallis's letter, whether he proposes any further operations in the Carolinas—what they may be—and how far you can operate in his favour. If I was to give a private opinion from reading his letter—I would say I cannot conceive from it that he has any offensive object

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in view. He says, that North-Carolina is a country, in which it is impossible for an army to act or move without the assistance of friends: he does not seem to think we have any there—nor do you. I shall give no opinion respecting that at present, or until I receive his Lordship's account of the state of the province, and of his winter campaign.

His Lordship tells me that he wants reinforcement.—With nine British battalions, and detachments from seven more, (besides those from the Artillery and seventeenth Dragoons)—five Hessian battalions, and a detachment of Yagers—and eleven Provincial battalions, exclusive of the cavalry and infantry of the Legion, and the Provincial Light Infantry;—I would ask,—How can that be possible? And if it is, what hopes can I have of a force sufficient to undertake any solid operation?

To be brief—If his Lordship proposes no operation to you soon, and you see none that will operate for him directly—(that is, before the first of June,)—I think the best indirect one in his favour will be, what you and General Arnold proposed to me in No. 10 of your joint letter of the 18th instant, beginning with the attempt on Philadelphia. The only risk you run is from a temporary superiority of the enemy at sea.—Land and naval reinforcements from France are talked of—If they come immediately from Europe, we must have some information of them, and they will, I hope, be followed;—if from  
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the West-Indies, I hope the same. It is however an important move, and ought (in my opinion) to be tried, even with some risk. If our friends are as numerous and hearty as Colonel Rankin represents them to be, with their assistance added to what you carry thither, you will be able to maintain yourself. But if, after having given the experiment a fair trial, you find it will not do; you may either retire to Portsmouth, or by transports and boats in Delaware pass to Jersey—where, at all events, I must pick you up, by receiving you at, or near, Mount Holly. Give me timely notice of your intended move, and, if possible, I will follow you into Delaware with such a small reinforcement as I can at the time spare.

As my invitation to Lord Cornwallis to come to the Chesapeake was upon a supposition that every thing would be settled in the Carolinas, I do not think he will come;—if however, he determines to do so as a visitor, he will get Barklay or some other to bring him, for the Admiral has this day only ordered a ship for the purpose—and the one he has ordered cannot (I apprehend) get over the bar of Cape Fear.

Our Admiral is grown, if possible, more impracticable than ever. He swears to me that he knows nothing of his recall—to others he says, he is going home immediately. If the next packet does not satisfy me in this particular, I shall probably retire, and leave him to Lord Cornwallis's management.—

To

To whom it will be my advice to try the only experiment that (in my opinion) can operate, if the one in Carolina has failed.—As to Virginia, I know none which can reduce that province in one campaign.—Though it is certainly a great exertion, the only one that appears to me is the above. If I stay it shall be tried. Without a co-operating naval Chief, the risk is doubly great:—it would be sufficiently so with one. But if it succeeds, its consequences must be very decisive.

*May 2d.* The reinforcement is embarked, and fallen down to Staten Island, where they wait only the Admiral's pleasure for their proceeding to Chesapeake. Two days ago he offered to take them thither under the escort of his fleet—to-day he writes to me, "that he thinks he cannot be justified in losing a moment to proceed off the Chesapeake; but if I think it of greater consequence to land the reinforcement of troops proposed to be sent there, than to intercept the enemy, he will take the transports with him—otherwise, he shall certainly leave them behind, until it is known where the enemy's fleet is lodged, of which he will transmit the earliest information to me, and then appoint a convoy to bring them on." In answer, I have acknowledged the very great importance of intercepting the French fleet—but that it is also of importance that this reinforcement should join you immediately, and to leave him (as being the best judge) the properest mode of accomplishing it with safety.—Thus the matter rests.

*May*

*May 3d.* As I am (from the Admiral's strange conduct) doubtful when or whether the reinforcement will ever join you, I do not now send Colonel Rankin to you, as I at first proposed—but I enclose his proposals. You will see by them that he is not much of an officer—but he appears to be a plain, sensible man, worth attending to—And Simcoe can explain a thousand things respecting him and his associates, which I cannot in a letter. As you seemed to think (before you received Lord Cornwallis's letter) that all direct operations in favour of his Lordship would cease by the end of May; should the expedition not fail from hence before the 20th inst. and I do not hear further from you, I will not send it: for, in that case, I think the experiment on the peninsula may be tried to more advantage up Delaware than round by Chesapeake: in which case I shall expect General Arnold and you, with such troops as you can spare, to meet me at the head of Elk or Bohemia, and form a junction. I can certainly spare more troops from hence for such a move than I can send to Chesapeake, for reasons obvious. Pray let me receive General Arnold's and your opinions upon Colonel Rankin's proposals as soon as possible. I confess I am not sanguine; but if the experiment can be tried without any other risk than from the enemy's superiority at sea, I should wish to do it. Therefore if General Arnold and you like it, I shall be reconciled to it, and it shall be tried, after I know your opinions on it, and the inclosed

inclosed propofals—and if you approve, about what time you think the attempt may take place. I am perfuaded, that on application, Captain Hudfon will give you a frigate for your difpatches. If we move up Delaware, Captain Duncan, (Lord Howe's Captain,) will conduct us. I have already talked to him on the fubject, and he approves.

If Lord Cornwallis propofes any thing neceffary for his operations, you of courfe muft adopt it if you can, letting me know your thoughts thereon. But fhould his Lordfhip determine on a defenfive in the Carolinas, he furely cannot want any of the European reinforcement, and will of courfe fend it to you, and all fuch other as fhall arrive. Thus reinforced, if after leaving a fufficient garrifon in Elizabeth river, you can proceed to the peninsula; I think we fhall be in force to give this a fair trial: and I may leave you in the command there, unlefs things fhould take a more favourable turn in the Carolinas, and Lord Cornwallis's prefence there be no longer neceffary; for, until they do, I fhould imagine he will not leave Carolina.

You will think me long-winded. But as fafe opportunities are not frequent, I muft make the beft ufe I can of this. I refer you for more information to Lord Chewton, who is the bearer of my difpatches.

H. CLINTON.

N U M-

N U M B E R VIII.

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Major-general Phillips,  
dated May 11.*

[Received by Earl Cornwallis at Peterfburg, May 24.]

D E A R P H I L L I P S,

I was in hopes that the fleet would have failed long since, but although the Admiral dates his letter the 10th, off Sandy Hook, I fear he is still within.

Report says that the French had not failed from Rhode-Island a few days ago, they might, however, have failed yesterday: the only news we have is a riot at Philadelphia, and all paper-money refused in payment; it works finely.

No news from Lord Cornwallis since his letter of the 10th of April.

Washington some days since called in Burgoyne; by a letter from him this day, that is countermanded or suspended; their councils seem a little unsettled,—it is reported and believed, that the French troops are to join Washington, and are now on their route.

I am, &c.

H. C L I N T O N.

Lord Chewton failed three days since for Lord Cornwallis.

N U M-

## N U M B E R IX.

*Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York  
June 15, 1781.*

[Received June 26, 1781, from Ensign Amiel.]

MY LORD,

AS the Admiral has thought proper to stop the sailing of the convoy with stores, horse accoutrements, &c. (which has been for some days ready to sail to the Chesapeake) without assigning to me any reason for so doing, I delay not a moment to dispatch a runner to your Lordship, with a duplicate of my letter of the 11th instant, which was to go by that opportunity.

And as I am led to suppose (from your Lordship's letter of the 26th ult.) that you may not think it expedient to adopt the operations I had recommended in the Upper Chesapeake, and will by this time probably have finished those you were engaged in, I request you will immediately embark a part of the troops stated in the letter inclosed (beginning with the light infantry, &c.) and send them to me with all possible dispatch; for which purpose Captain Hudson, or officer commanding the King's ships, will I presume, upon your Lordship's application appoint a proper convoy.

I shall likewise in proper time solicit the Admiral to send some more transports to the Chesapeake, in  
which



which your Lordship will please to send hither the remaining troops you judge can be spared from the defence of the posts you may occupy; as I do not think it advisable to leave more troops in that unhealthy climate at this season of the year than what are absolutely wanted for a defensive, and desultory water excursions.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

Duplicate inclosed in Number IX.

*Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York,  
June 11, 1781.*

[Received the 26th of June from Ensign Amiel.]

MY LORD,

I am honoured with your Lordship's letter of the 26th ult. and as I am unwilling to detain the convoy, I shall not have time to write so fully to your Lordship as I would wish.

Respecting my opinions of stations in James and York rivers, I shall beg leave only to refer your Lordship to my instructions to, and correspondence with, Generals Phillips and Arnold; together with the substance of my conversations with the former; which your Lordship will have found amongst General

Phillips's papers, and to which I referred you in my last dispatch. I shall, therefore, of course, approve of any alteration your Lordship may think proper to make in those stations.

The detachments I have made from this army into Chesapeake, since General Leslie's expedition in October last, inclusive, have amounted to seven thousand seven hundred and twenty-four effectives; and at the time your Lordship made the junction with the corps there, there were under Major-general Phillips's orders five thousand three hundred and four; a force I should have hoped, would be sufficient of itself to have carried on operations in any of the southern provinces of America; where, as appears by the intercepted letters of Washington and La Fayette, they are in no situation to stand against even a division of that army.

I have no reason to suppose the Continentals under La Fayette can exceed one thousand; and I am told by Lieutenant-colonel Hill, of the ninth regiment, that about a fortnight ago, he met at Frederick-town, the Pennsylvania line, under Wayne, of about the same number, who were so discontented, that their officers were afraid to trust them with ammunition. This, however, may have since altered; and your Lordship may possibly have opposed to you, from fifteen hundred to two thousand Continentals, and (as La Fayette observes,) a small body of ill armed peasantry, full as spiritless as the militia  
of

of the southern provinces, and without any service.

Comparing, therefore, the force now under your Lordship in the Chesapeake, and that of the enemy opposed to you (and I think it clearly appears they have for the present, no intention of sending thither reinforcements,) I should have hoped you would have quite sufficient to carry on any operation in Virginia; should that have been advisable at this advanced season.

By the intercepted letters, inclosed to your Lordship in my last dispatch, you will observe, that I am threatened with a siege in this post. My present effective force is only ten thousand nine hundred and thirty-one. With respect to that the enemy may collect for such an object, it is probable they may amount to at least twenty thousand, besides reinforcement to the French, (which, from pretty good authority, I have reason to expect,) and the numerous militia of the five neighbouring provinces. Thus circumstanced, I am persuaded, your Lordship will be of opinion, that the sooner I concentrate my force the better. Therefore, (unless your Lordship, after the receipt of my letter of the 29th of May, and 8th inst. should incline to agree with me in opinion and judge it right to adopt my ideas respecting the move to Baltimore or the Delaware Neck, &c.) I beg leave to recommend it to you as soon as you have finished the active operations you may be  
now

now engaged in, to take a defensive station, in any healthy situation you choose, (be it at Williamsburg or York-town.) And I would wish in that case, that after reserving to yourself such troops as you may judge necessary, for an ample defensive, and defultory movements by water, for the purpose of annoying the enemy's communications, destroying magazines, &c. the following corps may be sent to me in succession as you spare them.

Two battalions of Light Infantry.

Forty-third regiment.

Seventy-sixth or eightieth regiment.

Two battalions of Anspach.

Queen's Rangers, cavalry and infantry.

Remains of the detachment of 17th Light

Dragoons; and such proportion of Artillery as can be spared, particularly men.

Until the arrival of the expected reinforcements from Europe, it will be impossible for me to judge what future operations may be within my power, under my present circumstances. I heartily wish I was able to spare a second army, after leaving a sufficient defensive for this important post. But your Lordship will, I hope, excuse me, if I dissent from your opinion of the manner in which that army should be employed; for experience ought to convince us, that there is no possibility of re-establishing order in any rebellious province on this continent without the hearty assistance of numerous friends.

friends. These, my Lord, are not, I think, to be found in Virginia; nor dare I positively assert, that under our present circumstances they are to be found in great numbers any where else, or that their exertions when found will answer our expectations: but I believe there is a greater probability of finding them in Pennsylvania than in any, except the southern provinces. In these your Lordship has already made the experiment; it has there failed—they are gone from us, and I fear are not to be recovered. The only one therefore now remaining is this; and if I continue in the command I am determined to give it a fair trial, whenever it can be done with propriety: I am not, however, likely to have a choice of operation at least for some time to come. Nor can I altogether agree with your Lordship, in thinking that a desultory move against Philadelphia would do more harm than good. There, my Lord, are collected their principal depots of stores for the campaign, an immense quantity of European and West-India commodities, and no inconsiderable supply of money, which their uninterrupted trade and cruisers have lately procured them; and from these funds they are now forming a bank by subscription, which, if it succeeds, may give fresh vigour to their cause. Could we therefore at this moment seize those important magazines, &c. overturn their schemes, and break up their public credit, the favourable consequences resulting from such success are too obvious

obvious to need explanation. And all this, my Lord, I have no doubt might have been effected if our reinforcement had arrived in time, and the enemy had no prospect of receiving any without our either keeping or destroying Philadelphia; the latter of which is foreign to my inclination, and the former is certainly at present inadvisable.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

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N U M B E R X.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated  
Williamsburgh, June 30, 1781.*

S I R,

AFTER passing James river, at Westover, I moved to Hanover court-house, and crossed the South Anna; the Marquis de la Fayette marched to his left, keeping above at the distance of about twenty miles.

By pushing my light troops over the North Anna, I alarmed the enemy for Fredericksburgh, and for the junction with General Wayne, who was then marching through Maryland. From what I could learn of the present state of Hunter's iron manufactory, it did not appear of so much importance as the stores on the other side of the country, and it was impossible

impossible to prevent the junction between the Marquis and Wayne: I therefore took advantage of the Marquis's passing the Rhappahannock, and detached Lieutenant-colonels Simcoe and Tarleton to disturb the assembly then sitting at Charlotteville, and to destroy the stores there, at Old Albemarle courthouse, and the Point of Fork; moving with the infantry to the mouth of Byrd creek, near the Point of Fork, to receive those detachments. Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton took some members of the assembly at Charlotteville, and destroyed there and on his return one thousand stand of good arms, some cloathing and other stores, and between four and five hundred barrels of powder, without opposition.

Baron Stuben, who commanded about eight hundred twelvemonths-men and militia, retired with great precipitation from the Point of Fork. Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, after using every exertion to attack his rear-guard, destroyed there and at places adjacent, about three thousand three hundred stand of arms, most of which unferviceable, but then under repair, some salt, harness, &c. and about one hundred and fifty barrels of powder. I then moved by Richmond, and arrived at Williamsburgh on the 25th instant, having, in addition to the articles already mentioned, destroyed on this expedition at different places above 2000 hogheads of tobacco, and a great number of iron guns, and brought off four brass thirteen-inch mortars, five brass eight-inch howitzes



howitzes, and four long brass nine-pounders, all French. We found near Hanover court-house ten French brass twenty-four pounders, which we could not carry, and had not time or means to destroy farther than spiking, and throwing five or six of them into the Pamunkey; and we found at Williamsburgh a considerable quantity of shot and shells, which are embarked. General Wayne joined the Marquis about the middle of the month, as did Baron Stuben soon after; and their army has generally kept about twenty miles from us, without any material attempt by detachment, except in an attack on Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, on the 26th, as he was returning with his corps and the yagers from the destruction of some boats and stores on the Chickahominy. The enemy, though much superior in numbers, were repulsed with considerable loss, three officers and twenty-eight privates were made prisoners: the Rangers had three officers and thirty privates killed and wounded; Lieutenant Jones, who was killed, behaved with the greatest spirit, and is much lamented by Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe.

The morning after my arrival here I was honoured with your Excellency's dispatches of the 11th and 15th instant, delivered by Ensign Amiel. By them I find, that you think if an offensive army could be spared, it would not be advisable to employ it in this province. It is natural for every officer to turn his thoughts particularly to the part of the war in which  
he

he has been most employed; and as the security at least of South Carolina, if not the reduction of North Carolina, seemed to be generally expected from me, both in this country and in England, I thought myself called upon, after the experiment I had made had failed, to point out the only mode in my opinion of effecting it, and to declare, that until Virginia was to a degree subjected, we could not reduce North Carolina, or have any certain hold of the back country of South Carolina; the want of navigation rendering it impossible to maintain a sufficient army in either of those provinces at a considerable distance from the coast, and the men and riches of Virginia furnishing ample supplies to the rebel southern army. I will not say much in praise of the militia of the southern colonies; but the list of British officers and soldiers killed and wounded by them since last June, proves but too fatally that they are not wholly contemptible.

Your Excellency being charged with the weight of the whole American war, your opinions of course are less partial, and are directed to all its parts; to those opinions it is my duty implicitly to submit.

Being in the place of General Phillips, I thought myself called upon by you to give my opinion with all deference on Mr. Alexander's proposals, and the attempt upon Philadelphia. Having experienced much disappointment on that head, I own I would cautiously engage in measures depending materially

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for their success on the active assistance from the country, and I thought the attempt on Philadelphia would do more harm than good to the cause of Britain; because, supposing it practicable to get possession of the town, (which, besides other obstacles, if the redoubts are kept up, would not be easy) we could not hope to arrive without their having had sufficient warning of our approach to enable them to secure specie, and the greatest part of their valuable public stores, by means of their boats and shipping, which give them certain possession of the river from Mud Island upwards. The discriminating of the owners, and destroying any considerable quantity of West India goods, and other merchandize dispersed through a great town, without burning the whole together, would be a work of much time and labour. Our appearance there, without an intention to stay, might give false hopes to many friends, and occasion their ruin; and any unlucky accident on our retreat, might furnish matter for great triumph to our enemies. However, my opinion on that subject is, at present, of no great importance, as it appears, from your Excellency's dispatches, that, in the execution of those ideas, a co-operation was intended from your side, which now could not be depended upon, from the uncertainty of the permanency of our naval superiority, and your apprehensions of an intended serious attempt upon New York. I have, therefore, lost no time in taking measures for complying with  
the

the requisition contained in your dispatch of the 15th instant.

Upon viewing York, I was clearly of opinion, that it far exceeds our power, consistent with your plans, to make safe defensive posts there and at Gloucester, both of which would be necessary for the protection of shipping.

The state of the transports has not yet been reported to me, but I have ordered the few that are at Portsmouth to be got ready; and as soon as I pass James River (for which purpose the boats are collecting), and can get a convoy, they shall be dispatched with as many troops as they will contain, and shall be followed by others as fast as you send transports to receive them. When I see Portsmouth, I shall give my opinion of the number of men necessary for its defence, or of any other post that may be thought more proper. But as magazines, &c. may be destroyed by occasional expeditions from New York, and there is little chance of being able to establish a post capable of giving effectual protection to ships of war, I submit it to your Excellency's consideration, whether it is worth while to hold a sickly defensive post in this Bay, which will always be exposed to a sudden French attack, and, which experience has now shewn, makes no diversion in favour of the southern army.

Tarleton was lucky enough to intercept an express with letters from Greene to La Fayette, of which the  
inclosed

inclosed are copies. By them you will see General Greene's intention of coming to the northward, and that part of the reinforcements, destined for his army, was stopped in consequence of my arrival here. As soon as it is evident that our plan is nearly defensive here, there can be little doubt of his returning to the southward, and of the reinforcements proceeding to join his army.

I still continue in the most painful anxiety for the situation of South Carolina. Your Excellency will have received accounts of Lord Rawdon's proceedings previous to his arrival at Monk's Corner, and of his intended operations. My last account from him is in a note to Lieutenant Colonel Balfour, dated the 9th instant at Four Hole Bridge, and he was then in great hopes of being in time to save Cruger. I have ordered Colonel Gould to proceed, as soon as convoy could be procured, with the nineteenth and thirtieth regiments to New York, leaving the third regiment and the flank companies in South Carolina, till your pleasure is known. I named the flank companies, because they might be distant at the time of the arrival of the order, and as a corps capable of exertion is much wanted on that service.

Your Excellency well knows my opinion of a defensive war on the frontiers of South Carolina. From the state of Lord Rawdon's health, it is impossible that he can remain; for which reason, although the command in that quarter can only be  
attended

attended with mortification and disappointment, yet, as I came to America with no other view than to endeavour to be useful to my country, and as I do not think it possible to render any service in a defensive situation here, I am willing to repair to Charles-town if you approve of it; and in the mean time, I shall do every thing in my power to arrange matters here till I have your answer.

Major Craig represented so strongly to Lord Rawdon his regret at leaving the distressed Loyalists in the neighbourhood of Wilmington, and his hopes of a considerable insurrection in the lower part of North Carolina, where the enemy have no force, that his Lordship gave him a conditional permission to postpone the evacuation of Wilmington; but I have not yet learned whether he has availed himself of it.

La Fayette's continentals, I believe, consist of about seventeen or eighteen hundred men, exclusive of some twelvemonth's men, collected by Steuben. He has received considerable reinforcements of militia, and about eight hundred mountain rifle-men under Campbell. He keeps with his main body about eighteen or twenty miles from us; his advanced corps about ten or twelve; probably with an intention of insulting our rear guard when we pass James River. I hope, however, to put that out of his power, by crossing at James City Island; and if I can get a favourable opportunity of striking a blow at him without loss of time, I will certainly

certainly try it. I will likewise attempt water expeditions, if proper objects present themselves after my arrival at Portsmouth.

I inclose a report made by Lieutenant Thomas Hagerly, who came with a Captain Fleming from Maryland to join us in North Carolina. I feel most sincerely for the sufferings of the unfortunate Loyalists; but being of opinion, that a detachment would not afford them substantial and permanent relief, I shall not venture such a step, unless your Excellency should think proper to direct it.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

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N U M B E R X I.

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York, June 28, 1781. [In Cypher.]*

[Received July 8, 1781.]

MY LORD,

HAVING for very essential reasons come to a resolution of endeavouring by a rapid move to seize the stores, &c. collected at Philadelphia, and afterwards



wards to bring the troops employed on that service to reinforce this post, I am to request, that if your Lordship has not already embarked the reinforcement I called for in my letters of the 8th, 11th, 15th, and 19th instant, and should not be engaged in some very important move, either of your own, or in consequence of my ideas respecting operation in the Upper-Chefapeak, you will be pleased, as soon as possible, to order an embarkation of the troops specified below, ‡ and of stores, &c. &c. stated in the enclosed paper;—or, in as full a manner as your Lordship can with propriety comply;—recollecting, that whatever may have been taken too great a proportion of, will be immediately returned to you the moment the expedition is over.

As it is possible that your Lordship may have sent Major-general Leslie to Charles-town, in consequence of what I said to you in my letter of the 29th ult. I have thought proper to appoint General Robertson to the command of the troops on this service, which I should not have judged necessary, could I have been certain of his being named by you to accompany the troops coming hither. Should that have been the case, your Lordship

‡ Second battalion of light infantry; forty-third regiment; seventy-sixth or eightieth; two battalions of Anspach; Queen's rangers, cavalry and infantry; and such a proportion of artillery as can be spared, particularly men.

ship will be pleased, nevertheless, to direct him to proceed with the expedition.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

Inclosed in No. XI.

*List of Cannon, Stores, &c. to be sent from Virginia.*

A R T I L L E R Y, &c.

Two eight-inch howitzes, light,  
Two five and a half-inch ditto,  
Two medium brass twelve-pounders,  
Four brass six-pounders, field pieces,  
Twelve waggons, without the bodies, for transporting boats, &c. &c.  
A proportion of carcaffes.

V E S S E L S.

The sloop Formidable,  
Brigantine Spitfire,  
Brigantine Rambler,  
The prize-ship Tempest, if she can be unloaded and fitted without delaying the transports.  
  
As many horses as are necessary for the artillery and waggons.  
  
As many of the first twenty-four new boats as can be spared.—Those with platforms, to have cannon mounted in them, and compleatly fitted,  
if

if it can be done without delaying the embarkation.—The cannon to be brought in the transports, and the boats towed by them.

Lieutenant Sutherland, of the Engineers, with intrenching tools, &c. &c. for five hundred men.

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N U M B E R XII.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated  
Cobham, July 8, 1781.*

S I R,

I WAS this morning honoured with your dispatch of the 28th ult. The troops are perfectly ready, and will proceed to Portsmouth to wait the arrival of the transports. I will give immediate orders about the artillery, stores, &c.

The transports now at Portsmouth are sufficient to carry the light infantry; I had prepared them to receive that corps, and should have sent them to you in a few days, if your last order had not arrived. In your cyphered dispatch, the second battalion of light infantry only is mentioned, but I conclude that to be a mistake, and shall keep both ready to embark. I take for granted that General Robertson will come with the transports to take the command of the expedition.

pedition. General Leslie is still here, but as it was not my intention to have sent him with the troops to New-York, and, as he will be the properest person to command here in case you should approve of my returning to Charles-town, I shall not send him on the expedition unless it shall then appear to be your Excellency's desire that he should accompany General Robertson.

I must again take the liberty of calling your Excellency's serious attention to the question of the utility of a defensive post in this country, which cannot have the smallest influence on the war in Carolina, and which only gives us some acres of an unhealthy swamp, and is for ever liable to become a prey to a foreign enemy, with a temporary superiority at sea. Desultory expeditions in the Chesapeake may be undertaken from New-York with as much ease and more safety, whenever there is reason to suppose that our naval force is likely to be superior for two or three months.

The boats and naval assistance having been sent to me by Captain Hudson, I marched on the 4th from Williamsburgh to a camp which covered a ford into the island of James-town. The Queen's Rangers passed the river that evening. On the 5th, I sent over all the wheel carriages, and on the 6th the bat-horses and baggage of every kind, intending to pass with the army on the 7th. About noon on the 6th, information was brought me of the approach of the  
enemy,

enemy, and about four in the afternoon a large body attacked our out-posts. Concluding that the enemy would not bring a considerable force within our reach, unless they supposed that nothing was left but a rear-guard, I took every means to convince them of my weakness, and suffered my piquets to be insulted and driven back; nothing, however, appeared near us but riflemen and militia till near sun-set, when a body of continentals with artillery began to form in the front of our camp. I then put the troops under arms, and ordered the army to advance in two lines. The attack was began by the first line with great spirit; there being nothing but militia opposed to the light infantry, the action was soon over on the right, but Lieut. Col. Dundas's brigade, consisting of the forty-third, seventy-sixth, and eightieth regiments, which formed the left wing, meeting the Pennsylvania line, and a detachment of the Marquis de la Fayette's continentals, with two six-pounders, a smart action ensued for some minutes, when the enemy gave way and abandoned their cannon. The cavalry were perfectly ready to pursue, but the darkness of the evening prevented my being able to make use of them. I cannot sufficiently commend the spirit and good behaviour of the officers and soldiers of the whole army; but the seventy-sixth and eightieth regiments, on whom the brunt of the action fell, had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves particularly, and Lieutenant-colonel Dundas's conduct and gallantry deserve

serve the highest praise. The force of the enemy in the field was about two thousand, and their loss, I believe, between two and three hundred. Half an hour more of day-light would have probably given us the greatest part of the corps.

I have enclosed a list of our killed and wounded. We finished our passage yesterday, which has been an operation of great labour and difficulty, as the river is three miles wide at this place; I have great obligations to Captain Aplin and the officers of the navy and seamen, for their great exertions and attentions on this occasion.

I have not received the letters your Excellency alludes to, of the 29th of May, or 8th and 19th of June.

I have the honour to be, &c.

C O R N W A L L I S.

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N U M B E R XIII.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated  
Suffolk, July 12, 1781.*

S I R,

I ACKNOWLEDGED in my letter of the 8th the receipt of your Excellency's dispatch of the 28th of June. I have since been honoured with that of  
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the 1st, by the Orpheus, and of the duplicates of those of the 29th of May, 8th and 19th of June, by the Charon, the originals of which have miscarried.

I have only now to inform your Excellency, that every exertion shall be made to fit out the expedition in the compleatest manner without loss of time, and as by your letter to General Leslie you seem to wish that he should accompany it, I have sent him directions for that purpose.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

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N U M B E R   X I V .

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated  
New-York, June 8th, 1781.*

[Received July 12, 1781, from Lieut. Col. M<sup>c</sup>Pherson.]

M Y   L O R D ,

I INCLOSE to your Lordship copies of some intercepted letters: by these your Lordship will see that we are threatened with a siege. The enemy have had bad information respecting my force; it is not, however, as your Lordship knows, what it ought to be. Your Lordship will see by Fayette's letter, that you have little more opposed to you  
than



than his corps and an unarmed militia; for, we are told here, that the Pennsylvania troops have revolted a second time, at York-town. Your Lordship can therefore certainly spare two thousand, and the sooner they come the better; without it should be your intention to adopt my ideas of a move to Baltimore or the Delaware Neck, and put yourself in nearer co-operation with us; but even in that case you can spare us something, I suppose.

I am naturally to expect reinforcement from Europe, but not having heard from thence since February, I can say nothing positive as to when it failed. It is rumoured here (from what authority I cannot learn) that the three battalions from Corke are arrived at Charles-town, and that your Lordship has ordered them to Chesapeake. Should that have been the case, I have by this opportunity directed them not to disembark, but to join me here as soon as a convoy can be obtained for them; in the first place because I want them, and in the next, because it would be death to them to act in Chesapeake in July.

From all the letters I have seen, I am of opinion, if circumstances of provisions, stores, &c. turn out as they wish, that the enemy will *certainly* attack this post. As for men, for such an object as this (circumstanced as they suppose it to be) it cannot be doubted that they can raise a sufficient number. By a commissary of provision's intercepted letter, he now feeds

feeds (at West-point only) eight thousand, and they are coming in very fast. My dispatches for your Lordship, and the stores, &c. you sent for, have been waiting for a convoy these ten days. I hope it will fail immediately, but I dispatch this runner in the mean time, referring your Lordship to the bearer, Lieutenant Nairne, for particulars.

I request that the officer commanding at Portsmouth may have positive orders to dispatch a runner once a week while they last, whether he has any thing material to say or not. Every circumstance in the present situation of the corps of this army is of consequence to know. As your Lordship is now so near, it will be unnecessary for you to send your dispatches immediately to the Minister: you will therefore be so good to send them to me in future.

I am much in want of howitzes, &c. I think your Lordship can spare some; if so, I request they may be sent, and a good proportion of artillery men with them. Captain Fage of the Artillery, and Lieutenant Sutherland of the Engineers are to return here, as I particularly want them; and Lieutenant Fyers, if your Lordship can possibly spare him. I likewise request that your Lordship will send General Arnold to me.

I send by Lieutenant-colonel Macpherson a commission for Colonel Abercrombie to act as Brigadier-general until further orders; but I fear it will not be in my power to establish him in that rank, as I understand

derstand there are six older than him coming out. The commission will therefore be delivered to your Lordship, to use or not as you may see expedient. But at all events I imagine your Lordship will not think it necessary to give the commission to Colonel Abercrombie, whilst Major-general Leslie, or Brigadier-general Arnold, remain with you.

I am persuaded that I need not say to your Lordship how necessary it is that I should be informed without delay of every change of position in your Lordship's army; and I am sure you will excuse me for observing that had it been possible upon the arrival of the last reinforcement from hence (which I am told joined you the day after the date of your letter of the 20th ult.) for your Lordship to have let me know your views and intentions, I should not now be at a loss to judge of the force you might want for your operations. Ignorant therefore as I am of them, I can only trust, that as your Lordship will see by the inclosed letters, my call for a reinforcement is not a wanton one, you will send me what you can spare as soon as it may be expedient; for should your Lordship be engaged in a move of such importance as to require the employment of your whole force, I would by no means wish to starve or obstruct it; but in that case would rather endeavour to wait a little longer, until my occasions grow more urgent, or your situation can admit of your detaching; of which, however, I request to be informed with all possible

possible dispatch. But with respect to the European reinforcement, I must request, that should it arrive in the Chesapeake, it may be sent to me without delay, agreeable to the orders I have sent to the officer commanding at Portsmouth, and the requisition I make by this opportunity to Captain Hudson, or officer commanding the King's ships.

Should your Lordship not propose to send Major-general Leslie to command in South Carolina, I beg leave to mention that his assistance may probably be wanted here, if he can be spared from your army.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

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N U M B E R    X V.

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated at New-York, 19th of June, 1781.*

[Received July 12, 1781, from Lieut. Col. M<sup>c</sup>Pherson.]

M Y L O R D,

THE intercepted letters, which I had the honour to transmit to your Lordship with my dispatch of the 8th inst. will have informed you, that the French Admiral meant to escape with his fleet to Boston,  
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from Rhode Island; (from whence it is probable they failed the 15th inst. the wind being then fair;) and that it was proposed the French army should afterwards join such troops as Mr. Washington could assemble, for the purpose of making an attempt on this post.

I have often given it as my opinion to your Lordship, that for such an object as this, they certainly could raise numbers; but I very much doubt their being able to feed them. I am, however, persuaded, they will attempt the investiture of the place. I therefore heartily wish I was more in force, that I might be able to take advantage of any false movement they may make in forming it.

Should your Lordship have any solid operation in the Chesapeake to propose, or have approved of the one I mentioned in my former letters, I shall not, as I have already told you, press you for the corps I wished to have sent me, at least for the present. But if, in the approaching inclement season, your Lordship should not think it prudent to undertake operations with the troops you have, (and you may easily conceive I cannot possibly spare more,) I cannot but wish for their sake, if I had no other motive, that you would send me as soon as possible what you can spare from a respectable defensive. And that your Lordship may better judge what I mean by a *respectable* defensive, it is necessary to inform you, that other intelligence, besides Monsieur Barras' letter, makes it highly probable,

bable, that Monsieur de Grasse, will visit this coast in the hurricane season, and bring with him troops as well as ships. But, when he hears that your Lordship has taken possession of York river before him, I think it most likely he will come to Rhode Island; and, in that case, that their first efforts will be in this quarter. I am, however, under no great apprehensions, as Sir George Rodney seems to have the same suspicions of De Grasse's intention that we have, and will of course follow him hither. For I think our situation cannot become very critical, unless the enemy by having the command of the Sound, should possess themselves of Long Island; which can never be the case, whilst we are superior at sea.

What I said to your Lordship in my letter of the 8th inst. respecting the reinforcement from England, was only occasioned by a report prevailing here, that you had ordered them from Charles-town to the Chesapeake. But as it is now probable there is no real foundation for the report, it is unnecessary to trouble your Lordship again on the subject, as they will of course remain in South Carolina, should they arrive there. In the hope that your Lordship will be able to spare me three thousand men, I have sent two thousand tons of transports from hence; and what is wanting may be made up from those in Chesapeake. The corps I named in my letter of the 11th, will, I imagine, amount to nearly that number. But should your Lordship not be able to spare the whole, it is  
necessary

necessary to mention, that I expect the detachment of the seventeenth dragoons, as they happened to be placed last in the list. I likewise request, your Lordship will at the same time send me the twenty-four boats built by General Arnold, if you should have no particular call for them; as they will be useful here, and it is probable the ten, (which I understand are now building in the Chesapeake,) will be sufficient for your Lordship's purposes. But as your Lordship will be the best judge of this, you will send them or not, as you please.

I have at last had a personal conference with the Vice-admiral; and he has agreed, if he does not intercept the French fleet, to take his station between the Nantucket Shoals and Delaware, where his fleet is to cruise for the protection of this harbour, and our communication with the Chesapeake.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

N U M-



N U M B E R XVI.

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated  
New York, July 1st, 1781.*

[Received July 12, 1781, by the Orpheus.]

M Y L O R D,

FOR reasons which I think it unnecessary to mention to you by this opportunity, I request, that whatever troops, &c. your Lordship may have embarked for this place, may sail forty-eight hours after the departure from the Cheapeake of the frigate which carries this letter, and which has orders to return whenever your Lordship signifies to the Captain of her, that the troops, &c. are all on board, and ready to proceed on the intended service.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. C L I N T O N.

N U M B E R

## N U M B E R XVII.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated  
Suffolk, 17th July, 1781.*

S I R,

I AM glad to hear from Portsmouth that the expedition is almost ready to sail; and having given General Leslie full powers relating to the equipment of it, I hope it will be to your satisfaction. I have detained six infantry boats and four horse boats for the service here, and have directed all the others to go, if they can be carried. The twenty-third Light Company has done duty for some time past with the Legion, which is not yet returned from an excursion to the upper part of the country; I have, therefore, in place of the twenty-third, sent the Light Company of the eightieth.

The enemy's army having come so low down the country, and we having, by the destruction of their craft, rendered it difficult for them to pass James river below Tuckahoe, and the militia of the upper counties of this side of the river being with them, I thought it a good opportunity to endeavour to destroy the magazines between James river and the Dan that are destined for the use of their southern army. I accordingly detached Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton with the Legion cavalry, and something upwards of one hundred

hundred mounted infantry, on the 9th instant, from Cobham, with orders to call, among other places, at Prince Edward and Bedford court houses, where I was informed their principal military stores had been collected. This will be a fatiguing expedition; but I shall be able to give them rest upon their return, as I see little appearance of cavalry being much wanted in this quarter for some time to come. In the mean time I shall remain at, or near, this place till he comes back, which I hope will be in a few days. I have detached Lieutenant-colonel Dundas with part of the eightieth, to destroy the shipping and stores at South Quay; and, if possible, I shall send a detachment to Edenton for the same purpose, before I fall back to Portsmouth.

Colonel Gould has not received my order for sending two of the late-arrived regiments to New-York, the express vessel with my dispatches having been taken by a rebel privateer. And as it appears by your Excellency's dispatch to me of the 19th of June, that you approve of the three regiments remaining in South Carolina, I have notified this to Colonel Gould by the *Amphitrite*, which retook the express vessel, and called here two days ago, in her way to Charles-town.

The variety of fatiguing services for which pioneers are constantly wanted, obliged me to augment the detachment with this army to a company of fifty men, and I appointed Lieutenant Brown of that corps

corps Captain; and Mr. Jackson, a North-Carolina refugee, Lieutenant. Mr. Brown is an old officer of pioneers, and in his own line a man of uncommon merit.

The officers of the guards having repeatedly represented the very superior merit of Mr. Rush, their surgeon, and his unwearied and skilful attention to their numerous sick and wounded, I think it right to mention him to your Excellency, as a man highly worthy of a mark of favour.

I received your Excellency's letter, with the inclosures relating to the transports intended to be sent home by the Agent and Lieutenant-colonel Balfour. The resolution of sending all had been adopted after I left South Carolina, in consequence of the Minister's Circular Letter, and which, if executed, I should, no doubt, have disapproved of, being entirely of opinion with your Excellency, that it is with you to decide whether serviceable transports can be spared. But I am happy to find that Lieutenant-colonel Balfour returned to his first resolution, which I approved of, only dispatching victuallers and unserviceable transports, and which I hope before now has been explained to your Excellency's satisfaction.

It gave me great pleasure to learn from a Charlestown paper, lately brought in here, that General Greene had raised the siege of Ninety-six, after having been repulsed in an attempt to carry it by assault, and that Lord Rawdon had arrived there on the 20th ult.

I have

I have likewise been informed in this country that Greene was on his march on the 24th ult. towards Broad river.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

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N U M B E R XVIII.

*Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated Headquarters, New-York, July 11th, 1781.*

[In Cypher.]

[Received from Brig. Maj. Bowes, July 20th, at 1 A.M.]

MY LORD,

I HAVE received your Lordship's letter of the 30th of June, and the Admiral has dispatched a frigate with his and my opinions in answer to it. I cannot be more explicit by this opportunity than to desire, that if you have not already passed the James river, you will continue on the Williamsburgh Neck, until she arrives with my dispatches by Captain Stapleton. If you have passed, and find it expedient to recover that station, you will please to do it, and keep possession until you hear further from me. Whatever troops may have been embarked by you for this place, are likewise to remain until further  
u orders;

orders; and if they should have been failed, and within your call, you will be pleased to stop them. It is the Admiral's and my wish, at all events to hold Old Point Comfort, which secures Hampton road.

H. CLINTON.

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N U M B E R   X I X .

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated  
New-York, July 15, 1781.*

MY LORD,

UNTIL I had the honour to receive your Lordship's letter of the 8th instant, I had flattered myself, that upon re-considering the general purport of our correspondence, and General Phillips's papers in your possession, you would at least have waited for a line from me in answer to your letter of the 30th ult. before you finally determined upon so serious and mortifying a move as the re-passing James river, and retiring with your army to Portsmouth. And I was the more induced to hope that this would have been the case, as we both seemed to agree in our opinion of the propriety of taking a healthy station on the Neck, between York and James rivers, for the purpose of covering a proper harbour for our line-of-battle ships. And I am persuaded your Lordship  
will

will be sensible, that in all my letters I clearly leave you at full liberty to detain any part, or even the whole of the troops I solicited you to send me, should your Lordship have determined on any solid operation of your own in Virginia, or elsewhere; or should you have adopted the one I had recommended in the Upper Chesapeake; or even should you have judged their continuance with you necessary until the stations you might think proper to take were rendered respectably defensive.

Your letter of the 30th ult. in which your Lordship was pleased to intimate this intention, did not leave the Chesapeake before the 5th instant: and as soon as I consulted the Admiral at the Hook upon its contents, I lost no time in dispatching my answer to your Lordship, both by a ship of war and one of my runners; but as I now find your Lordship has decided, I shall say no more upon the subject: and I sincerely congratulate you upon the success of your well concerted plan against the Marquis de la Fayette, hoping that amongst other good effects which may be expected from it, it will prevent his giving you disturbance in the execution of what I recommended to your Lordship in my letter of the 11th instant, a duplicate of which accompanies this. I likewise request your Lordship will be pleased to communicate to Lieutenant-colonels Dundas, Simcoe, and Tarleton (whom you have particularised, the first for his conduct and gallantry in the action of Jamestown,



town, and the two others for their active services on your march through Virginia) and to all the other officers and foldiers under your command, the high fenfe I have of their fpirit and good behaviour, for which I defire their acceptance of my thanks.

As your Lordfhip is again pleafed to recall my ferious attention to the queftion of the utility of a defensive poft in Virginia, which you fay cannot have the fmalleft influence on the war in Carolina, and which only gives us fome acres of an unhealthy fwamp, I muft in anfwer beg leave again to repeat to your Lordfhip, that it never was my intention to continue a poft on Elizabeth river any longer than until the commencement of folid operation in the Chefapeak, nor to have there more troops than what might be capable of defending a fmall work on that river; and that all the general officers who have commanded in the Chefapeak have had my confent to change that ftation for one more healthy, if they judged it proper to do fo. To which I will moreover add, it ever has been, is, and ever will be, my firm and unalterable opinion, that it is of the firft confequence to his Majefty's affairs on this continent, that we take poffeffion of the Chefapeak, and that we do not afterwards relinquish it. I beg leave alfo, my Lord, to diffent from the opinion you have given me of a defensive poft in Chefapeak, and that defultory expeditions there may be undertaken from New-York with as much eafe and more fafety; for I cannot but fup-  
pofe,

pose, that a defensive station in the Chesapeake, with a corps of at least four thousand regular troops, for its protection and desultory water movements during the summer months, wherein land operation may be impracticable, would have the most beneficial effects on more distant districts, for the reasons I have already had the honour to give your Lordship. Nor do I recollect, that in any of my letters to your Lordship I have suggested an idea, that there was a probability of the enemy's having a naval superiority in these seas for any length of time, much less for so long a one as two or three months. But with respect to the unhealthiness of the station at Portsmouth, my letters to General Phillips on that subject, (wherein I say, God forbid I should wish to bury the elite of my army in Nansemond and Princess Anne) will satisfy your Lordship that we are both of one opinion.

With regard to your Lordship's returning to Charles-town, for which you say you wait my approbation, though I allow your Lordship to be the best judge where your presence may be most required, yet, as I cannot conceive that offensive operation will be carried on in Carolina for some months, I must beg leave to recommend it to you to remain in Chesapeake, at least until the stations I have proposed are occupied and established, and your Lordship favours me with your opinion of the number of men you can afterwards spare from their defence until the first week in October; about which time it is my intention, as I  
have

have before told your Lordship, to recommence operation in the Chesapeake: but whether in Virginia, according to your Lordship's plan, or in the Upper Chesapeake, according to my own, I shall then determine. If in the first, I shall request the favour of your Lordship to conduct it, as you must be a better judge than I can, from the local knowledge you have acquired in your march through great part of the country, and your being from thence capable of judging how far it is connected with the southern provinces. If in the last, I shall probably assume the direction of it myself; and I shall in that case be glad to have your Lordship's assistance: but if you should prefer returning to Carolina, I shall after that no longer restrain your Lordship from following your inclinations.

Now, my Lord, I have only to repeat, what I have already said in all my letters, that you are at full liberty to employ all the troops under your immediate command in the Chesapeake, if you are of opinion they may be wanted for the defence of the stations you shall think proper to occupy, securing to us at least a healthy one, from whence we may start at the proper time for beginning operation, and for the carrying on in the interim such defultory water expeditions as you may think of any utility. I should, indeed, have hoped, that even in the season for active operation, seven thousand men would have been quite sufficient, considering the force which the enemy can bring against you; in this, however, your Lordship  
seems

seems to think differently. Should nothing, therefore, happen to induce you to alter your opinion, or should any object cast up of importance enough to be undertaken at this inclement season, you are at liberty to keep the whole. But before you finally decide, I request your Lordship will recollect the very bare defensive I am reduced to in this post; whilst I have opposed to me Washington's army, which is already eight or ten thousand men, the French four thousand, besides the large reinforcements expected to them: and I scarce need mention to your Lordship, who is so well acquainted with their disposition, the effect which such an appearance will have on the numerous and warlike militia of the five neighbouring provinces.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

N U M-

## N U M B E R XX.

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated  
New-York, July 26, 1781.*

MY LORD,

I HAD the honour to receive your Lordship's letter, of the 17th instant, by Major Damer, who arrived here the 22d, and as it is possible that my dispatches of the 11th may not have reached you before the troops under General Leslie failed from Portsmouth, and left any change of arrangement your Lordship may have judged proper in consequence may be thereby prevented, I immediately dispatched a runner to cruize for the fleet off the Delaware, with orders for the troops, in that case, to return immediately to you, and wait your further commands; but if you had received my letters by Captain Stapleton before they failed, and had, notwithstanding, directed them to proceed according to their original destination, they are ordered to come to the Hook to receive mine.

What I said to your Lordship in my letter of the 19th instant, respecting the continuance of the three European regiments in Carolina, was only on a supposition that your Lordship thought they would be wanted there; but as that appears not to be the case,  
from

from your having ordered two of them to join me, if you should still be of opinion, that they can be spared during the inactive summer months, I hope your Lordship will think proper to renew your order for their coming here, as I shall probably want them, as well as the troops you may be able to spare me from the Chesapeak, for such offensive or defensive operations as may offer in this quarter, until the season will admit of their acting in yours, where I propose collecting, in the beginning of October, all the force which can be spared from the different posts under my command. But if your Lordship wishes that Brigadier General Gould should command in Carolina upon the departure of Lord Rawdon, I shall have no objection to his remaining behind for that purpose.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

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N U M B E R   X X I .

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated York-Town, Virginia, 20th August, 1781.*

S I R,

I HAVE been honoured with your Excellency's dispatches of the 15th and 26th ult.

v

I beg

I beg leave to assure your Excellency, that before I resolved to pass James River to enable me to comply with your requisition of troops, I had very maturely considered the general tenor of your dispatches to General Phillips, as well as those to me of the 11th and 15th of June, delivered on the 26th, by Ensign Amiel; and when I decided upon that measure, I sufficiently felt how mortifying it was to me, personally, and how much the reputation of his Majesty's arms would suffer by it in this province.

But your Excellency was pleased to give me to understand, in your dispatch of the 11th, that you wished to concentrate your force, being threatened with an attack at New York by General Washington with twenty thousand men at least, besides an expected French reinforcement, and the numerous militia of the five neighbouring provinces; and, in your dispatch of the 15th, supposing that I had not thought it expedient to engage in operations in the Upper Chesapeake, and that those I had undertaken in this province would be finished, you require that part of the troops, mentioned in a list contained in the former dispatch, should be embarked to be sent to New York with all possible dispatch; notifying to me, at the same time, that you would, in proper time, solicit the Admiral to send more transports to the Chesapeake; in which you desired that I would send the remaining troops that I judged could be spared from the defence of the posts that I might  
occupy



occupy, as you did not think it adviseable to leave more troops in this unhealthy climate, at this season of the year, than what were absolutely wanted for a defensive, and desultory water excursions.

My own operations being finished, and being of opinion, that, with the force under my command, and circumstanced as I was, in a variety of respects, it would have been highly inconsiderate in me, and dangerous for the King's service, to engage in operations in the Upper Chesapeake, I thought it incumbent upon me to take effectual measures to enable me to obey so explicit an order without loss of time. To this end, as I could not discover in your instructions to General Phillips, or in your paper containing the substance of private conversations with him, or in your dispatches to me, any earnestness for immediately securing a harbour for line of battle ships, I thought myself under the necessity of being contented with the post at Portsmouth, such as it was; for I did not imagine myself at liberty to exercise my discretionary power, by changing that post for another, which I knew would have required so great a part of the troops under my command for many weeks, for the purposes of covering, subsisting, and fortifying it, that any offensive or defensive plans of yours, which depended upon material reinforcement from hence, might thereby have been totally frustrated.

My

My resolution to pass James River was just executed when I received your dispatch of the 28th of June, ordering the expedition for the attempt upon Philadelphia. That order being likewise positive, unless I was engaged in any important move of my own, or in operations in the Upper Chesapeake, I felt a particular satisfaction that my decision on your first order had enabled me to comply so expeditiously with this; and I own, that instead of blame, I hoped to have merited approbation.

I was clearly convinced when I received those orders, and I cannot yet see any cause to alter my opinion, that having a sufficient force remaining for a defensive in the post that I had resolved to occupy, and for desultory water excursions, if I had detained the troops required and specified in your list, for any other reason than that of being engaged in an important move of my own, or in operations in the Upper Chesapeake, and if in the mean time a misfortune had happened at New York, or you had been disappointed of any material object at Philadelphia, my conduct would have been highly and deservedly censured. But I acknowledge, I never apprehended, even although it might afterwards appear that the danger at New York was not imminent, nor the attempt upon Philadelphia expedient, that I should be subject to blame for passing James river; a step rendered indispensably necessary by an  
obedience

obedience of your orders, and for the safety of the troops remaining under my command.

Your Excellency, after mentioning your intention of recommencing operation in the Chesapeake about the beginning of October, is pleased to say, that you will then determine whether you will act in Virginia according to my plan, or in the Upper Chesapeake according to your own.

It is true, that it is my opinion, that while we keep a naval superiority, Virginia is, by its navigable rivers, extremely accessible; and that if we have force to accomplish it, the reduction of the province would be of great advantage to England, on account of the value of its trade, the blow that it would be to the rebels, and as it would contribute to the reduction and quiet of the Carolinas. But in my subordinate situation, being unacquainted with the instructions of administration, ignorant of the force at your command from other services, and without the power of making the necessary arrangements for execution, I can only offer my opinions for consideration; certainly not as plans. I am thoroughly sensible that plans, which essentially affect the general conduct of the war, can only come from your Excellency, as being in possession of the requisite materials for framing them, and of the power of arranging the means for their execution. But whatever plan you may think proper to adopt for operations in the Chesapeake, I shall be most sincerely

cerely concerned if your Excellency should be so circumstanced as not to be able to undertake the execution of it in person; for the event must be of great importance to our country, and not only the military operations would be best directed by your superior abilities, but your weight and authority as commissioner, might have the happiest effects in the civil and political regulation of the country, without which, military success would not be attended with solid consequences. However, if your Excellency should find it necessary to direct me to undertake the execution of any plan that may be fixed upon by you, I shall make the best use in my power of the force put under my command. But as my acting differently from your ideas or wishes, might, in many instances, be attended with great detriment to the King's service, I shall, if employed, hope to be honoured with explicit instructions from your Excellency on all points that will admit of them.

I shall, by the first opportunity, acquaint General Leslie, that if he can spare troops from the service in South Carolina, you wish them to be sent to New York. But being ignorant of the present state of affairs, and knowing well that, since the surrender of Charles-town, the seasons of the year have not occasioned military inactivity in that quarter, I cannot judge whether your Excellency may expect any reinforcement from thence.

As

As there appears to be little chance of co-operation from hence with the troops in that province, and as my communication with it is extremely precarious, I submit it to your Excellency's consideration, whether it would not be most expedient to transmit your commands, relating to the affairs of that country, directly to General Leslie.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

CORRES-



# C O R R E S P O N D E N C E

B E T W E E N

Gen. Sir HENRY CLINTON, K. B.

C O M M A N D E R I N C H I E F,

A N D

Lieut. Gen. Earl CORNWALLIS.

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## P A R T IV.

RELATIVE TO OCCUPYING AN HARBOUR FOR  
LINE OF BATTLE SHIPS.

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### N U M B E R I.

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated  
Head-Quarters, New-York, July 8th, 1781.*

[Received July 21st, 1781, from Captain Stapleton.]

MY LORD,

I AM this moment honoured with your Lordship's letter by Ensign Amiel of the 30th ultimo, and am very happy to be informed you have had an opportunity of destroying such a quantity of arms and public stores, the loss of which must be very heavily felt by the enemy.

w

By



By your Lordship's answer to my letters of the 11th and 15th ultimo, (which are the only ones you acknowledge the receipt of, and in which I made a requisition for some of the corps serving in the Chesapeake, *if you could spare them*,) I am to understand that your Lordship does not think, that with the remainder (which would have amounted to at least four thousand, supposing even that you sent me three thousand,) you could maintain the posts I had proposed to be occupied at York-town, &c. so necessary in every respect to cover our fleet, and give us entire command over the entrance of that bay. I therefore think proper to mention to your Lordship, that whatever my ideas may have been of the force sufficient to maintain that station, and the corresponding one on the Gloucester side, your Lordship was left the sole judge of that sufficiency to the whole amount of the corps under your immediate orders in Virginia; nor did I mean to draw a single man from you until you had provided for a respectable defensive, and retained a small corps for desultory water expeditions; for my requisition was made after the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 26th of May; from which I apprehend that you had no immediate operation of your own to propose, and did not think it expedient to adopt the one I had recommended to General Phillips. But I confess I could not conceive you would require above four thousand in a station wherein General Arnold had  
repre-

represented to me (upon report of Colonel Simcoe) that two thousand men would be amply sufficient; and being strongly impressed with the necessity of our holding a naval station for large ships as well as small, and judging that York-town was of importance for securing such a one, I cannot but be concerned that your Lordship should so suddenly lose sight of it, pass James-river, and retire with your army to the sickly post of Portsmouth, where your horses will, I fear, be starved, and a hundred other inconveniences will attend you: and this, my Lord, as you are pleased to say, because you were of opinion that it exceeded your power, consistent with my plans, to make safe defensive posts there and at Gloucester. My plans, my Lord, were to draw from Chesapeake, as well for the sake of their health, as for a necessary defensive in this important post, such troops as your Lordship could spare from a respectable defensive of York, Gloucester, or such other station as was proper to cover line of battle ships, and all the other services I had recommended; but I could not possibly mean that your Lordship should, for this, give up the hold of a station so important for the purposes I designed, and which I think La Fayette will immediately seize and fortify the moment he hears you have repassed James-river; for though I am to suppose the enemy will be as little able to defend it with five thousand as your Lordship judges yourself to be, and of course may  
be

be for the same reasons dispossessed, I should be sorry to begin with a siege the operations I am determined to carry on in Chesapeake whenever the season will admit of it; I will therefore consult Rear-admiral Graves on this subject, and let your Lordship have our joint opinion in consequence.

With regard to Portsmouth, your Lordship will have seen by my former letters and the papers in your possession, that when I sent General Leslie to the Chesapeake, I only wished for a station to cover our cruising frigates and other small ships; that General officer thought proper to make choice of Portsmouth, and had, I doubt not, good reasons for so doing. But it has ever been my opinion that if a better could be found, especially for covering line of battle ships, it ought to have the preference; and I think, if Old Point Comfort will secure Hampton-Road, that is the station we ought to choose; for if Elizabeth-River is at all kept, a small post for about three hundred men at Mill-Point, would in my opinion answer. But as to quitting the Chesapeake entirely, I cannot entertain a thought of such a measure, but shall most probably on the contrary send there, as soon as the season returns for acting in that climate, all the troops which can possibly be spared from the different posts under my command. I therefore flatter myself, that even although your Lordship may have quitted York and detached troops to me, that you will have a sufficiency to re-  
occupy

occupy it, or that you will at least hold Old Point Comfort, if it is possible to do it without York.

I find by the intercepted letters you sent me, that La Fayette's continentals, when joined by Stuben and Wayne, do not altogether exceed one thousand eight hundred, and that if he could collect a numerous militia, he had but few arms to put into their hands, and those your Lordship I see has effectually destroyed. It likewise appears that although Greene may himself come to the Northward, his corps is to remain in South Carolina. I therefore suppose your Lordship has recollected this, when you sent orders to Brigadier-general Gould to bring the 19th and 30th regiments to this place, especially as you tell me you still continue in the most painful anxiety for the situation of that province.

I am sorry Lord Rawdon's health should oblige him to return to Europe. I think it is highly proper that either your Lordship, General Leslie, or General O'Hara should go to Charles-town, but I can by no means consent to your Lordship's going thither, before you hear further from me, for very essential reasons which I shall not now trouble your Lordship with.

I am very unhappy to hear of the unfortunate move of our friends and its consequences, as related by Lieutenant Haggarty; those under the influence of Mr. Alexander were desired by me not to rise, and they seemed contented to remain quiet until  
operation

operation came to them. But it is probable they have no arms to defend themselves; I should imagine that if a station could be found in their neighbourhood, which was safe and tenable, and arms could be given to them, it might be the means of saving many of them: your Lordship will, however, as being upon the spot be the best judge how far this may be proper or practicable, for as I know nothing of the district where this is supposed to have happened, or what their numbers, I cannot say how far it may be expedient to give them assistance. Your Lordship has, I believe, many spare arms in Chesapeak, and there are likewise a considerable number at Charles-town, but if any should be wanted from hence, I will spare as many as I can.

As your Lordship must be sensible how necessary it is I should have frequent and accurate returns of the state of the troops under my command, I am persuaded you will pardon me for requesting you to order that returns are prepared, and, if possible, sent to me every fortnight of the troops under your Lordship's immediate orders in the Chesapeak, and as accurate ones as can be procured of those in Carolina, and the other southern posts.

By the letters brought to me from the Minister by the last packet, I understand that three battalions originally destined for this army, are to accompany Sir George Rodney in case De Graffe comes on this coast, from whence I am to conclude he will be certainly

tainly followed by that Admiral. I am likewise told that nearly two thousand two hundred German recruits and auxiliary troops may be hourly expected to arrive here.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

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N U M B E R II.

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated  
Head-Quarters, New-York, July 11, 1781.*

[Received July 21st, 1781, from Captain Stapleton.]

M Y L O R D,

I am just returned from having a conference with Rear-admiral Graves, in consequence of your Lordship's letter of the 30th ultimo, and we are both clearly of opinion that it is absolutely necessary we should hold a station in Chesapeake for ships of the line, as well as frigates; and the Admiral seems to think that should the enemy possess themselves of Old Point Comfort, Elizabeth River would no longer be of any use to us as a station for the frigates, therefore judges that Hampton-road is the fittest station for all ships, in which your Lordship will see by the papers in your possession, I likewise agree with him.



him. It was moreover my opinion that the possession of York-town, even though we did not possess Gloucester, might give security to the works we might have at Old Point Comfort, which I understand secures Hampton-road.

I had flattered myself that after giving me as nearly three thousand men as you could spare, your Lordship might have had a sufficiency not only to maintain them, but to spare for defultory expeditions; for I had no other plans in view than to draw for the defence of this post, and operation in its neighbourhood, such troops as could be spared from your army, after leaving an ample defensive to such stations as your Lordship might judge proper to occupy; and a small moving corps for defultory water expeditions during the summer months, in which no other might be proper in that unhealthy climate. But as your Lordship seems to think that you can in no degree comply with my requisition for troops, and at the same time establish a post capable of giving protection to ships of war, and it is probable, from what you write me, that you may have repassed James-river and retired to Portsmouth; I beg leave to request that you will without loss of time examine Old Point Comfort, and fortify it; detaining such troops as you may think necessary for that purpose, and garrisoning it afterwards. But if it should be your Lordship's opinion that Old Point Comfort cannot be held without having possession of York, for in this case Gloucester



cester may perhaps be not so material, and that the whole cannot be done with less than seven thousand men, you are at full liberty to detain all the troops now in the Chesapeake, which I believe amount to somewhat more than that number: which very liberal concession will, I am persuaded, convince your Lordship of the high estimation in which I hold a naval station in Chesapeake, especially when you consider that my whole force in this very extensive and important post, is not quite eleven thousand effectives; and how far I may be justifiable in leaving it to so reduced a garrison, time will shew.

I am as much mortified as your Lordship can possibly be at the necessity there is at present for leaving you upon the defensive in Chesapeake; and your Lordship will do me the justice to observe that I have for some months past been myself content with a starved defensive, from the desire I had to give your Lordship as large an army for offensive operations as I could. Therefore, until the season for recommencing operations in the Chesapeake shall return, your Lordship, or whoever remains in the command there, must I fear be content with a strict defensive; and I must desire that you will be pleased to consider this as a positive requisition to you not to detain a greater proportion of the troops now with you than what may be absolutely necessary for defensive operations, &c. as before mentioned. When, therefore, your Lordship has finally determined upon the force you think suf-

ficient for such works as you shall erect at Old Point Comfort, and the number you judge requisite to cover them at York-town, and for the other services of the Chesapeake during the unhealthy season; you will be pleased to send me the remainder. Your Lordship will observe by this that I do not see any great necessity for holding Portsmouth while you have Old Point Comfort: for, should a station on Elizabeth-river be judged necessary, I think Mill-point will answer every necessary purpose of covering frigates, &c.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

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N U M B E R III.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated  
Portsmouth, Virginia, July 26, 1781.*

S I R,

I RECEIVED your cyphered letter of the 11th instant, on the 20th, in consequence of which the expedition was detained; and on the 21st I was honoured with your dispatches of the 8th and 11th instants, delivered by Captain Stapleton, the contents of which, I will confess, were to me as unexpected as, I trust, they are undeserved.

As

As a subordinate officer, I think it my duty to obey positive orders, or in exercising discretionary powers, to act as much as possible conformable to the apparent wishes of my superior officer, combined with the evident good of the service; and in my late conduct I hope I have not deviated from those principles; for, permit me to remark, that I cannot discover in the instructions to General Phillips, and the substance of private conversation with him, (extracts of which I take the liberty to enclose) to which I am referred, nor in our former correspondence, any trace of the extreme earnestness that now appears, to secure a harbour for ships of the line, and your assent to my engaging in operations in the Upper Chesapeake, if I could have brought myself to think them expedient, would, if I had doubted before, have convinced me that securing a harbour for line of battle ships was not with you a primary and immediate object. In my letter of the 26th of May, I informed your Excellency, that after destroying the stores at Richmond and the adjoining country, I should move back to Williamsburg, keeping the army in readiness to comply with your further instructions. I arrived at that place on the 25th, and on the 26th of June I received from Ensign Amiel your dispatches of the 11th and 15th of the same month, being the first letters that I had received from you since my arrival in Virginia. In the first you tell me, that New-York is threatened to be attacked by a very numerous enemy,

enemy, and, therefore, wishing to concentrate your force, you recommend to me to send a body of troops to you, as I can spare them, in the order mentioned in a list, unless I have engaged in operations in the Upper-Chesapeake; and in the dispatch of the 15th, taking for granted that I have not engaged in those operations, you require the embarkation of those troops may begin with the greatest dispatch. After a full compliance with this requisition, the force left under my command would have been about two thousand and four hundred rank and file, fit for duty, as will appear by the returns, which in a post adapted to that number, I hoped would be sufficient for a defensive, and desultory water expeditions. You mention Williamsburg and York in your letter of the 11th, as defensive stations, but only as being supposed healthy, without deciding on their safety,—Williamsburg having no harbour, and requiring an army to occupy the position, would not have suited us. I saw that it would require a great deal of time and labour to fortify York and Gloucester, both of which are necessary to secure a harbour for vessels of any burthen; and to effect it, assistance would have been wanted from some of the troops then under embarkation orders, which, when New-York was in danger, I did not think myself at liberty to detain for any other purpose than operations in the Upper Chesapeake, and supposing both places fortified, I thought they would have been dangerous defensive posts,

ports, either of them being easily accessible to the whole force of this province, and from their situation they would not have commanded an acre of country. I, therefore, under these circumstances, with the most earnest desire to comply with what I thought were your present wishes, and to facilitate your intended future operations in Pennsylvania, did not hesitate in deciding to pass James-river, and to retire to Portsmouth, that I might be able to send you the troops required. And I was confirmed in the propriety of the measure, when upon passing James-river, I received your dispatch, informing me that for essential reasons you had resolved to make an attempt on Philadelphia, and directing me to embark with the greatest expedition the same body of troops, with stores, &c. for that purpose. Having likewise executed this order with the utmost exertion and alacrity, I must acknowledge I was not prepared to receive in the next dispatch from your Excellency a severe censure of my conduct.

Immediately on the receipt of your cyphered letter, I gave orders to the engineer to examine and survey Point Comfort, and the channels adjoining to it. I have likewise visited it with the Captains of the King's ships now lying in Hampton road. I have the honour to inclose to you copies of the report of the Engineer, and of opinions of the Captains of the navy on that subject, with which my own entirely concurs. And I likewise transmit a survey of the  
peninsula

peninsula, made by Lieutenants Sutherland and Stratton. From all which, your Excellency will see, that a work on Point Comfort, would neither command the entrance, nor secure his Majesty's ships at anchor in Hampton road. This being the case, I shall in obedience to the spirit of your Excellency's orders, take measures with as much dispatch as possible, to seize and fortify York and Gloucester, being the only harbour in which we can hope to be able to give effectual protection to line of battle ships. I shall, likewise, use all the expedition in my power to evacuate Portsmouth and the posts belonging to it, but until that is accomplished, it will be impossible for me to spare troops. For York and Gloucester, from their situation, command no country; and a superiority in the field will not only be necessary to enable us to draw forage and other supplies from the country, but likewise to carry on our works without interruption.

Your Excellency having been pleased to disapprove of my going to South Carolina, I have sent General Leslie, who sailed on the 25th instant, in the Carysfort, to take the command there.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

Inclosed



Inclosed in No. III.

*Extract of the Instructions of his Excellency Sir Henry Clinton, to Major-general Phillips, dated New-York, March 10, 1781.*

“If the Admiral, disapproving of Portsmouth, and requiring a fortified station for large ships in the Chesapeake, should propose York-town, or Old Point Comfort, if possession of either can be acquired and maintained without great risk or loss, you are at liberty to take possession thereof, but if the objections are such as you think forcible, you must, after stating those objections, decline it, till solid operation take place in the Chesapeake.”

*Extract of the Substance of several Conversations that his Excellency Sir Henry Clinton had with Major-general Phillips, on the Subject of Operations in the Chesapeake, before his Embarkation on his Expedition thither, dated April 26, 1781.*

“With regard to a station for the protection of the King’s ships, I know of no place so proper as York-town, if it could be taken possession of, fortified, and garrisoned with one thousand men, as by having one thousand more at a post somewhere in Elizabeth-river, York and James rivers would be  
ours,



ours, and our cruizers might command the waters of the Chesapeake. Troops might likewise be spared from these posts to carry on expeditions during the summer months, when, probably, nothing can be risked in that climate but water movements. But if the heights of York, and those on Gloucester side, cannot be so well and so soon fortified as to render that post hors d'infort before the enemy can move a force, &c. against it, it may not be adviseable to attempt it. In that case, something may possibly be done at Old Point Comfort, to cover large ships lying in Hampton-road (which is reckoned a good one, and not so liable to injury from gales at N. E. as that of York, particularly in winter.) If neither can be secured, we must content ourselves with keeping the Chesapeake with frigates and other armed vessels, which will always find security against a superior naval force in Elizabeth river. As our operations in proper season may re-commence in the Upper-James; perhaps a station might be found at the entrance of the narrows of that river that may be of use in future day, and held with a small force. Jamestown seems a proper spot for such a station, as does the place where the narrows and windings begin."

Inclosed

Inclosed in Number III.

*Copy of the Report of Lieutenant Sutherland, Engineer,  
dated Billy Ordnance Transport, Hampton Road, July  
25, 1781.*

MY LORD,

AGREEABLE to your orders, I have examined the ground on Old Point Comfort with as much accuracy as I possibly could, and for your Lordship's better information I have made a survey of the ground, upon which is laid down the width and soundings of the channel.

I beg leave to offer what appears to me respecting the situation of a work on that spot.

The ground where the ruins of Fort George lay is the fittest for a work, but at the same time must be attended with many inconveniences.

The level of the ground there is about two feet higher than the high water mark, which, from its very short distance to the deep water, must soon be destroyed by a naval attack.

The great width and depth of the channel give ships the advantage of passing the fort with very little risk. I apprehend fifteen hundred yards is too great a distance for batteries to stop ships, which is the distance here. Ships that wish to pass the fire of the fort have no occasion to approach nearer.

Y

Nor

Nor do I imagine a fort built there could afford any great protection to an inferior and weak fleet, anchored near the fort, against a superior fleet of the enemy, which must have it in their power to make their own disposition, and place our fleet between them and the fort, the channel affording no bay for the security of ships under cover of a fort.

The time and expence to build a fort there, must be very considerable, from the low situation of the ground, which must necessarily cause the soil to be moved from a great distance, to form the ramparts and parapets; and every other material must be carried there, as the timber on the peninsula is unfit for any useful purpose.

These are the remarks which have occurred to me on examining the ground and situation of a work on Old Point Comfort, for the protection of the harbour and fleet, which I humbly submit to your Lordship.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ALEX. SUTHERLAND,  
Lieutenant of Engineers.

Inclosed

Inclofed in No. III.

*Copy of the Opinions of the Commanders of his Majesty's  
Ships in Chesapeake, relative to Old Point Comfort,  
dated Richmond, Hampton Road, July 26, 1781.*

MY LORD,

IN consequence of a requisition that your Lordship received from the commanders in chief of his Majesty's troops and ships, relative to a post being established at Old Point Comfort, for the protection and security of the King's ships that may occasionally be sent to the Chesapeake: We, whose names are hereunto subscribed, have taken as accurate a survey of that place as possible, and are unanimously of opinion, from the width of the channel and depth of water close to it, that any superior enemy's force coming in, may pass any work that can be established there, with little damage, or destroy it with the ships that may be there, under its protection.

We have the honour to be, &c.

CHARLES HUDSON,  
THOMAS SYMONDS,  
CHARLES, EVERITT,  
RALPH DUNDAS.

NUMBER

N U M B E R IV.

*Admiral Graves to Earl Cornwallis, dated London, off  
Sandy Hook, 12th July, 1781.*

M Y L O R D,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship that the Solebay, Captain Everitt, carries Captain Stapleton, charged with his Excellency Sir Henry Clinton's dispatches to your Lordship, and with my orders to the Captains of the King's ships to return with the troops under his convoy to the Chesapeake, and if not failed, for them to remain, and to conform to your Lordship's requisitions in the disposal of them.

I need only to say to your Lordship, that there is no place for the great ships during the freezing months on this side the Chesapeake, where the great ships will be in security, and at the same time capable of acting—and in my opinion they had better go to the West Indies than be laid up in Halifax during the winter. If the squadron is necessary to the operations of the army—Hampton road appears to be the place where they can be anchored with the greatest security, and at the same time be capable of acting with the most effect against any attempts of the enemy.—To this end, Old Point Comfort seems necessary to be occupied by us, as commanding the entrance to the road—and if York can be secured, it will give the  
command

command of the Lower or Elizabeth country, and deprive the rebels of the use of the two best settled rivers of the Chesapeake, and deter an enemy from entering the Chesapeake whilst we command the access to it—for we should have all his convoys and detachments exposed to our attempts.

I have the honour to be, &c.

THO. GRAVES.

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N U M B E R V.

*Earl Cornwallis to Admiral Graves, dated Portsmouth,  
July 26, 1781.*

S I R,

I WAS honoured with your letter of the 12th of July, by the Solebay, in which you mention a desire of having a harbour secured in the Chesapeake for line of battle ships. I immediately ordered the engineers to examine Old Point Comfort, and went thither myself with the captains of the navy on this station. You will receive a copy of the engineer's report, with a sketch of the peninsula, and the opinion of the officers of the navy relative to the occupying and fortifying of that post.

The Commander-in-chief having signified to me in his letter of the 11th instant, that he thought a secure  
harbour

harbour for line of battle ships of so much importance in the Chesapeake, that he wished me to possess one, even if it should occupy all the force at present in Virginia; and, as it is our unanimous opinion, that Point Comfort will not answer the purpose, I shall immediately seize and fortify the posts of York and Gloucester, and shall be happy at all times to concur in any measures which may promote the convenience and advantage of his Majesty's navy.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

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N U M B E R VI.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated  
York, in Virginia, August 12, 1781.*

S I R,

I RECEIVED the inclosed letter last night from Governor Bruere: one to the same effect arrived two days ago from him, directed to the Commanding Officer of the Navy, and was immediately forwarded to the Admiral by the officer stationed near the Capes.

I embarked the eightieth regiment in boats, and went myself on board the Richmond very early in the morning of the 29th; but we were so unfortunate in winds as to be four days on our passage. The eightieth  
landed



landed on the night of the 1st at Gloucester; and the troops which were in transports on the morning of the 2d at this place. I have since brought the seventy-first and the Legion hither, and sent the regiment du Prince Hereditaire to Gloucester. The works on the Gloucester side are in some forwardness, and I hope in a situation to resist a sudden attack. Brigadier-general O'Hara is hastening as much as possible the evacuation of Portsmouth: as soon as he arrives here, I will send to New-York every man that I can spare, consistent with the safety and subsistence of the force in this country.

I have the honour to be, &c.

C O R N W A L L I S.

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N U M B E R VII.

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated  
New-York, August 11, 1781.*

[In Cypher.]

[Received August 16, 1781.]

M Y L O R D,

I AM honoured with your Lordship's dispatches of the 24th and 27th ultimo, which were delivered to me by Captain Stapleton on the 1st instant, which I shall defer answering to a safer opportunity.

I have

I have the pleasure to inform you, that the fleet from Bremer-lehe is this day arrived with two thousand five hundred German recruits.

I hope before this meets your Lordship you will so far have established yourself on the Williamsburg Neck, as to have been able to embark the troops you can spare me for operation here—In which case I have no doubt Captain Hudson will have given every assistance to forward them to us as soon as possible. And if they are not already failed, I beg that the Queen's Rangers may be the second corps you send me; and that your Lordship will please to recollect my wish to have such a proportion of General Arnold's boats, and artillery men and stores as you can spare. And as you have three engineers, I beg that Lieutenant Sutherland may be sent to this place, as also Captain Fage of the artillery. The French and rebels shewed themselves the other day in front of our lines to the amount of eleven thousand.

A man goes from hence through the country to your Lordship with a proposal to liberate the Convention troops—for which he says he will only want a frigate and some transports to receive them.—Left any accident should happen to the runner that carries this, a duplicate of it is sent by him in cypher.

H. C.

N U M-

N U M B E R   V I I I .

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated  
York-town, 16th August, 1781.*

S I R,

THIS morning I received your cyphered letter of the 11th instant, by the runner.

I did not imagine that my letter of the 26th July would have given your Excellency reason to be so sanguine as to hope, that by this time any detachment could have been made from hence. The evacuation of Portsmouth has employed one engineer, and a number of labourers and artificers; and with every exertion by land and water, I do not expect that business to be completed before the 21st or 22d instant. Since our arrival we have bestowed our whole labour on the Gloucester side; but I do not think the works there (after great fatigue to the troops) are at present, or will be for some time to come, safe against a coup de main with less than one thousand men.

After our experience of the labour and difficulty of constructing works at this season of the year, and the plan for fortifying this side not being entirely settled, I cannot at present say whether I can spare any troops, or if any, how soon. But when the garrison of Portsmouth arrives, and the engineer's plan is completed, I shall apply to Captain Hudson for a frigate to carry my report of the state of things here, and to

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bring

bring your Excellency's commands upon it. I have received your Excellency's dispatches of the 15th and 26th ult. which I shall answer by the first safe opportunity.

I beg that your Excellency will be pleased to order it to be notified to the port of New-York that Portsmouth is evacuated, to prevent vessels going into that harbour.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

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N U M B E R IX.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated  
York town, Virginia, 22d August, 1781.*

S I R,

PORTSMOUTH having been completely evacuated without any interruption from the enemy, General O'Hara arrived here this day with the stores and troops; and a great number of refugees have accompanied him from the counties of Norfolk, Suffolk, and Princess Anne.

The engineer has finished his survey and examination of this place, and has proposed his plan for fortifying it; which appearing judicious, I have approved of, and directed to be executed.

The

The works at Gloucester are now in such forwardness, that a smaller detachment than the present garrison would be in safety against a sudden attack; but I make no alteration there, as I cannot hope that the labour of the whole will complete that post in less than five or six weeks.

My experience there of the fatigue and difficulty of constructing works in this warm season, convinces me, that all the labour that the troops here will be capable of, without ruining their health, will be required at least for six weeks to put the intended works at this place in a tolerable state of defence. And as your Excellency has been pleased to communicate to me your intention of re-commencing operations in the Chesapeake about the beginning of October, I will not venture to take any step that might retard the establishing of this post: but I request that your Excellency will be pleased to decide whether it is more important for your plans that a detachment of a thousand or twelve hundred men, which I think I can spare from every other purpose but that of labour, should be sent to you from hence, or that the whole of the troops here should be employed in expediting the works.

My last accounts of the enemy were, that the Marquis de la Fayette was encamped in the fork of the Pamunky and Matapony with his own detachment of Continentals, a considerable body of eighteen-months men, and two brigades of militia under

Stevens

Stevens and Lawfon; that he had armed four hundred of the seven hundred Virginia prisoners lately arrived from Charles-town, and expected to be joined in a short time by General Smallwood with seven hundred eighteen-months men from Maryland; and that Generals Wayne and Morgan having returned from the other side of James river, were likewise on their march to join him.

There being only four eighteens and one twenty-four pounder here, more heavy guns will be wanted for the sea batteries at this place, and we are likewise in want of many other artillery and engineer's stores, the returns of which I take the liberty to inclose.

It is proper to mention to your Excellency, that you may make your arrangements accordingly, that there are only about six hundred stand of spare arms in the Chesapeake; and that our consumption of provisions is considerably increased by a number of refugees lately come to us, and by negroes that are employed in different branches of the public service.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

C O R-

C O R R E S P O N D E N C E

B E T W E E N

Gen. Sir HENRY CLINTON, K. B.

C O M M A N D E R I N C H I E F,

A N D

Lieut. Gen. Earl CORNWALLIS.

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P A R T V.

R E L A T I V E T O T H E D E F E N C E O F  
Y O R K , I N V I R G I N I A .

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N U M B E R I .

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated  
York-town, in Virginia, 31st August, 1781.*

[In Cypher.]

S I R,

**A** FRENCH ship of the line, with two frigates,  
and the Loyalist, which they have taken, lie at  
the mouth of this river.

A Lieutenant of the Charon, who went with an  
escort of dragoons to Old Point Comfort, reports,  
that there are between thirty and forty sail within  
the Capes, mostly ships of war, and some of them  
very large.

I have the honour to be, &c.

C O R N W A L L I S .

N U M -



## N U M B E R II.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated  
York, 1st September, 1781.*

[Written in Cypher on a Congress Note.]

AN enemy's fleet within the Capes, between thirty  
and forty ships of war, mostly large.

CORNWALLIS.

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## N U M B E R III.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated York,  
in Virginia, 2d September, 1781.*

[In Cypher.]

S I R,

COMTE de Grasse's fleet is within the Capes of  
the Chesapeake. Forty boats with troops went up  
James river yesterday; and four ships lie at the en-  
trance of this river.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

N U M-

N U M B E R    I V.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated  
York-town, Virginia, 4th September, 1781.*

[In Cypher.]

S I R,

COMTE de Graffe's fleet is within the Capes or the Chesapeake. Forty boats with troops went up James river on the 1st instant, which are landed, as I am informed, at James-city Island; and four ships lie at the entrance of this river.

I have the honour to be, &c.

C O R N W A L L I S.

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N U M B E R    V.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated  
York-town, in Virginia, 8th Sept. 1781.*

[In Cypher.]

S I R,

I HAVE made several attempts to inform your Excellency, that the French West-India fleet under Monsieur de Graffe entered the Capes the 29th ult. I could not exactly learn their number; they report  
twenty-five

twenty-five or twenty-six sail of the line. One of seventy-four and two of sixty-four, and one frigate, lie at the mouth of this river. On the 6th, the seventy-four and frigate turned down with a contrary wind; and yesterday the two others followed. My report, dated last evening, from a point below, which commands a view of the capes and bay, says, that there were within the capes only seven ships, two of which were certainly ships of the line, and two frigates. Firing was said to be heard off the capes the night of the 4th, morning and night of the 5th, and morning of the 6th.

The French troops landed at James-town are said to be three thousand eight hundred men; Washington is said to be shortly expected, and his troops are intended to be brought by water from the head of Elk under protection of the French ships. The Marquis de la Fayette is at or near Williamsburgh: the French troops are expected there, but were not arrived last night. As my works were not in a state of defence, I have taken a strong position out of the town. I am now working hard at the redoubts of the place. Provisions for six weeks: I will be very careful of it.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

N U M-

N U M B E R VI.

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated  
New-York, Sept. 2, 1781.—[In Cypher.]*

[Triplicate, — Received 15th September.]

M Y L O R D,

BY intelligence which I have this day received, it would seem that Mr. Washington is moving an army to the southward, with an appearance of haste, and gives out that he expects the co-operation of a considerable French armament. Your Lordship, however, may be assured, that if this should be the case, I shall either endeavour to reinforce the army under your command by all the means within the compass of my power, or make every possible diversion in your favour.

Captain Stanhope, of his Majesty's ship Pegasus, who has just arrived from the West Indies, says, that on Friday last, in lat. 38 deg. about sixty leagues from the coast, he was chased by eight ships of the line, which he took to be French, and that one of the victuallers he had under his convoy had counted upwards of forty sail more. However, as Rear-admiral Graves, after being joined by Sir Samuel Hood with fourteen coppered ships of the line, failed from hence on the 31st ult. with a fleet of nineteen  
sail,

fail, besides some fifty gun ships, I flatter myself you will have little to apprehend from that of the French.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

P. S. Washington, it is said, was to be at Trenton this day, and means to go in vessels to Christian Creek; from thence, by head of Elk, down Chesapeake, in vessels also. If that navigation is not interrupted, he should go by land from Baltimore. Your Lordship can best judge what time it will require—I should suppose, at least, three weeks from Trenton. Washington has about four thousand French and two thousand rebel troops with him.

H. C.

September 4.—To this triplicate, and by this very uncertain conveyance, I shall only add to your Lordship, that I have had the honour to receive, this morning, a duplicate, and, this evening, a triplicate of your letter of the 31st ult.

H. C.

N U M-

N U M B E R    VII.

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated  
New-York, Sept. 6, at Noon, 1781.—[In Cypher.]*

[Received 16th September.]

MY LORD,

AS I find by your letters that De Graffe has got into the Chesapeake, and I can have no doubt that Washington is moving with, at least, six thousand French and rebel troops against you, I think the best way to relieve you, is to join you, as soon as possible, with all the force that can be spared from hence, which is about four thousand men. They are already embarked, and will proceed the instant I receive information from the Admiral that we may venture, or that from other intelligence the Commodore and I shall judge sufficient to move upon.

By accounts from Europe, we have every reason to expect Admiral Digby hourly on the coast.

Commodore Johnstone has beat a superior French fleet at St. Jago, and proceeded the day after for the place of his destination.

I beg your Lordship will let me know, as soon as possible, your ideas how the troops embarked for the Chesapeake may be best employed for your relief, according to the state of circumstances when you receive  
this

this letter. I shall not, however, wait to receive your answer, should I hear, in the mean time, that the passage is open.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

P. S. I have just received your Lordship's dispatch, by the Dundas galley, from Master Carey.

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N U M B E R    VIII.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated  
York Town, in Virginia, 16th Sept. 1781.*

[In Cypher.]

S I R,

I HAVE received your letters of the 2d and 6th. The enemy's fleet has returned. Two line of battle ships, and one frigate, lie at the mouth of this river; and three or four line of battle ships, several frigates and transports, went up the Bay on the 12th and 14th. I hear Washington arrived at Williamsburgh on the 14th. Some of his troops embarked at head of Elk, and the others arrived at Baltimore on the 12th.

If I had no hopes of relief, I would rather risk an action than defend my half-finished works; but as you say Digby is hourly expected, and promise every exertion



exertion to assist me, I do not think myself justified in putting the fate of the war on so desperate an attempt. By examining the transports with care, and turning out useless mouths, my provisions will last at least six weeks from this day, if we can preserve them from accidents. The cavalry must, I fear, be all lost. I am of opinion, that you can do me no effectual service, but by coming directly to this place.

Lieutenant Conway, of the *Cormorant*, is just exchanged. He assures me, that since the Rhode Island squadron has joined, they have thirty-six sail of the line. This place is in no state of defence. If you cannot relieve me very soon, you must be prepared to hear the worst.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

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N U M B E R IX.

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Earl Cornwallis dated  
New York, Sept. 24, 1781.—[In Cypher.]*

[Received September 29, 1781.]

M Y L O R D,

I WAS honoured yesterday with your Lordship's letter of the 16th and 17th instant, and at a meeting  
of

of the General and Flag Officers held this day, it is determined, that above five thousand men, rank and file, shall be embarked on board the King's ships, and the joint exertions of the navy and army made in a few days to relieve you, and afterwards co-operate with you.

The fleet consists of twenty-three sail of the line, three of which are three deckers. There is every reason to hope we start from hence the 5th October. I have received your Lordship's letter of the 8th instant.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

P. S. Admiral Digby is this moment arrived at the Hook, with three sail of the line.

At a venture, without knowing whether they can be seen by us, I request, that if all is well, upon hearing a considerable firing towards the entrance of the Chesapeake, three large separate smokes may be made parallel to it; and, if you possess the post of Gloucester, four.

I shall send another runner soon.

H. CLINTON.

N U M-

N U M B E R    X.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated York-Town  
in Virginia, September 29, 1781. 10 P. M.*

[In Cypher.]

S I R,

I HAVE ventured these last two days to look General Washington's whole force in the face in the position on the outside of my works, and I have the pleasure to assure your Excellency, that there was but one wish throughout the whole army, which was, that the enemy would advance.

I have this evening received your letter of the 24th, which has given me the greatest satisfaction. I shall retire this night within the works, and have no doubt, if relief arrives in any reasonable time, York and Gloucester will be both in possession of his Majesty's troops.

I believe your Excellency must depend more on the sound of our cannon than the signal of smokes for information; however, I will attempt it on the Gloucester side.—Medicines are wanted.

I have the honour to be, &c.

C O R N W A L L I S.

NUMBER

## N U M B E R XI.

*Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York,  
September 25, 1781.*

[Duplicate, — in Cypher. — Received October 2.]

MY LORD,

MY letter of yesterday will have informed your Lordship of the number of ships and troops we can bring with us.—It is supposed the necessary repairs of the fleet will detain us here to the 5th of October; and your Lordship must be sensible that unforeseen accidents may lengthen it out a day or two longer; I therefore intreat you to lose no time in letting me know by the bearer your real situation, and your opinion how upon our arrival we can best act to form a junction with you, together with the exact strength of the enemy's fleet, and what part of the Chesapeake they appear to be most jealous of.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

P. S. As your Lordship must have better intelligence than we can possibly have, I request you will send a trusty person to each of the capes, about the  
7th

7th of next month, with every information respecting the force and situation of the enemy, you may judge necessary, and directions to continue there until our arrival, when small vessels will be sent to bring off any person they may find there.

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N U M B E R XII.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, dated York-Town,  
Virginia, October 3, 1781.*

[In Cypher.]

S I R,

I RECEIVED your letter of the 25th of September last night. The enemy are encamped about two miles from us. On the night of the 30th of September they broke ground, and made two redoubts about eleven hundred yards from our works, which, with some works that had been constructed to secure our exterior position occupy a gorge between two creeks which nearly embrace this post. They have finished these redoubts, and I expect they will go on with their works this night. From the time that the enemy have given us, and the uncommon exertions of the troops, our works are in a better state of defence than we had reason to hope.

I can see no means of forming a junction with me

BB

but

but by York river, and I do not think that any diversion would be of use to us. Our accounts of the strength of the French fleet have in general been, that they were thirty-five or thirty-six sail of the line; they have frequently changed their position; two ships of the line and one frigate lie at the mouth of this river; and our last accounts were, that the body of the fleet lay between the tail of the Horse shoe and York spit. And it is likewise said, that four line of battle ships lay a few days ago in Hampton road. I see little chance of my being able to send persons to wait for you at the capes, but I will if possible.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

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N U M B E R XIII.

*Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York,  
September 30, 1781.*

[Duplicate, — in Cypher.]

[Received October 10, from Major Cockran.]

M Y L O R D,

YOUR Lordship may be assured that I am doing every thing in my power to relieve you by a direct move, and I have reason to hope, from the assurances  
given

given me this day by Admiral Graves, that we may pass the bar by the 12th of October, if the winds permit, and no unforeseen accident happens: this, however, is subject to disappointment, wherefore, if I hear from you, your wishes will of course direct me, and I shall persist in my idea of a direct move, even to the middle of November, should it be your Lordship's opinion that you can hold out so long; but if, when I hear from you, you tell me that you cannot, and I am without hopes of arriving in time to succour you by a direct move, I will immediately make an attempt upon Philadelphia by land, giving you notice, if possible, of my intention. If this should draw any part of Washington's force from you, it may possibly give you an opportunity of doing something to save your army; of which, however, you can best judge from being upon the spot.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

NUMBER



## N U M B E R   XIV.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated  
York-Town, Virginia, October, 11, 1781.—12 M.*

[In Cypher.]

S I R,

COCHRAN arrived yesterday. I have only to repeat what I said in my letter of the 3d, that nothing but a direct move to York river, which includes a successful naval action, can save me. The enemy made their first parallel on the night of the 6th, at the distance of six hundred yards, and have perfected it, and constructed places of arms and batteries, with great regularity and caution. On the evening of the 9th their batteries opened, and have since continued firing without intermission, with about forty pieces of cannon, mostly heavy, and sixteen mortars, from eight to sixteen inches. We have lost about seventy men, and many of our works are considerably damaged; with such works on disadvantageous ground, against so powerful an attack we cannot hope to make a very long resistance.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

P. S. Since

P. S. — Oct. 11, 5 P.M. — Since my letter was written, we have lost thirty men.

Oct. 12, — 7 P.M. Last night the enemy made their second parallel at the distance of three hundred yards.

We continue to lose men very fast.

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N U M B E R    X V.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated  
York-Town, October 15, 1781.*

[In Cypher.]

S I R,

LAST evening the enemy carried my two advanced redoubts on the left by storm, and during the night have included them in their second parallel, which they are at present busy in perfecting. My situation now becomes very critical; we dare not shew a gun to their old batteries, and I expect that their new ones will open to-morrow morning; experience has shewn that our fresh earthen works do not resist their powerful artillery, so that we shall soon be exposed to an assault in ruined works, in a bad position, and with weakened numbers. The safety of the place is, therefore, so precarious, that I cannot recommend that the fleet and army should run great risk in endeavouring to save us.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

NUMBER

## N U M B E R   XVI.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated York-Town, Virginia, October 20, 1781.*

S I R,

I have the mortification to inform your Excellency that I have been forced to give up the posts of York and Gloucester, and to surrender the troops under my command, by capitulation on the the 19th inst. as prisoners of war to the combined forces of America and France.

I never saw this post in a very favourable light, but when I found I was to be attacked in it in so unprepared a state, by so powerful an army and artillery, nothing but the hopes of relief would have induced me to attempt its defence; for I would either have endeavoured to escape to New-York, by rapid marches from the Gloucester side, immediately on the arrival of General Washington's troops at Williamsburgh, or I would notwithstanding the disparity of numbers have attacked them in the open field, where it might have been just possible that fortune would have favoured the gallantry of the handful of troops under my command: but being assured by your Excellency's letters, that every possible means would be tried by the navy and army to relieve us, I could not think myself at liberty to venture upon  
either

either of those desperate attempts; therefore, after remaining for two days in a strong position in front of this place, in hopes of being attacked, upon observing that the enemy were taking measures, which could not fail of turning my left flank in a short time, and receiving on the second evening your letter of the 24th of September, informing that the relief would fail about the 5th of October, I withdrew within the works on the night of the 29th of September, hoping by the labour and firmness of the soldiers, to protract the defence until you could arrive. Every thing was to be expected from the spirit of the troops, but every disadvantage attended their labour, as the works were to be continued under the enemy's fire, and our stock of intrenching tools, which did not much exceed four hundred, when we began to work in the latter end of August, was now much diminished.

The enemy broke ground on the night of the 30th, and constructed on that night, and the two following days and nights, two redoubts, which, with some works that had belonged to our outward position, occupied a gorge between two creeks or ravines, which come from the river on each side of the town. On the night of the 6th of October they made their first parallel, extending from its right on the river to a deep ravine on the left, nearly opposite to the center of this place, and embracing our whole left at the distance of six hundred yards. Having perfected this parallel, their batteries opened on the evening of the 9th,

9th, against our left, and other batteries fired at the same time against a redoubt, advanced over the Creek upon our right, and defended by about one hundred and twenty men of the 23d regiment and marines, who maintained that post with uncommon gallantry. The fire continued incessant from heavy cannon and from mortars and howitzes, throwing shells from eight to sixteen inches, until all our guns on the left were silenced, our work much damaged, and our loss of men considerable. On the night of the 11th they began their second parallel, about three hundred yards nearer to us; the troops being much weakened by sickness as well as by the fire of the besiegers, and observing that the enemy had not only secured their flanks, but proceeded in every respect with the utmost regularity and caution, I could not venture so large forties, as to hope from them any considerable effect; but otherwise, I did every thing in my power to interrupt this work, by opening new embrasures for guns, and keeping up a constant fire with all the howitzes and small mortars that we could man. On the evening of the 14th, they assaulted and carried two redoubts that had been advanced about three hundred yards for the purpose of delaying their approaches, and covering our left flank, and during the night included them in their second parallel, on which they continued to work with the utmost exertion. Being perfectly sensible that our works could not stand many hours after the opening of the batteries  
of

of that parallel, we not only continued a constant fire with all our mortars, and every gun that could be brought to bear upon it, but a little before day break on the morning of the 16th, I ordered a fortie of about three hundred and fifty men under the direction of Lieutenant-colonel Abercrombie to attack two batteries, which appeared to be in the greatest forwardness, and to spike the guns. A detachment of guards with the eightieth company of Grenadiers, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Lake attacked the one, and one of Light Infantry under the command of Major Armstrong attacked the other, and both succeeded by forcing the redoubts that covered them, spiking eleven guns, and killing or wounding about one hundred of the French troops, who had the guard of that part of the trenches, and with little loss on our side. This action, though extremely honourable to the officers and soldiers who executed it, proved of little public advantage, for the cannon having been spiked in a hurry, were soon rendered fit for service again, and before dark the whole parallel and batteries appeared to be nearly complete. At this time we knew that there was no part of the whole front attacked, on which we could show a single gun, and our shells were nearly expended; I therefore had only to chuse between preparing to surrender next day, or endeavouring to get off with the greatest part of the troops, and I determined to attempt the latter, reflecting that though it should prove unsuccessful

cessful in its immediate object, it might at least delay the enemy in the prosecution of further enterprizes: sixteen large boats were prepared, and upon other pretexts were ordered to be in readiness to receive troops precisely at ten o'clock. With these I hoped to pass the infantry during the night, abandoning our baggage, and leaving a detachment to capitulate for the town's people, and the sick and wounded; on which subject a letter was ready to be delivered to General Washington. After making my arrangements with the utmost secrecy, the Light Infantry, greatest part of the Guards, and part of the twenty-third regiment landed at Gloucester; but at this critical moment, the weather from being moderate and calm, changed to a most violent storm of wind and rain, and drove all the boats, some of which had troops on board, down the river. It was soon evident that the intended passage was impracticable, and the absence of the boats rendered it equally impossible to bring back the troops that had passed; which I had ordered about two in the morning. In this situation, with my little force divided, the enemy's batteries opened at day break; the passage between this place and Gloucester was much exposed, but the boats having now returned, they were ordered to bring back the troops that had passed during the night, and they joined us in the forenoon without much loss. Our works in the mean time were going to ruin, and not having been able to strengthen them by abatis, nor



nor in any other manner but by a flight fraizing which the enemy's artillery were demolishing wherever they fired, my opinion entirely coincided with that of the engineer and principal officers of the army, that they were in many places assailable in the forenoon, and that by the continuence of the same fire for a few hours longer, they would be in such a state as to render it desperate with our numbers to attempt to maintain them. We at that time could not fire a single gun, only one eight-inch and little more than an hundred cohorn shells remained; a diversion by the French ships of war that lay at the mouth of York-river, was to be expected. Our numbers had been diminished by the enemy's fire, but particularly by sickness, and the strength and spirits of those in the works were much exhausted by the fatigue of constant watching and unremitting duty. Under all these circumstances, I thought it would have been wanton and inhuman to the last degree to sacrifice the lives of this small body of gallant foldiers, who had ever behaved with so much fidelity and courage, by exposing them to an assault, which from the numbers and precautions of the enemy could not fail to succeed. I therefore proposed to capitulate, and I have the honour to inclose to your Excellency the copy of the correspondence between General Washington and me on that subject, and the terms of capitulation agreed upon. I sincerely lament that better could not be obtained, but I have neglected  
nothing

nothing in my power to alleviate the misfortune and distress of both officers and soldiers. The men are well clothed and provided with necessaries, and I trust will be regularly supplied by the means of the officers that are permitted to remain with them. The treatment, in general, that we have received from the enemy since our surrender, has been perfectly good and proper; but the kindness and attention that has been shewn to us by the French officers in particular, their delicate sensibility of our situation, their generous and pressing offer of money both public and private, to any amount, has really gone beyond what I can possibly describe, and will, I hope, make an impression on the breast of every British officer, whenever the fortune of war should put any of them into our power.

Although the event has been so unfortunate, the patience of the soldiers in bearing the greatest fatigues, and their firmness and intrepidity under a persevering fire of shot and shells, that I believe has not often been exceeded, deserved the highest admiration and praise. A successful defence, however, in our situation was perhaps impossible, for the place could only be reckoned an intrenched camp, subject in most places to enfilade, and the ground in general so disadvantageous, that nothing but the necessity of fortifying it as a post to protect the navy, could have induced any person to erect works upon it. Our force diminished daily by sickness and other losses,  
and

and was reduced when we offered to capitulate on this side to little more than three thousand two hundred rank and file fit for duty, including officers, servants, and artificers; and at Gloucester about six hundred, including cavalry. The enemy's army consisted of upwards of eight thousand French, nearly as many continentals, and five thousand militia. They brought an immense train of heavy artillery, most amply furnished with ammunition, and perfectly well manned.

The constant and universal cheerfulness and spirit of the officers in all hardships and danger, deserve my warmest acknowledgments; and I have been particularly indebted to Brigadier-general O'Hara, and to Lieutenant-colonel Abercrombie, the former commanding on the right and the latter on the left, for their attention and exertion on every occasion. The detachment of the twenty-third regiment of Marines in the redoubt on the right, commanded by Captain Apthorpe, and the subsequent detachments commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Johnson, deserve particular commendation. Captain Rochfort who commanded the artillery, and indeed every officer and soldier of that distinguished corps; and Lieutenant Sutherland the commanding Engineer have merited in every respect my highest approbation; and I cannot sufficiently acknowledge my obligations to Captain Symonds, who commanded his Majesty's ships,

ships, and to the other officers and seamen of the navy for their active and zealous co-operation.

I transmit returns of our killed and wounded, the loss of seamen and towns people was likewise considerable.

I trust that your Excellency will please to hasten the return of the Bonetta, after landing her passengers, in compliance with the article of capitulation.

Lieutenant-colonel Abercrombie will have the honour to deliver this dispatch, and is well qualified to explain to your Excellency every particular relating to our past and present situation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

C O R N W A L L I S.

Inclosed in No. XVI.

*Copy of Earl Cornwallis's Letter to General Washington, dated York, in Virginia, October 17th, 1781.*

S I R,

I PROPOSE a cessation of hostilities for twenty four hours, and that two officers may be appointed by each side, to meet at Mr. Moore's house, to settle terms for the surrender of the posts of York and Gloucester.

I have the honour to be, &c.

C O R N W A L L I S.

In-

Inclosed in No. XVI.

*Copy of General Washington's Letter to Earl Cornwallis,  
dated Camp before York, 17th October, 1781.*

MY LORD,

I HAVE had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of this date.

An ardent desire to spare the further effusion of blood, will readily incline me to listen to such terms, for the surrender of your posts and garrisons at York and Gloucester as are admissible.

I wish, previous to the meeting of Commissioners, that your Lordship's proposals, in writing, may be sent to the American lines; for which purpose, a suspension of hostilities, during two hours from the delivery of this letter, will be granted.

I have the honour to be, &c.

G. WASHINGTON.

Inclosed in No. XVI.

*Copy of Earl Cornwallis's Letter to General Washington,  
dated York, in Virginia, 17th Oct. 1781. Half past  
Four, P. M.*

S I R,

I HAVE this moment been honoured with your Excellency's letter, dated this day.

The

The time limited for sending my answer will not admit of entering into the detail of articles; but the basis of my proposals will be, that the garrisons of York and Gloucester shall be prisoners of war, with the customary honours. And, for the conveniency of the individuals which I have the honour to command, that the British shall be sent to Britain, and the Germans to Germany, under engagement not to serve against France, America, or their allies, until released or regularly exchanged. That all arms and public stores shall be delivered up to you; but that the usual indulgence of side-arms to officers, and of retaining private property, shall be granted to officers and soldiers, and that the interest of several individuals, in civil capacities and connected with us, shall be attended to.

If your Excellency thinks that a continuance of the suspension of hostilities will be necessary, to transmit your answer, I shall have no objection to the hour that you may propose.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

Inclosed

Inclosed in No. XVI.

*Copy of General Washington's Letter to Earl Cornwallis,  
dated, Camp before York, 18th October, 1781.*

MY LORD,

TO avoid unnecessary discussions and delays, I shall at once, in answer to your Lordship's letter of yesterday, declare the general basis upon which a definitive treaty of capitulation may take place.

The garrisons of York and Gloucester, including the seamen, as you propose, shall be received prisoners of war. The condition annexed of sending the British and German troops to the parts of Europe to which they respectively belong, is inadmissible. Instead of this, they will be marched to such parts of the country as can most conveniently provide for their subsistence, and the benevolent treatment of the prisoners, which is invariably observed by the Americans, will be extended to them. The same honours will be granted to the surrendering army as were granted to the garrison of Charles-town.

The shipping and boats in the two harbours, with all their guns, stores, tackling, furniture, and apparel, shall be delivered, in their present state, to an officer of the navy, appointed to take possession of them.

The artillery, arms, accoutrements, military chest, and public stores of every denomination, shall be delivered unimpaired to the heads of the departments to which they respectively belong.

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The



The officers shall be indulged in retaining their side-arms, and the officers and foldiers may preserve their baggage and effects, with this reserve, that property taken in the country will be reclaimed.

With regard to the individuals in civil capacities, whose interest your Lordship wishes may be attended to, until they are more particularly described, nothing definitive can be settled.

I have to add, that I expect the sick and wounded will be supplied with their own hospital stores, and be attended by British surgeons, particularly charged with the care of them.

Your Lordship will be pleased to signify your determination, either to accept or reject the proposals now offered, in the course of two hours from the delivery of this letter, that Commissioners may be appointed to digest the articles of capitulation, or a renewal of hostilities may take place.

I have the honour to be, &c.

G. WASHINGTON.

Inclosed in No. XVI.

*Copy of Earl Cornwallis's Letter to General Washington, dated York in Virginia, 18th October, 1781.*

S I R,

I A G R E E to open a treaty of capitulation upon the basis of the garrisons of York and Gloucester, including

cluding seamen, being prisoners of war, without annexing the condition of their being sent to Europe; but I expect to receive a compensation in the articles of capitulation for the surrender of Gloucester in its present state of defence.

I shall, in particular, desire, that the Bonetta sloop of war may be left entirely at my disposal, from the hour that the capitulation is signed, to receive an Aid-de-camp to carry my dispatches to Sir Henry Clinton. Such soldiers as I may think proper to send as passengers in her, to be manned with fifty men of her own crew, and to be permitted to sail without examination, when my dispatches are ready: engaging, on my part, that the ship shall be brought back and delivered to you, if she escapes the dangers of the sea, that the crew and soldiers shall be accounted for in future exchanges, that she shall carry off no officer without your consent, nor public property of any kind; and I shall likewise desire, that the traders and inhabitants may preserve their property, and that no person may be punished or molested for having joined the British troops.

If you choose to proceed to negotiation on these grounds, I shall appoint two field officers of my army to meet two officers from you, at any time and place that you think proper, to digest the articles of capitulation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

Inclosed

Inclosed in No. XVI.

C O P Y

OF THE

## ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION,

SETTLED between his Excellency General Washington, Commander in Chief of the combined forces of America and France—his Excellency the Count de Rochambeau, Lieutenant General of the armies of the King of France, Great Cross of the royal and military order of St. Louis, commanding the auxiliary troops of his Most Christian Majesty in America; and his Excellency the Count de Grasse, Lieutenant-general of the naval armies of his Most Christian Majesty, Commander of the order of St. Louis, Commander in Chief of the naval army of France in the Chesapeake, on the one part; and the Right Honourable Earl Cornwallis, Lieutenant-general of his Britannic Majesty's forces, commanding the garrisons of York and Gloucester; and Thomas Symonds, Esq. commanding his Britannic Majesty's naval forces in York river, in Virginia, on the other part.

## ARTICLE I.

The garrisons of York and Gloucester, including the officers and seamen of his Britannic Majesty's ships, as well as other mariners, to surrender themselves prisoners of war to the combined forces of America and France. The land troops to remain prisoners to the United States—the navy to the naval army of his Most Christian Majesty.

Granted.

## ARTICLE

A R T I C L E II.

The artillery, arms, accoutrements, military chest, and public stores of every denomination, shall be delivered unimpaired to the heads of departments appointed to receive them.

Granted.

A R T I C L E III.

At twelve o'clock this day the two redoubts on the left flank of York to be delivered, the one to a detachment of American infantry, the other to a detachment of French grenadiers.

Granted.

The garrison of York will march out to a place to be appointed in front of the posts, at two o'clock precisely, with shouldered arms, colours cased, and drums beating a British or German march. They are then to ground their arms, and return to their encampments, where they will remain until they are dispatched to the places of their destination. Two works on the Gloucester side will be delivered at one o'clock to a detachment of French and American troops appointed to possess them. The garrison will march out at three o'clock in the afternoon; the cavalry with their swords drawn, trumpets sounding, and the infantry in the manner prescribed for the garrison of York. They are likewise to return to their encampments until they can be finally marched off.

A R T I C L E

## ARTICLE IV.

Officers are to retain their side-arms. Both officers and soldiers to keep their private property of every kind; and no part of their baggage or papers to be at any time subject to search or inspection. The baggage and papers of officers and soldiers taken during the siege to be likewise preserved for them.

Granted.

It is understood that any property obviously belonging to the inhabitants of these States in the possession of the garrison, shall be subject to be reclaimed.

## ARTICLE V.

The soldiers to be kept in Virginia, Maryland, or Pennsylvania, and as much by regiments as possible, and supplied with the same rations of provisions as are allowed to soldiers in the service of America. A field officer from each nation, to wit, British, Anspach, and Hessian, and other officers on parole, in the proportion of one to fifty men, to be allowed to reside near their respective regiments, to visit them frequently, and be witnesses of their treatment, and that their officers may receive and deliver cloathing and other necessaries for them, for which passports are to be granted when applied for.

Granted.

## ARTICLE

A R T I C L E VI.

The General, Staff, and other officers not employed, as mentioned in the above articles, and who choose it, to be permitted to go on parole to Europe, to New-York, or to any other American maritime ports at present in the possession of the British forces, at their own option, and proper vessels to be granted by the Count de Grasse to carry them under flags of truce to New-York within ten days from this date, if possible, and they to reside in a district to be agreed upon hereafter, until they embark.

The officers of the civil department of the army and navy to be included in this article. Passports to go by land to be granted to those to whom vessels cannot be furnished.

Granted.

A R T I C L E VII.

Officers to be allowed to keep foldiers as servants, according to the common practice of the service. Servants not foldiers are not to be considered as prisoners, and are to be allowed to attend their masters.

Granted.

A R T I C L E VIII.

The Bonetta sloop of war to be equipped, and navigated by its present Captain and crew, and left entirely

entirely at the disposal of Lord Cornwallis from the hour that the capitulation is signed, to receive an Aid de Camp to carry dispatches to Sir Henry Clinton; and such soldiers as he may think proper to send to New-York, to be permitted to sail without examination. When his dispatches are ready, his Lordship engages on his part that the ship shall be delivered to the order of the Count de Grasse, if she escapes the dangers of the sea. That she shall not carry off any public stores. Any part of the crew that may be deficient on her return, and the soldiers passengers, to be accounted for on her delivery.

#### A R T I C L E IX.

The traders are to preserve their property, and to be allowed three months to dispose of or remove them; and those traders are not to be considered as prisoners of war.

The traders will be allowed to dispose of their effects, the allied army having the right of pre-emption. The traders to be considered as prisoners of war upon parole.

#### A R T I C L E X.

Natives or inhabitants of different parts of this country at present in York or Gloucester, are not to be punished on account of having joined the British army.

This



This article cannot be assented to, being altogether of civil resort.

A R T I C L E   X I.

Proper hospitals to be furnished for the sick and wounded. They are to be attended by their own surgeons on parole; and they are to be furnished with medicines and stores from the American hospitals.

The hospital stores now in York and Gloucester shall be delivered for the use of the British sick and wounded. Passports will be granted for procuring them further supplies from New-York, as occasion may require; and proper hospitals will be furnished for the reception of the sick and wounded of the two garrisons.

A R T I C L E   X I I.

Waggons to be furnished to carry the baggage of the officers attending the soldiers, and to surgeons when travelling on account of the sick, attending the hospitals at public expence.

They are to be furnished if possible.

A R T I C L E   X I I I.

The shipping and boats in the two harbours, with all their stores, guns, tackling and apparel, shall be delivered up in their present state to an officer of the

EE

navy

navy appointed to take possession of them, previously unloading the private property, part of which had been on board for security during the siege.

Granted.

ARTICLE XIV.

No article of capitulation to be infringed on pretence of reprisals; and if there be any doubtful expressions in it, they are to be interpreted according to the common meaning and acceptation of the words.

Granted.

Done at York-town, in Virginia, October 19,  
1781.

CORNWALLIS.

THO<sup>s</sup>. SYMONDS.

Done in the trenches before York-town, in Virginia, October 19, 1781.

G. WASHINGTON.

Le Comte de ROCHAMBEAU.

Le Comte de BARRAS,

En mon nom & celui du

Comte de GRASSE.

N U M-

N U M B E R   XVII.

*Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New-York,  
November 30th, 1781.*

MY LORD,

AFTER the converfation I had with your Lordship (before I fent your letter to be publifhed) in which we feemed fo perfectly to agree, I muft beg your Lordship's pardon for again troubling you on the fubject; but being informed, perhaps officioufly, that fome people here fuppofe there are paffages in that letter which convey an idea, that you had been compelled by my orders to take the poft of York, though it was not your own preference; that you had reprefented the defects of the ground, and were detained there contrary to your own judgement; and likewise that I had promifed the exertions of the navy before my letter of the 24th of September: I am perfuaded your Lordship will readily excufe my requesting a more formal avowal of your fentiments, left I fhould have then miftaken them; becaufe if that fhould unfortunately be the cafe, I may perhaps be under the neceffity of taking meafures to obviate your letter being viewed in the fame light in England.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

N U M-

## N U M B E R XVIII.

*Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. dated  
New-York, 2d December, 1781.*

S I R,

YESTERDAY afternoon I was honoured with your Excellency's letter dated the 30th November.

I do not recollect that any conversation passed between us the other day, before the publication of my letter, relative to my reasons for taking possession of the posts of York and Gloucester; but in my answer to your dispatches, dated the 8th and 11th July, directing me so positively to possess a harbour in the Chesapeake for line of battle ships, your Excellency will see, that after finding that works on Point Comfort could not protect a naval force in Hampton Road, I thought that I acted in strict obedience to your orders by taking possession of these posts. I thought it unnecessary to enter into a minute detail of the disadvantages of the ground, either on my first examination of it in the month of June, or on my return to it in August; because on the first occasion, as I have already had the honour of explaining to your Excellency, I did not, after seeing it, entertain, for a moment, an idea of occupying it, not thinking myself at liberty, by the instructions under which I then acted, to detain the greatest part of the force in Virginia for the purpose of securing a harbour for ships

ships of the line; and on my return to it in August I thought it then became my duty to make the best of it I could, having no other harbour to propose in its place.

In regard to the promise of the exertions of the navy previous to your letter of the 24th of September, I can only repeat what I had the honour of saying to your Excellency in the conversation to which you allude, that without any particular engagements for the navy before that date, all your letters held out uniformly hopes of relief, and that I had no reason from any of them to suppose that you had lost sight of the possibility of effecting it; and that under these hopes, after serious reflection, I did not think that it would have been justifiable in me to abandon these posts with our numerous sick, artillery, stores, and shipping; or to risk an action which, in all probability, would, in its consequences, have precipitated the loss of them.

My letter from York, dated the 20th of October, was written under great agitation of mind, and in great hurry, being constantly interrupted by numbers of people coming upon business or ceremony; but my intention in writing that letter was to explain the motives that influenced my own conduct, and to narrate the incidents that preceded the extremity that forced us to surrender.

I have the honour to be, &c.

CORNWALLIS.

N U M-

## N U M B E R   XIX.

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated  
New-York, December 2, 1781.*

MY LORD,

AS your Lordship is pleased, in your letter of this day, to revert to the circumstance of your quitting the Williamsburg-neck, and re-passing the James-river, so contrary to the intentions I wished to express in my letters of the 11th and 15th June, and those referred to by them, and which I thought they would have clearly explained, your Lordship will, I hope, have the goodness to forgive me, if I once more repeat, that I am of opinion, if those letters had been properly understood by your Lordship, you would at least have hesitated before you adopted that measure. For I humbly presume, that it will appear upon a re-perusal of them, that it was my desire to recommend to your Lordship the taking a healthy defensive station, either at Williamsburg or York: and, after keeping what troops you might want for the ample defence of such a post, and desultory movements by water, to send me such a proportion of the corps (mentioned in a list) as you could spare, taking them in the succession they are there placed in.—Your Lordship, on the contrary, understood these  
as

as conveying a positive order to send me three thousand men, (by which, you say, your force would have been reduced to about two thousand four hundred rank and file fit for duty, having, it is presumed, above one thousand five hundred sick) and was pleased to tell me in your answer, that you could not, consistent with my plans, make safe defensive posts at York and Gloucester, both of which would be necessary for the protection of shipping, and that you should immediately re-pass James-river, and take measures for complying with my requisition.

I own, my Lord, that my opinion of the obvious meaning of the letters referred to continues still the same; and I am sorry to find, by the letter you have now honoured me with, that it differs so widely from your Lordship's. It is plain, however, we cannot both be in the right.

My letter of the 11th of July directs your Lordship to fortify Old Point Comfort in the mouth of James river, with the intention of securing Hampton road, which the Admiral recommended as the best naval station, and requested I would occupy. But your Lordship's letter of the 27th informs me you had examined Old Point Comfort with the officers of the navy and the engineers, and that you were all of opinion a post there would not answer the purpose, and that you should, in compliance with the spirit of my orders, seize York and Gloucester, being the only harbour in which you could hope to be able

to



to give effectual protection to line of battle ships. Supposing, therefore, of course, that your Lordship approved in every respect of York and Gloucester, from the preference you had thus given them to the post I had recommended, I did not oppose the choice you had made, having never received the least hint from your Lordship that the ground of York was unfavourable, or liable to be enfiladed till after you had capitulated.

With respect to your Lordship's having been influenced in your conduct by the hopes of relief, (which you say was uniformly held out to you in all my letters) your Lordship cannot be insensible, that the possibility of effecting it must have entirely depended upon the exertions of the navy; which, as I was not authorised to promise before the 24th of September, I am persuaded your Lordship will readily acknowledge, that if your letter of the 20th of October implies I had done so before that period, the implication cannot be supported by any thing I wrote previous to my letter of that date, which you received on the 29th.

As, therefore, my letters of the 2d and 6th of September, which promise only my own exertions, did not reach your Lordship before the 13th and 14th of that month, and you did not before then know of Sir Samuel Hood's arrival, or of Mr. Graves having more than seven sail of the line to combat Monsieur de Graffe's force, which on the  
29th

29th of August you had heard consisted of at least twenty-five sail of the line; your Lordship, consequently, could have no hopes of relief before that time; and, with respect to your escape to New-York immediately on the arrival of General Washington's troops at Williamsburg, which your letter of the 20th of October implies you were prevented from undertaking by the receipt of mine of the 24th of September, I must beg leave to observe, that if it had been ever practicable after the time your Lordship mentions (which I am free to own I do not think it was) it must have been between that period and the time of the enemy's force appearing before your lines. It may, therefore, be presumed you could not have been prevented by any thing I said in that letter, as you did not receive it until after the latter event took place. But I readily admit, my Lord, that none of my letters could give you the least reason to suppose that an attempt would not be made to succour you.

Your Lordship will, I am persuaded, also forgive me, if I again take notice of the too positive manner in which you are pleased to speak of the opinion I gave you about the failing of the fleet, as my words were "There is every reason to hope we shall start "from hence about the 5th of October." — And, in my letter of the next day, for fear that should appear too positive, I say, "it is supposed the necessary "repairs of the fleet will detain us here to the 5th of

“next month; — but your Lordship must be sensible,  
“that unforeseen accidents may lengthen it out a day  
“or two longer.”

With regard to entrenching tools, the want of which your Lordship complains so much of, I can only say, that by the returns made to me by the Adjutant-general, it appears that two thousand five hundred had been sent to the Chesapeake by the engineer since General Arnold's expedition inclusive; and that the first moment a requisition was made for more, (which was not before the 23d of August) I ordered an additional supply to be sent, which were prevented from going by the arrival of the French fleet. I own, however, that I was not at that time very uneasy on this score, as I supposed it possible for your Lordship to have collected a sufficiency from the neighbouring plantations any time before the investiture was began.

December 10. I had wrote thus far, my Lord, immediately after the receipt of your Lordship's letter of this date; but, considering that it was possible you might not have adverted to the implications which your letter of the 20th of October may be thought to bear, from the great agitation of mind and hurry in which you tell me it was written, I was unwilling to give you at that time more trouble on the subject, — in the honest hope, that your Lordship's candour will induce you most  
formally

formally to disavow your having any such intentions by writing that letter, in case you find, on your arrival in England, that the passages of it which I have taken notice of are understood as I suspect they may be; — and I therefore intended to have sent this letter to a friend to be delivered to you in London. But, upon re-considering your letter of the 2d instant, which I have had more leisure to do since my public dispatches were closed, I am of opinion that it is properer your Lordship should receive my answer to it here.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

P. S. Having forgot to speak to the part of your Lordship's letter of the 2d instant, when you say, "I do not recollect that any conversation passed between us the other day, before the publication of my letter relative to my reasons for taking possession of the posts of York and Gloucester," I beg leave to do it here.

It is true, my Lord, no conversation passed from your Lordship on that subject. But when, in the conversation alluded to, I mentioned that I had directed you to examine Old Point Comfort and  
fortify

fortify it, but that disapproving of that post, you had seized York, — and that, therefore, York was your Lordship's preference; as you were pleased not to make me any answer, I took it for granted you agreed with me.

P A R T

S T A T E of the T R O O P S in V I R G I N I A,  
Under the C O M M A N D of L I E U T E N A N T - G E N E R A L E A R L C O R N W A L L I S.

D A T E s.	R A N K A N D F I L E P R E S E N T, A N D F I T F O R D U T Y.																											
	B R I T I S H.										G E R M A N.				P R O V I N C I A L.		Total of the preceding Corps.	D E T A C H M E N T S N O T I N C L U D E D.								T O T A L.		
	Light Infantry, First Battalion.	Light Infantry, Second Battalion.	Brigade of Guards.	Seventeenth Regiment.	Twenty-third Regiment.	Thirty-third Regiment.	Forty-third Regiment.	Seventy-fifth Regiment, Second Battalion.	Seventy-sixth Regiment.	Eighteenth Regiment.	A n s p a c h.		H e l l i a n.		Queen's Rangers.	British Legion.		Royal Artillery.	German Artillery.	Seventeenth Light Dragoon.	Twenty-third Light Dragoon.	Light Company, 2d British Legion.	Light Company.	Vagers.	North Carolina Volunteers.		Guides and Pioneers.	Total of the Detachments.
											De Volt.	De Seybothen.	Prince Hereditary.	Regiment de Basse.														
June 1, 1781.	465	417	338	180	165	186	285	164	320	377	435	427	383	205	317	173	4837	220	50	25	--	36	57	33	54	475	5312	
July 1, 1781.	472	404	337	174	165	186	280	161	312	356	418	400	405	204	315	173	4762	233	50	25	--	36	57	33	54	488	5250	
August 1, 1781.	446	351	331	142	166	188	292	167	477	448	436	419	386	272	347	183	5051	217	50	22	--	32	76	78	54	529	5580	
Sept. 1, 1781.	447	334	354	124	147	163	192	162	446	460	404	394	384	250	307	168	4736	218	50	21	51	36	73	79	52	580	5316	
Octob. 1, 1781.	429	326	365	128	133	162	185	160	313	455	385	369	337	230	282	168	4417	218	49	21	45	35	71	79	52	570	4987	

# N U M B E R    X X I .

## S T A T E of the A R M Y in V I R G I N I A ,

Under the C O M M A N D of L I E U T E N A N T - G E N E R A L E A R L C O R N W A L L I S .  
O C T O B E R the 18th, 1781.

### R A N K A N D F I L E P R E S E N T , A N D F I T F O R D U T Y .

GARRISON OF YORK.														GARRISON OF GLOUCESTER.							T O T A L .
Royal Artillery.	Guards.	Light Infantry.	Seventeenth Regiment.	Twenty-third Regiment.	Thirty-third Regiment.	Forty-third Regiment.	Seventy-fifth Regiment.	Seventy-sixth Regiment.	Eightieth Regiment.	Two Battalions of Amherst.	Prince Hereditary.	Regiment de Bole.	Total of the Garrison of York.	Detachment of the 80th Regiment.	Queen's Rangers.	British Legion, &c.	Volunteers.	23d and 82d Light Companies.	North Carolina Volunteers.	Total of the Garrison of Gloucester.	
12	323	5	4	67	141	94	163	42	171	718	232	159	3273	84	268	208	42	44	98	744	

RANK and FILE  
Fit for Duty.

### R A N K A N D F I L E . — S I C K A N D W O U N D E D P R E S E N T .

40	16	209	114	97	17	168	65	134	269	191	135	115	1741	---	119	24	5		18	192	1933	RANK and FILE Sick and Wounded.	
16	490	786	388	164	178	262	228	561	440	909	367	274	4014	84	387	232	47	70	116	936	5950	T O T A L Of RANK and FILE.	



C O R R E S P O N D E N C E

B E T W E E N

Gen. Sir HENRY CLINTON, K. B.

C O M M A N D E R I N C H I E F,

A N D

Lieut. Gen. Earl CORNWALLIS.

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P A R T VI.

LETTERS FROM SIR HENRY CLINTON, K. B.  
TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

DELIVERED AT NEW-YORK A MONTH AFTER EARL  
CORNWALLIS'S SURRENDER.

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N U M B E R I.

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated  
New York, August 2d, 1781.*

[Received from the Secretary at New York, Nov. 19, 1781.]

M Y L O R D,

I WAS last night honoured with your Lordship's  
letters of the 24th and 27th ultimo, by Captain  
Stapleton; and it gives me no small concern to ob-  
serve by the tenor of them, that you are displeased  
with the opinions I took the liberty of giving in my  
letter

letter of the 29th May, respecting the probable consequences of your retreat from Cross Creek to Wilmington, and march from thence to Petersburg; and with what I said to your Lordship in my letters of the 8th and 11th of last month, on your design of abandoning the Williamsburg Neck, and retiring with your army to Portsmouth. Therefore, as it was not my intention to give offence, and is extremely my wish to be properly understood by your Lordship, I request your attention for a few moments to the following elucidation of my sentiments on both those subjects.

The high opinion I entertained of your Lordship's military talents, and the respect I had for your situation as second to myself, induced me, from the moment you took charge of a separate command, to leave you at full liberty to act in it as you judged best for the King's service. And I am persuaded your Lordship is not insensible that I constantly pursued this line of conduct towards you during all your operations in the Carolinas; aiming at no other merit than that of diligently attending to your wants and supplying them; — whilst I was content to remain here myself, upon the very confined defensive, to which I was reduced, by the large detachments I had sent to the southward in support of your progress.

Although your Lordship was, as you have observed subjected by this means to a certain degree of anxiety

anxiety and responsibility; it does not appear that I was exonerated of my share of them. I could not, therefore, but be personally and anxiously interested in your successes and disappointments. And, though I have a respect for your Lordship's judgment, and am apt to doubt my own when it differs from it; yet it is certainly a duty I owe to my station as Commander in Chief, to express my dissent from any measure your Lordship adopts, when I apprehend that the consequences may be prejudicial. This, my Lord, being the case with respect to the move taken notice of in my letter of the 29th May (and I most sincerely wish experience had convinced me I was mistaken) I immediately communicated to your Lordship my sentiments of the event, and how I thought it might have been obviated. In these it seems I am not so fortunate to have your concurrence. But I must confess they are not the least altered by your Lordship's arguments; being still of opinion, that, under the circumstances in which you describe your troops to be, you could have fallen back from Crosscreek to the Pedee, with much greater ease and safety, than you could have marched double the distance to Wilmington, through a country which you report to be entirely hostile: and I should suppose Lord Rawdon might have moved to the Pedee without interruption to join you, with every refreshment your army wanted; as there does not appear, to have been at that time, an enemy between

tween that river and Camden; and before you reached the Pedee, the country would probably have been so opened, that your orders for that purpose might have got to his Lordship with as much expedition and safety, as your note did from Guildford after the battle.

And with respect to your Lordship's subsequent move, I hope you will pardon me if I continue to dissent from the policy of the measure, tho' you happily surmounted the danger of it; as I fear the advantages resulting from your junction with the Chesapeake army will not compensate the losses which immediately followed your quitting Carolina, — notwithstanding General Greene's wishes to the contrary; which, I apprehend, meant nothing more than a gasconade, to boast the success he expected from a second action with your Lordship's army, in case it had directed its steps towards him instead of Virginia.

I hope your Lordship will likewise excuse me for expressing the uneasiness I feel at the observation you make respecting my opinion of the Virginia force; because it seems to convey an insinuation, which I am not conscious of deserving. And I trust, that as I know myself to be incapable of wresting opinions to serve particular purposes, it will appear, that what I have said at different periods, on that or any other subject, has been perfectly consonant and candidly what I thought. I beg leave, therefore, to contrast with each other what I have said, in this and my other letters, on the force of Virginia; and I request  
your

your Lordship will be pleased to point out the impropriety which gave rise to that observation.

In the letter your Lordship quotes, I say, "I should not have thought even the one under Major-general Phillips in safety, at Petersburg, at least for so long a time." In the one of June 8th, "Your Lordship will see by La Fayette's letter, that you have little more opposed to you than his corps, and an unarmed militia." And in that of June 11th, "where, as appears by the intercepted letters of Washington and La Fayette, they are in no situation to stand against even a division of that army. And your Lordship may possibly have opposed to you from 1500 to 2000 Continentals, and (as La Fayette observes) a small body of ill armed peasantry, full as spiritless as the militia of the Southern Provinces, and without any service." At the period alluded to in the first letter, General Phillips was at Petersburg with only 2000 men, uncovered by works. Fayette was opposed to him with his own corps, Steuben, Muhlenberg, &c. and all the militia of the province, and expected to be soon joined by Wayne with the Pennsylvania line. I therefore certainly had cause to be apprehensive for General Phillips's corps, in case Greene had, on hearing of your Lordship's move from Wilmington, fallen back, and calling La Fayette to him, placed himself with their united force between your Lordship's and the Petersburg army, ready to strike at either, as it suited his purpose. But when

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the other letters were written, my opinion of the Virginia force was formed from the Rebel letters just intercepted, which fully described the state of their arms and their numbers. I therefore cannot discover, that they shew I thought at different periods more or less favourably of it, but as I was warranted to do by matter of fact, and the intelligence I received.

To give a full and satisfactory answer to your Lordship's letter of the 27th July, will perhaps take up more time than you or I can well spare. But, as your Lordship appears to be greatly affected by the contents of my letters of the 8th and 11th ultimo, I think it a duty I owe to your feelings and my own, to say something in explanation of them. I must therefore beg your Lordship's patience, while I state the substance of my correspondence with General Phillips and yourself, concerning the stations to be held, and operations to be carried on in Chesapeake, &c. which, I presume, will at least prove, that I spared no pains to explain my desires to your Lordship, though I have, perhaps, unhappily failed in making them understood.

My instructions to General Phillips, as quoted by your Lordship, gave him a power to take possession of York Town, or Old Point Comfort, as a station for large ships, if the Admiral should disapprove of Portsmouth, and require one. In my letters to that General Officer, of 24th of March and 11th of April, I desired his opinion respecting the post of Portsmouth,

mouth, and such others as he proposed to establish on James River; with their importance considered, either as assisting your Lordship's operations, or connected with those of the navy: and, after having received that opinion, I told him, "that Portsmouth was by no means my choice;" and left him at liberty to change it if he saw proper. And the substance of the conversations with him, as extracted by your Lordship, go more fully into the advantage of a naval station, pointing particularly to the one at York — being led to the consideration of its utility by the French having, two winters ago, sheltered their ships under works thrown up there. And, as I have already mentioned to your Lordship, General Arnold has since told me, that from the description given him of it by Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, he judged 2000 men would be ample for its defence.

From hence, my Lord, I presume it will appear, that I very early entertained thoughts of a station in Chesapeake for large ships; and I referred your Lordship, in my letter of the 29th May, to my correspondence, &c. with General Phillips, in your possession, for my ideas on that and other operations which I had in view — leaving you at liberty, however, to follow them or your own, as you judged best for the King's service. Having therefore, afterwards seen by your Lordship's dispatches of the 26th of May, that you had considered the papers referred to; and that, though you did not think it expedient  
to



to attend to Mr. Alexander's proposal, and the expedition against the stores at Philadelphia, you had the same objections to Portsmouth which had been before stated, and was inclined to think well of York as a proper harbour and place of arms; I naturally concluded that your Lordship had entirely concurred with me, not only as to the propriety of laying hold of a naval station somewhere on the Williamsburg Neck, but as to the place. And I of course supposed, that your Lordship would set about establishing yourself there immediately on your return from Richmond, which I expected would be in three or four days after the date of your letter. Wherefore, imagining you were considerably advanced in your works (for I had no letter afterwards from your Lordship until the one you honoured me with of the 30th June) I ventured to solicit you for a part of your force to assist me in the operations I proposed carrying on in this quarter during the summer months — when those of the Chesapeake must have probably ceased. And in doing this, as I was totally in the dark with respect to what was then doing in the Chesapeake, I endeavoured, as much as lay in my power, to avoid all possibility of interrupting the moves you might be engaged in, or any object you might have in view — as will, I doubt not, be manifest from the following extracts from my letters to your Lordship, which I beg leave to submit once more to your consideration.

May

May 29th. — “I would rather content myself with ever so bare a defensive (until there was an appearance of serious operation against me) than cramp yours in the least.”

June 8th. — “You will see by Fayette’s letter, you have little more opposed to you, &c. — Your Lordship can therefore certainly spare 2000, and the sooner they come the better, &c. Had it been possible for your Lordship to have let me know your views and intentions, I should not now be at a loss to judge of the force you might want for your operations. Ignorant, therefore, as I am of them, I can only trust, that as your Lordship will see by the inclosed intercepted letters, my call for a reinforcement is not a wanton one; you will send me what you can spare as soon as may be expedient. For, should your Lordship be engaged in a move of such importance as to require the employment of your whole force, I would by no means wish to starve or obstruct it. But in that case, would rather endeavour to wait a little longer, until my occasions grow more urgent, or your situation admits of your detaching. Of which, however, I request to be informed with all possible dispatch.”

N. B. This letter was written immediately after I had known the enemy’s designs of attacking this place; and should therefore be considered as thoroughly descriptive of the nature of my wishes for a reinforcement.

June

June 11th. — “I shall of course approve of any alterations your Lordship may think proper to make with respect to the stations I proposed taking in York or James Rivers, &c.” — “Thus circumstanced, I am persuaded your Lordship will be of opinion, that the sooner I concentrate my force, the better. Therefore, (unless your Lordship, after the receipt of my letters of the 29th May and 8th inst. should incline to agree with me in opinion, and judge it right to adopt my ideas respecting the move to Baltimore, or the Delaware Neck;) I beg leave to recommend it to you, as soon as you have finished the active operations you may be now engaged in, to take a defensive station in any healthy situation you chuse (be it at Williamsburg or York Town:) and I would wish in that case,” (that is, after you have secured such a station) “that after reserving to yourself such troops as you judge necessary for an ample defensive, and desultory movements by water, &c. the following corps may be sent me, in succession as you can spare them.

June 15th. “I delay not a moment to dispatch a runner with a duplicate of my letter of the 11th instant; and as I am led to suppose from your Lordship’s letter of the 26th ultimo, that you may not think it expedient to adopt the operations I had recommended in the Upper Chesapeake, and will by this time probably have finished those you were engaged in,” (in which surely the securing defensive  
stations

stations is obviously implied) "I request you will immediately embark a part of the troops stated in the letter inclosed, (beginning with the Light Infantry) and send them to me with the greatest dispatch. I shall likewise in proper time solicit the Admiral to send some more transports to the Chesapeake; in which your Lordship will please to send hither the remaining troops you judge can be spared from the defence of the posts you may occupy; as I do not think it adviseable to leave more troops in that unhealthy climate at this season of the year, than what are absolutely wanted for a defensive and desultory water excursion."

June 19. "I am, however, persuaded they will attempt the investiture of the place; I therefore heartily wish I was more in force, that I might be able to take advantage of any false movements they may make in forming it." Should your Lordship have any solid operations to propose, or have approved of the one mentioned in my former letters, I shall not, as I have already told you, press you for the corps I wished to have sent me, at least for the present. But if in the approaching inclement season, your Lordship should not think it prudent to undertake operation with the troops you have, &c. I cannot but wish, for their sake, if I had no other motive, that you would send me as soon as possible what you can spare from a respectable defensive. And that your Lordship may better judge what I mean by a respectable

respectable defensive, it is necessary to inform you, that other intelligence (besides Monsieur Barras' letter) makes it highly probable that Monsieur De Graffe will visit this coast in the hurricane season, and bring with him troops as well as ships. But when he hears your Lordship has taken possession of York-river before him, &c. (which in other words certainly means your defensive is required to be more particularly respectable, as De Graffe is expected to come soon with a considerable armament to the Chesapeake, where he will probably seize a station for his large ships in York-river: but as it appears to be your Lordship's intention to take possession of that post, I think he will, upon hearing you have done so, relinquish the design, and join the force assembling against this place.) "In the hope that your Lordship will be able to spare me three thousand men, I have sent two thousand tons of transports, &c." But should your Lordship not be able to spare the whole, &c."

These letters, my Lord, are each a link of the same chain, and, collectively or separately, were intended to speak the same language. The simple and obvious meaning of which I humbly presume to be this.

I find your Lordship does not think it expedient to undertake the operations I proposed, and you have none of your own in contemplation; and it being probable you have made your arrangements for  
changing

changing the post of Portsmouth, which you dislike, and have finished your defensive on the Williamsburg Neck, which we both approve of; I request that, of the seven thousand men, which (as far as I can judge without having lately received any returns) you have, you will reserve as many as you want for the most ample defensive, and defultory water expeditions; and then send me the rest according to the inclosed lists in succession as you can spare them.

It is true, indeed, that several of these letters were not received by your Lordship until some time after you received those of the 11th and 15th, owing to the unexpected tedious voyage of the Charon that carried them (and you must be sensible that it would have been imprudent in me to have risked duplicates of them by the boat, in which Ensign Amiel was dispatched.) But, if your Lordship will be pleased to recur to those you received by him, I am persuaded you will find that the letter of the 11th refers you to those of the 29th of May and 8th of June; which (it is expressly implied) your Lordship was to read, before you executed the order contained in that of the 15th; and you not having received them would (I should suppose) have fully warranted, at least the suspension of your resolution of repassing James-river, until you had stated to me your situation, and heard again from me.

After this very candid and ample explanation, my Lord, I have only to assure you, that it was not my

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intention



intention to pass the lightest censure on your Lordship's conduct, much less an unmerited or severe one. We are both amenable to the censure of a much higher tribunal, should either of us unhappily commit errors that deserve it; nor had I the smallest right to doubt your Lordship's readiness to comply with my desires, if you had understood them. The dispatch with which you prepared to execute what you thought my wish, and the alacrity you afterwards shewed, together with the ample manner in which you equipped the expedition I ordered, convince me you are inclined to do so. I had therefore only to lament, that your Lordship had mistaken my intentions, and to endeavour to obviate the inconvenience as speedily as possible. This perhaps, was done in more positive language than I had been accustomed to use to your Lordship; but I had no other object in view than to make myself clearly understood, which I am happy to find has been the case, and that my messenger was in time to prevent the consequences I apprehended.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

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N U M B E R II.

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated  
New-York, August 27th, 1781.*

[Received from the Secretary at New-York, November  
19th, 1781.]

M Y L O R D,

I had the honour to receive your Lordship's letter in cypher of the 17th instant, by the Swallow dispatch boat, which arrived here the 23d. In answer to which, I must confess that I conceived your letter of the 27th ultimo, gave me reason to suppose it was your intention to send me the troops you could spare, as soon as you finished the evacuation of Portsmouth; and I was impatient for their arrival for the reasons I have already communicated to you, as it is probable they would have been of infinite use had they come in time. For on the arrival of the two thousand five hundred raw German recruits which I mentioned in my last, and in the hope of reinforcement from your Lordship, I had assembled my little army in such a manner as to be able to avail myself of any opportunity which might be given me by the enemy, who had foraged within six miles of my lines on the 17th. This small movement was made on the 18th, they fell back on the 19th, and passed the  
Croton;

Croton; afterwards crossed the Hudson at King's-ferry, and are now encamped in the neighbourhood of Chatham.

I cannot well ascertain Mr. Washington's real intentions by this move of his army; but it is possible he means for the present to suspend his offensive operations against this post, and to take a defensive station at his old post of Morris-town, from whence he may detach to the southward. On this account therefore, and because the season is approaching when operation may recommence in the Chesapeake, I request your Lordship will be pleased to keep with you all the troops you have there, and I shall send you such recruits, convalescents, &c. as can go by this sudden opportunity; which are all that I can at present spare; as this move of the enemy may be only a feint, and they may return to their former position, which they certainly will do, if De Graffe arrives. But towards the latter end of next month, when the effects of the equinox are over, (for I am persuaded the Admiral will not approve of any water movements till then) if this post should not be threatened, I propose to reinforce the Chesapeake army with all the troops which can possibly be spared consistently with the security of this important post.

General Leslie has been here some days, he will himself explain to your Lordship the cause of his coming. I was much concerned to find him in so bad a state of health on his arrival, but it is now much  
altered

altered for the better; he embarks to-morrow to proceed to Chesapeake on his way to Charles-town.

If your Lordship from your knowledge of the state of South-Carolina, should be opinion that any troops may be spared from thence, I beg leave to suggest that the sooner you give orders for their joining you the better.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. C L I N T O N.

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N U M B E R III.

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated  
New-York, August 30th, 1781.*

[Received from the Secretary at New-York, November  
19th, 1781.]

M Y L O R D,

I am this moment honoured with your Lordship's dispatches of the 20th, 22d, and 24th instant, which were delivered to me by Lieutenant-colonel Du Buy; and as my letters of the 2d and 27th, have already spoken very fully to the subject they chiefly treat of, it becomes unnecessary for me at  
present

present to give your Lordship any further trouble thereon.

General Leslie will have the honour to communicate to your Lordship my wishes respecting Carolina, as I have given him such instructions relative to the service in that quarter, as my present limited information enables me to do. However, as I cannot but suppose that the operations in Virginia and Carolina, will still have a considerable connection with each other, and that your Lordship, by applying to the officer commanding the King's ships, will have the same means of communication that I shall; I must request that you will still retain the direction of the southern district, until I can determine upon it, or shall find it expedient to comply with your Lordship's wishes, which I shall not fail to pay the earliest attention to. For your Lordship having hitherto had the entire management of the civil and military transactions in the Carolinas, and being in consequence better qualified than any other person to judge of what may be hereafter proper to be done there, it will be necessary I should receive your opinions upon them, before any change takes place, or I can frame definitive orders for General Leslie's guidance. Your Lordship will be therefore pleased in the mean time to make such additions to the instructions I have now given him as you shall find requisite.

I am

I am concerned to find your Lordship under the necessity of employing so many troops in working on the fortification; having entertained hopes that you were supplied with a sufficient number of Negroes for that and other drudgeries.

Mr. Wier having informed me that the Commissary with your Lordship has received your orders to buy rum for the troops; I have the honour to acquaint you, that as there is a considerable quantity of that article in the stores here, a supply of it will be sent you from hence, which will of course come cheaper than any that may be purchased in Virginia.

I hope your Lordship will find every thing you want sent you by this opportunity, except money, of which only ten thousand pounds can possibly be spared at present. But, a considerable sum being expected by the first fleet from England, I shall on its arrival send your Lordship a further supply.

Sir Samuel Hood arrived here from the Leeward-islands on the 28th, with fourteen sail of the line, three frigates and a fire ship; and has brought with him the fortieth and sixty-ninth regiments to reinforce this army: the latter of which continues to do duty on board the fleet. On the evening of the same day I received undoubted information that Monsieur Barras' fleet sailed from Rhode-island the morning of the 25th, their destination not known. Mr. Washington's force still remains in the neighbourhood of  
Chatham,

Chatham, and I do not hear that he has as yet detached to the southward.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

P. S. September 1st. As your Lordship informs me in your letter of the 22d, that the works you have thought proper to construct at York, will not probably be finished before the expiration of six weeks, I am to suppose you will not think of commencing solid operations before that time. Therefore unless Mr. Washington should send a considerable part of his army to the southward, I shall not judge it necessary until then to detach thither. I should wish, however, in the mean time to be informed from your Lordship what number of troops you think will be required for the defence of your works, what force you will afterwards have to take the field with, and what you will want in addition; supposing that you shall not have a greater force acting against you in Virginia, than what may be expected from the present appearances.

N U M-

N U M B E R   I V .

*Sir Henry Clinton, K. B. to Earl Cornwallis, dated  
New-York, October 14, 1781.*

[Received from the Secretary at New-York, Nov. 29, 1781.]

M Y   L O R D ,

I HAD the honour to receive your Lordship's letter of the 29th ult. on the 8th instant, and that of the 3d on the 12th instant, and am happy to hear that mine of the 24th and 25th have reached you.

At a council of war of the General officers, held on the 10th instant, it was resolved I should submit the three following plans to your Lordship's consideration. They occurred to us as secondary objects only, (in case we should find it absolutely impracticable to go directly up to York; or, by landing at Monday's point, effect a junction with you by the Gloucester side) and be thereby obliged to try James river.

F I R S T ,

To land at Newport News, and the troops to advance from thence on the James river road to some favourable position, in communication with that river, when we are to wait until we hear from your Lordship, or circumstances may make it proper for us to co-operate with you in effecting a junction of



the two armies, which we at present think will be best done without your lines, in preference to an attempt of doing it within, for reasons we think obvious.

S E C O N D.

To attempt a junction with you by a combined move, — we moving up James river to James town, and your Lordship up the York river to either Queen's creek or Cappahosick ferry, and effect the junction as near Williamsburg as we can; thereby putting ourselves in a situation to attack the enemy, should it be thought adviseable.

T H I R D.

To save as great a part of your Lordship's corps as possible, by bringing them off to James town, and a naval force will be ready to protect them. This we think may be done by our giving jealousy to the enemy from Newport News or Mulberry island, whilst your Lordship moving up the river with as many troops as your boats will carry, or marching up the Gloucester side, crosses the river, and lands either at Queen's creek or Cappahosick, and makes the best of your way to James town.

The above is our opinion of what is best to be done in case we do not hear from your Lordship. But, should we receive other ideas from you, we shall of course be governed by them.

By

By this your Lordship will perceive, our wishes are to effect the junction first by York, — next by Gloucester, — and, in case either of these are absolutely impracticable, by the James river. — First landing at Newport News, and taking a position ready to co-operate with your Lordship, in case you should recommend a combined effort to effect a junction that way; or to endeavour to effect it near Williamsburg, the two armies moving up the James and York rivers about the same time, we landing at James town, and your Lordship where you judge best; and when our junction is formed, bring on a general action with the enemy, should that on consultation be thought adviseable. But in case all these should fail, our last object will be to save as many of your Lordship's troops as we can, and leave the post at York afterwards to make the best terms they can for themselves.

The Torbay and Prince William having arrived on the 11th, our fleet at present consists of twenty-five sail of the line and two fifties, with a large number of frigates. They are now ready, and I expect we shall certainly sail in a day or two.

P. S. Oct. 15. — Had the wind been fair to-day, the fleet would have fallen down to the Hook, but I expect the whole will sail to-morrow.

P. S. By

P. S. By the duplicate, London, at the Hook, Oct. 18. — The fleet is assembled, the troops embarked on board, and the whole will go to sea, if the wind continues fair, to-morrow morning, as the tide will not suit before. The Admiral and I intreat that we may receive all possible information from you and the Commodore, of your situation, and the exact position of the enemy's fleet, to meet us off cape Charles.

I was honoured with your Lordship's letter of the 11th on the 16th instant.

I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

Original, forwarded by Captain Stapleton on the 15th. Duplicate by the Resolution whale-boat, Robertfon.

T H E   E N D.











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